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Section I:
Introduction

INTRODUCTION

He (Christ) was the greatest revolutionary,
because being God he identified with the poor
and he came down from heaven to become a
member of the lower class, and he gave life to
us all (anonymous young, Nicaraguan CEB
participator in Solentiname).

This paper investigates liberation theology's impact
upon the societies of Brazil and Colombia.

It will emphasize the

theology's role in affecting social change.

Social change is far

from a two-dimensional, simplistic process.

Rather, it entails

various levels of depth and intricacy and often manifests itself
in more subtle ways than just military coups or communist
revolutions. Societal change involves individual, personal
transformation as well as broad, structural modifications.
Patricia Hill Collins (1990:111) speaks of social change being
able to occur even within the most microcosmic spheres, such as "in
the private, personal space of an individual woman's
consciousness." This paper analyzes the impact of liberation
theology on the many societal levels in Brazilian and Colombian.
Before turning to this task, however, it is, first,
necessary to understand the historical events and processes that
were occurring before and during the emergence of liberation
theology in Latin America.

The social, political and economic

processes going on within Latin America in the 1950's through the
1980 1 s are crucial in the understanding of how and why liberation
theology emerged and grew as a popular ideology.

Equally

important in this investigation is a consideration of the
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theological currents which circulated within the Catholic Church
during this time period.

Since liberation theology is a product

of Twentieth Century Catholicism; political, theological and
social positions of members of the clergy and hierarchy have
directly affected its influence in secular society.

Finally, one

must understand the origins and principles of liberation
theology, itself, before analyzing its long-term effects on
society.

Thus, I shall devote the following section of this

paper to an overview of the afore-mentioned historical processes
within Latin America in order to better contextualize the
analysis which 'follows.

overview of the Historical Processes within Latin
America which Gave Rise to Liberation Theology

Traditionally, the Catholic Church in Latin America has been
closely aligned with the dominant, upper classes and the State.
This linkage can be traced as far back as the Spanish
colonization, when the clergy was made up of imported Europeans
and members of the upper-most portions of the social pyramid.
In the period shortly after World War II the catholic Church in
Latin America "seemed an antiquated ornament of a social order
that was passing away" (Mainwaring and Wilde, 1989:1).

It was

allied to conservative elites "opposed to change in the
established order of things" (Levine and Mainwaring, 1989:203).
The 1950's and 1960 1 s were marked by the coming to power of
populist governments in several Latin American na'tions
(especially Brazil, Mexico and Argentina) (Boff and Boff, 1987:
2

66).

These governments implemented policies of what became known

as developmentalism or "desarrollismo" (Gutierrez, 1973: 82).
The goal of these policies was to achieve self-sustained economic
development by eliminating foreign-oriented growth, thereby,
freeing the Latin American nations from being exclusively
dependent upon foreign trade.

Thus, the governments issued

policies of import substitution, expansion of the internal market
and full-scale industrialization in hopes of gaining economic
independence from the more "developed" countries of the world
(Gutierrez, 1973:82).
Developmentalism, however, did not achieve the expected
results.

Instead of creating economic independence and raising

the standard of living within the "developing" nations, policies
of "desarrollismo" tended to benefit only the upper and middle
classes, while it "threw huge sectors of the peasantry into
deeper rural marginalization or sprawling urban shantytown" (Boff
and Boff, 1987:66-67).

On a global scale the gap between

"developed" and "underdeveloped" continued to widen As the
developed nations wealth steadily increased, the developing
nations (comprising two-thirds of the world's population)
remained in poverty with much of their people living on the
subsistence level (Gutierrez, 1973:83).
Another effect of the implementation of developmentalism was
the Catholic Church's loss of influence in both the political and
social sphere of Latin American society.

Urbanization caused

mass migration to the cities and destroyed the christian
communities of the countryside (Segundo, 1982:128).
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With

urbanization also came new influences in people's lives.

Access

to the outside media and exposure to new and different ideologies
and life styles also contributed to a growing secularization of
society under the populist governments.
A shortage of clergy and ineffectual ecclesiastical
structures further alienated the "people" from the Church's
institutions (Mainwaring and Wilde, 1989:11).

Often priests

visited rural areas only once or twice a year to perform
marriages and baptisms.

r

The large parish structures and huge

dioceses of the Latin American church allowed for little
individualized ministry of parishioners.

As the alienated poor

sectors grew more and more marginalized and deprived, and society
became increasingly secularized; it became apparent that the
present structures of the Church were out of step with the Latin
American context.
Developmentalism and the poverty it brought in its wake also
brought about the creation of strong popular movements who sought
changes in the socio-economic structures of their countries (Boff
and Boff, 1987:67).

The Cuban Revolution of 1959 showed other

Latin American governments and clergy members just how powerful
these popular movements could be.

Cuba's revolution and Fidel

Castro's assumption of power in 1962 had long-ranging effects in
Latin America.
America.

Guerrilla movements appeared throughout Latin

The success of the Marxist movement redefined

revolutionary possibilities in Latin America (Wickham-Crowley,
1989:139).

Labor unions and other reform movements radicalized

politically and many adopted Marxist orientations (Richard,
1978:114).

Revolutionary currents swept Latin America in the
4

form of mass political-intellectual movements.
In response to these revolutionary movements, military
regimes took over various Latin American countries in the
interest of "national security."

These regimes claimed that the

former governments were unable to control these Marxist movements
or repel the "communist threat" that they represented.

At first

the Church supported these regimes' effort to rid the nation of
atheist Marxist ideologies.

As the regime's military repression

became more and more brutal, however, lay Christians and clergy
members began to question the State's connection with this
inhumane enterprise.

In the face of the military repression of

the populist movements, many clergy radicalized and even joined
revolutionary movements.

The torture and oppression

of

christians and clergy members caused the Church to denounce the
military regimes and to break its association with the State.
In this manner a new, progressive Latin American Church emerged
with a renewed commitment to the poor and oppressed.

The Roots of Liberation Theo1ogy within the catho1ic Church
Vatican I I

Progressive currents in the Latin American Church stemmed,
partly, from a shift to progressivism in Rome. In 1962 the
revolutionary Pope John XXIII called the Second Vatican Council.
This historic event transformed the Catholic Church and Catholic
theology.

It has had long-ranging impact on the religious as

well as the secular world.

The council explored the very meaning
5

of the Church as an institution and reinterpreted its mission in
the world (Gutierrez, 1973:253), declaring that it "must ever

r

look to the present, to the new conditions and new forms of life
introduced into the modern world which have opened new avenues to
the Catholic apostolate" (quoted in Cabal, 1978:13).

It

dispelled former, ecclesiastical views which saw historical
values as being different from, and even dangerous to, God's
values (Segundo, 1982:140).

Instead, it encouraged a new trend

in theology to see the presence and activity of the Church in the
world as a starting point for reflection (Gutierrez, 1973:8).
The Council brought forth a new view of the relationship
between faith and the world.

For the first time, the Church's

hierarchy recognized that the temporal and historical world is
related to the salvific process (Gutierrez, 1973:273).

The

document Schema of Ariccia emphasizes the linkage of the kingdom
of God and the temporal world and states:

·"man's history and the

history of salvation are closely implicated with each other ••• "
(quoted in Gutierrez, 1973:169).
Vatican II's emphasis of the social mission of the Church
reaffirmed the idea of a Church of service and not of power
(Gutierrez, 1973:8).

In Lumen

gentium we see the Church's

identification with Christ and its rejection of worldly riches
and power:

Just as Christ carried out the work of
redemption in poverty and under oppression, so
the Church is called to follow the same path
in communicating to men the fruits of
salvation .•• Although the Church needs human
6

resources to carry out her mission, she is not
set up to seek earthly glory, but to proclaim
humility and self-sacrifice even by her own
example (quoted in Gutierrez, 1973:290-300).

The council, through its doctrinal renovation, raised
questions about key facets of human existence in contemporary
society (Cabal, 1978:16).

In the document entitled, Pastoral

Constitution Concerning the Church in the Present World, one sees
the social agenda of equality for all humans present at the
council.

Never has the human race enjoyed such an ·
abundance of wealth, resources and economic
power. Yet a huge proportion of the world's
citizens is still tormented by hunger and
poverty, while countless numbers suffer from
total illiteracy. Never before today has man
been so keenly aware of freedom, yet at the
same time, new forms of social and
psychological slavery make their appearance
(quoted in Cabal, 1978: 16).

In keeping with this agenda, the Second Vatican Council sought to
redraw the authority lines within the Church to give more
responsibility to the laity and to make the liturgy more
accessible by discontinuing the saying of the mass in Latin
(Mainwaring and Wilde, 1989:10).

Popu1ona Progressio

Vatican II, however, was primarily a European event and was
dominated by European theologians, who addressed the Church's
7

mission particularly in the context of the developed, western
world (Mainwaring and Wilde, 1989:11).

Although the council

addressed many social issues relevant to Latin America, it did so
from an outsider's perspective.

For this reason, Pope Paul VI's

encyclical Populorum Prog ressio of 1967 was significant in its
specific influence within the Latin American Church.
Deeply rooted in the spirit of Vatican II, the document was
in many ways directed at Latin America.

In the encyclical Paul

VI stated that "no one has an unconditional and absolute right to
private property" and proclaimed that "the earth was given to all
and not merely to the rich" (quoted in Cabal, 1978: 21).

The

Pope bluntly analyzed the world's population, noting the
inequities in the standard of living between the rich and poor
and the injustice of the economic imbalance between the developed
and underdeveloped nations.

He rejected the system of colonial

dependence that had virtually enslaved the under classes, keeping
them in an inescapable level of poverty (Cabal, 1978:19).
Populorum Prog ressio greatly affected the Church in Latin
America.

For members of the progressive clergy it legitimized

the cause of liberation and social reform.

Bishop Fragoso of the

Brazilian Catholic hierarchy perceived it as "an encyclical for
the oppressed people of the Third World which explicitly and
valiantly condemns oppression through imperialism and alienation"
(quoted in Cabal, 1978:21).

The Latin American clergy saw Paul VI's

statement as being an exact diagnosis of the problems they had
long encountered.

Furthermore, the document in its continuation

of "John XXIII's Revolution" opened new dialogue between the
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Church and its popular base (Cabal, 1978:23).
The Medellin Conference

Another effect of the newly-created atmosphere of social
reform in the Church was the second assembly of CELAM (Latin
American Bishop's Council) at Medellin, Colombia in 1968.

Pope

Paul, himself, traveled to Colombia to inaugurate the conference,
whose agenda was to discuss the application of Vatican II in
Latin America.

He was the first pope in history to visit Latin

America (Lernoux, 1980:37).
The conference at Medellin provided guidelines for a
transformation of the Church specifically in the socio-political
context of Latin America.

At Medellin the bishops declared their

duty of solidarity with the poor and oppressed:

"This solidarity

means that we make ours their problems and their struggles, that
we know how to speak with them (Gutierrez, 1973:114).

The

bishops affirmed that solidarity with the poor includes the
Church's taking on poverty itself (Gutierrez, 1973:116):

The poverty of the Church and her members
in Latin America should be a sign and a
commitment: a sign of the inestimable
value of poverty in God's eyes, and a
commitment to solidarity with those who are
suffering (CELAM, 1970c:213).

In taking on poverty the Church also expresses its solidarity
with Christ himself, who "focused his mission around proclaiming
the liberation of the poor" (CELAM, 1970c:213).
The bishops at the conference also showed their solidarity
9

with the poor by rejecting the injustice of the system in which the
ruling sectors exploit the poorer classes (CELAM, 1970b:201).
CELAM declared the injustice of this system of oppression as
being a "sinful situation" and a "rejection of the peace of the
Lord" (Gutierrez, 1973:109).

By denouncing the existing unjust and

oppressive system, the Church disassociated itself from the
existing unjust order, breaking the ties that have
historically allied it with the dominant class:

"When a system

ceases to promote the common good and favors special interests,
the Church must not only denounce injustice, but also break with
the evil system" (Gutierrez, 1973:115).

In so doing, the bishops

recognized the need for the separation of Church and State in
order to liberate the Church from the political bonds and
compromising commitments of the State.

The bishops affirmed that

the only ties the Church should have besides with God should be
with the poor (Gutierrez, 1973:115).
Another injustice that the bishops at the conference
denounced was that of the situation of dependence .

In this

situation decision-making occurs outside of the continent, and
Latin American countries remain in a state of
"neocolonialism," while the center countries receive great profit
from their utilization of the underdeveloped nations• raw materials
(Gutierrez, 1973:109).

To the clergy members of CELAM it became

apparent that the poverty of the underdeveloped countries was a
product of the development of the center nations.

Thus, the

dependence system prevents the Latin American people from
fulfilling themselves;

their liberty and dignity are taken from
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them, as they remain in an inescapable state of poverty.

Only

the minority in Latin America--the members of the dominant class-benefits from this system, which the CELAM bishops recognized as
being sinful (CELAM, 1970b:205).

They also exposed and

denounced the ruling classes use of "anticommunism" as an excuse
for the violent repression of legitimate reactions of the under
classes to the violent order of oppression (Berryman, 1973:360).
CELAM's commitment to the poor and oppressed caused the
bishops to realize that the present structure of the Latin
American Church would impede the ministering of the gospel to the
poor (Gutierrez, 1973:118).

Renewal within the internal

structures of the Church was necessary as was a change in the
lifestyle of the clergy in order to better minister to the underprivileged.

Medellin encouraged the oppressed to take control of

their own destinies {Gutierrez, 1973:116).

Within the Church,

structures were in need of change to give the laity more autonomy
and increased participation (Gutierrez, 1973:118).

Renewal of

the Church's structures would help to revitalize the Christian
beliefs of its base.
Medellin encouraged the laity "to create and develop their
own grass-roots organizations for the redress and consolidation

r

of their rights and the search for true justice" (Gutierrez,
1973:114).

The formation of grass-root organizations and "base-

communities" would help to spread the process of awakening
0

(concientizaci6n) as well as to strengthen the christian
commitments of the popular base (Berryman, 1973:363).

This

element of the conference was extremely controversial, as it
seemed to encourage the politicalization of religious groups of
11

the Church.

Furthermore, it urges the independence of these

groups from the Roman hierarchical structure.
Another manner of aiding the poor in delivering themselves
from the injustices present in Latin American society was through
"liberating education."

The bishops at the conference realized

that education would help to "liberate the masses from all
servitude and to ascend to more human conditions" (Gutierrez,
1973:110).

Liberating the people from servitude would, in

effect, liberate them from the bonds of human selfishness.
Thus, Medellin sought to situate the Church and theology in
the human reality of Latin America (Berryman, 1973:359).

It

denounced the injustices of Latin American society and the
oppression of the poor, recognizing both as situations of sin.
In its proclaimed solidarity with the poor, the bishops sought to
sever the Church's ties with the polity and to recognize the need
for radical social reform.

Furthermore, the bishops realized

that the structures of the Church.itself were in need of renewal
in order to better minister to the poor.

They encouraged lay

participation and community-building to both seek justice within
the secular world and to revitalize christian values.

The Principles of Liberation Theology

Thus, liberation theology and the Progressive Church emerged
within the context of the socio-political, economic and
theological processes outlined above.

Like many social

processes, liberation theology can not be conveniently or
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exclusively defined neither in terms of its theological elements,
nor in terms of its sociological impact.

The theological

elements that comprise liberation theology vary considerably as
does its impact on the religious and secular world from one
country (or even geographical location within a country} to
another.

Despite these diversities, the following section will

consist of an outline of the basic theological elements of
liberation theology and a description of the ecclesiastical
structures formed through its influence.
In continuation of the spirit of Populorum Prog ressio and
the CELAM conference at Medellin, Latin American theologians
continued to explore theology in the socio-historical context of
Latin America.

The landmark work Theology of Liberation by

Gustavo Gutierrez gave liberation theology concrete, basic
concepts as well as a specific focus.

I(

Gutierrez, in effect,

established the personality and identity of liberation theology
in the Roman Catholic Church (Oliveros Maqueo, 1978:123}.
Gutierrez and the theologians after him were concerned with
the implementation and application of the principles put forth by
the Medellin conference.

In keeping with these principles,

liberation theologians challenged the old alliance of Church,
State and the dominant class.

They explored the relation between

faith and human existence--that, is they began to probe into the
very meaning of Christianity.

'/

Liberation theology essentially

seeks to establish an absolute relationship with God as the
horizon of every human action (Gutierrez, 1973:45, 50).

It

unifies the temporal world with the spiritual and sees salvation
as a historical and temporal process as well as a spiritual one
13

(Gutierrez, 1973:172).
Liberation theology sees salvation as a process of different '(
levels of liberation.

These three levels mutually affect each

other, but are distinct in their natures.

The first of these

levels of liberation is that of liberation from sin (Gutierrez,
1973: 176).

Here we see liberation at its most individual level.

To seek self-liberation from sin is to seek salvation.

For,

according to the outlook of liberation theology, salvation is the
communion of the individual with God and with others.

Thus, it

embraces all human reality and leads the individual to fullness
in Christ (Gutierrez, 1973:151).

Salvation, then, is here and now--

present in the worldly life of the individual.
of salvation.

Sin is the opposite

It is a breach of communion of people with one

another and with God.

Like salvation, it exists in the reality

of everyday human life (Gutierrez, 1973:152).
To liberate oneself from sin and come closer to God, one
must come to see God's presence in one's everyday existence.

One

of the ways to to do this is to relate the scriptures to one's
life.

For the poor this means realizing that Jesus lived in the

lifestyle of the poor, associated with the poor and preached
poverty as a holy way of life:
of God is yours" (Luke 6:20).

"Blessed are you poor, the reign
Jesus preached his good news to

all people, not just to those in positions of power.

By focusing

on his humanity, the christian comes to see himself/herself as an
important part of God's plan.

Similarly, the gospel message of

"love your neighbor as yourself"

emphasized the need for

community service to bring oneself in communion with one's fellow
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human-beings--to become a new person in a new society (Berryman,
1987:56).

The s ~_d level of the salvific process is that of
liberation of people throughout history (Gutierrez, 1973:176).
This is the liberation of people from human oppression and sin.
To bring the kingdom of God closer to its coming here on earth,
it is necessary to work to rid the world of the injustices
implemented through human sin and to build a human community
based on love and solidarity {Gutierrez, 1973:159).

Indeed, the

growth of the kingdom occurs historically in liberation.
Salvation cannot be reduced to the "religious sphere."

Building

a more just society is equally part of the salvation process
{Gutierrez, 1973:177,159)

In this process of liberation humans

must reject the the present order and recognize its sinfulness
(Gutierrez, 1973:174).
Liberation theology rejects fatalism--the idea that one's
state of misery is God's will.

Instead, it preaches that unjust

situations do not happen by chance or through fate.

Injustice,

oppression and poverty all carry a human responsibility behind
them (Gutierrez, 1973:175).
In order to liberate themselves, the poor must become selfaware (process of concientizaci6n).

They must recognize their

own state of poverty as unjust oppression.

Once again, the bible

is an important source for confirming liberation theology.

In

the Old Testament the prophets denounce abuse of the poor and the
rich who keep them in a state of poverty: (Gutierrez, 1973:293)
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Woe to those who decree iniquitous decrees and
the writers who keep writing oppression,
to turn aside the needy from justice
and to rob the poor of my people of their
right, that widows may be their spoil,
and that they may make the fatherless
their prey!
(Isaiah 10:1-2)

Throughout the Old Testament the prophets condemn social
injustices:

fraudulent commerce (Amos 3:7, Isaiah 3:14), the

hoarding of lands (Micah 2:1-3, Ezekiel 22:29), violence of the
ruling classes (2 Kings 23:30, Amos 4:1), slavery (Nehemiah 5:15), and unjust taxes (Amos 4:1, 5:11-12).

The book of Exodus

focuses on God's concern to liberate his people.

God

hears the

cry of the oppressed and liberates them from the hands of the
pharaoh (Berryman, 1987:49).
The New Testament is equally full of criticisms of the rich
and of those

in positions of power.

In Matthew Jesus denounces the

pharisees and their hypocrisy (Matthew 23).

In Luke he exclaims:

"How hard it is for those who have riches to enter the kingdom of
God!" (Luke 18:24).

Throughout the New Testament Jesus opts for

the poor and opposes the rich.

It becomes apparent, then, that

it is not God's will that a few rich people enjoy the goods of
the world and exploit the poor.

The poor and oppressed come

to understand the significance of Jesus' message to their lives.
They come to see their responsibility to reject injustice and
help to transform the world in preparation for the coming of the
kingdom (Gutierrez, 1973:232).
Brazil asserts:

For, as Dom Antonio Fragoso of

"The struggle for justice is also the struggle

for the Kingdom of God" (quoted in Gutierrez, 1973:168).
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Thus, a commitment to social change is an intricate part of
liberation theology.

It is the poor, themselves who must better/

the world and liberate themselves.

The process of liberation

also includes an educational process and the development of a
critical spirit, "which in the name of love and of the liberty of
the children of God challenges cultural structures .•• " {Boff,
1986:120).

Liberation can not be done for them by outsiders

{Gutierrez, 1973:113).

Communion with God and with other humans can

only be realized in a society with a foundation of socio-economic
equality {Gutierrez, 1973:112).

It is, therefore, a christian

duty to participate in changing oppressive social structures
{Nana Conference of Peruvian Lay Apostolate, 1970:152).
According to Gustavo Gutierrez {1973:176), t h e ~ level
of the salvific process is that of political liberation.
This is the most controversial element of liberation theology.
Liberation theology teaches an intertwinement of faith and
political action. According to this teaching, God calls all
humans to act in the abolition of systems of exploitation
{Gutierrez, 1973:237).

Political action is, indeed, the

application of faith {Segundo, 1982:101).

Faith in God and the

coming of the kingdom urges the oppressed and the poor into
action to transform society.
Liberation theologians realize that the influence of
politics cannot be escaped in other spheres of human thinking.
As Juan Segundo (1982:74) states in his book The Liberation of
Theology. "Every theology is political, even one that does not
speak or think in political terms." In fact, many liberation
theologians see political commitment as bein9 necessary and
17

enhancing the word of the gospel (Segundo, 1982:84).

They see

political participation and action as the application of faith
and of the word of the gospel.
political authorities.

Jesus died at the hands of

The Pharisees and Romans considered his

message as being dangerous to their privileged positions of
power. (Gutierrez, 1973:228-229).
one.

Jesus' trial was a political

Wolfhart Pannenberg affirms that Jesus' message of the

coming of the kingdom was "subversive" in that it proclaims "the
end of domination of man over man; it is a Kingdom of
contradiction to the established powers and on behalf of man"
(quoted in Gutierrez, 1973:231).

Jesus' very life and preachings

are concerned with the search of a new human being and a new
society.

Gustavo Gutierrez (1973:231-232) sees this as a way of

grafting the political into the eternal.
Liberation theology, then, urges the poor into active
political participation.

\

l

They must work for the redistribution

of land and power among the peasants and for the bettering of
their own living conditions.

Clergy members urged workers to

form trade unions to defend their rights to just wages and social
s~curity (A Letter to the Peoples of the Third World 1970:11).
Politicalization within the teachings of liberation theology
has resulted in the adoption of many theologians and clergy
members to incorporate elements of socio-political theories into
their theological holdings.

For example, many theologians see

socialism as being a legitimate model for the structure of a
society in accordance with the Kingdom of God.

Don Sergio Mendez

Arceo of the Mexican Church is one of these preachers of
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I

"socialist theology."

He affirms:

"Only socialism can enable

Latin America to achieve true development ••• ! believe that a
socialist system is more in accord with christian principles of f
true brotherhood, justice and peace ••• "
1973:111).

(quoted in Gutierrez,

(

Theologians like Mendez see capitalism as an anti-

christian system, which promotes the exploitation of human-beings
by other human-beings; whereas, socialism emphasizes the value of
the laborer over the value of capital.

Socialism is said to

dignify labor and to humanize economics (Gutierrez, 1973:111).
Similarly, many liberation theologians and christians, who
hold with a theology of liberation, have adopted some Marxist
concepts (Berryman, 1987:143).

Marxism views human history as

I

stages of class struggle and many liberation theologians see the
Marxist description of this struggle as an integral part of the
liberation process (Beers, 1986:930).

The equation of Marxist

values and the Christian liberation process (an apparent
oxymoron) is prominent among christian participants in

guerrilla

movements.
A prevalent view of Marxism in liberation theology, however,
is that of "Critical Marxism" (Beers, 1986:930).

This view uses

the Marxist theory as a type of structural and class analysis
used to access the way the forces in society line up and interact
during a specific period of time. Liberation theologians might
apply a Marxist analysis of society in order to determine the
effectiveness of a particular method of collective action
(Berryman, 1987:140-141).

These Christians are Marxist in the

sense that they utilize Marxist concepts, but at the same time,
they object to seeing Marxism as a governing ideology or faith
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(Berryman, 1987:143).
Other liberationists take on an entirely different vision of
Marxism.

For example, Jose Miranda (1987:161), a prominent

liberation theologian, completely disassociates communism from
Marxism:

"To identify communism with Marxism implies a crass

ignorance of history."

Miranda (1987:161) affirms that

the original christians established a system of communism.
He bases this claim on the New Testament.

For example, in the

book of Acts appears descriptions of the original christian
community in which no one held private property:

11 • • •

all the

faithful together had everything in common" (Acts 2:44); " ••. not
a single one said anything was his" (Acts 4:32).
Miranda (1987:161) sees communism as being completely in
accordance with christianity and, therefore, cannot understand
the National Security policies established in many Latin American
nations to defend the Christian community from communism.
According to Miranda and others who adhere to his view,
himself, preached communism.

Christ,

In Luke he states, "Every one of

you who does not renounce all he has cannot be my disciple (Luke
14: 3 3) •
Basic Christian Communities

Of course, liberation theology involves much more than just
theoretical principles.

Its key component is in its implementation.

As the documents of the conference at Medellin attest, Latin
American clergy members realized that to implement a theology of
the poor, it was necessary to change the structures of the Church
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itself.

In the traditional church structure those in the popular

base had little or no means of communication with those in the
institutional hierarchy.

Progressive clergy, in an effort to

integrate the poor more thoroughly within the institution of the

Church, established innovative grass-root structures that promote

J

communication and interchange between the base and the high
levels of the Church (Mainwaring and Wilde, 1989:18).
The most important of these structures is the CEB
(comunidad eclesiastica de base).

These grass-root

communities were not spontaneous creations of the poor.

They

were, rather, initiated by pastoral agents, who put ideals of
liberation theology into practice by going to live with the poor
and sharing their living conditions (Berryman, 1987:34).

There,

they began christian discussion groups in which they explored the
peasants' real-life, human experiences.

They emphasized the

importance of the peasants• own culture, rather than attempting
to use their authority to instill an alien culture (Berryman,
1987:36).

Peasants, thus, came to see the value of their

traditions, practices and methods of worship.

The clergy members

related bible passages to the personal experience of the people
and showed them that it was, in fact, a mirror of their own
reality (Berryman, 1987:41, 61).

Through the process of

evangelization and "concientizaci6n" the people would become
aware of their own dignity and importance within the "body" of
the Church and would challenge the pre-existing fatalistic
notions that their poverty was the "will of God" (Berryman,
1987:41).

Soon they would lead their own discussions, meetings

and activities--independent of the clergy.
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CEB's were, thus, an effective structural entity for
relating to the poor and marginalized.

Furthermore, the

structure of the CEB manifests the ideals of liberation theology
in that it is a community of fully-involved laity (Bruneau,
1982:128).

CEB's emerged from religious functions and were

firmly based on religious activities.

They became forums for

people to gather socially, pray together, read the bible and
discuss the important issues in their daily lives (Levine and
Mainwaring, 1989:154).

To reach out to others in the community,

members often participated in social activities of visiting the
sick or collecting money, food and clothes for those in need
(Levine and Mainwaring, 1989:213).
CEB's provided an arena for the layperson to interpret God's
message for him/herself.

It allowed the laity to make decisions

and take initiatives (Berryman, 1987:75). Despite the decisionmaking power of the laity within base communities, CEB's remained
linked to the Church as an institution.

Clergy members visited

the base communities on a regular basis, distributing teaching
materials, circulars and cassettes.

The CEB's remained subject

to the institutional church's influence and control (Levine and
Mainwaring, 1989:210).

They were not autonomous organizations,

separated from the Church.
CEB's did, however, exhibit social impact in most Latin
American nations.
action.

They often became centers for collective

With the emergence of the doctrine of "National

Security" and the increased repression it brought, church-based
activities and organizations became the the only available
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channels for political action and free speech (Levine and
Mainwaring, 1989:211).

Through community-building, members came

to develop a group identity.

This group consciousness

facilitated direct action by CEB's.

Furthermore, liberation

theology provided members of the CEB's with a particular vision
of life and motivation for involvement.

As we have already

seen, liberation theology preaches a christian duty of
participation in the transformation of society and the
elimination of injustice in order to fulfill the Kingdom of God.
Thus, for many CEB members participation in collective action is
"every bit as religious as prayer" (Mainwaring 154).
Liberation theology provided members of CEB's with a distinct
ideology.
Myra Marx Ferree and Beth B. Hess (1985) point out in
their book Controversy and Coalition:

The New Feminist Movement

the importance of ideology in the formation of collective action.
They affirm that an ideology "or way of explaining reality that
makes sense to potential participants and justifies their
involvement" (Ferree and Hess, 1985:26).

Ferree and Hess

(1985:26) go on to say that "the ideology must support
identification with the group and perceptions of opportunities
for change."

The ideals of liberation theology (that one is

obligated by one's faith to help transform society from a unjust,
oppressive one to one based on solidarity and love) certainly
seem to fit Ferree and Hess' definition of an ideology.
Discussion groups and bible studies generated a group identity,
as the poor came to see themselves as significant in God's plan.
Doug MacAdam (1982) in his political process model of social
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movements mentions another necessary element for the emergence of
social action.

He calls this element "cognitive liberation."

MacAdam contends that for direct action to occur people must
"collectively define their situations as unjust and subject to
change through group action" (MacAdam, 1982:51).

Clearly, the

process of "concientizaci6n" or the awakening of the laity within
the CEB's is an example of "cognitive liberation." (See MacAdam,
1982 for an explanation of his political process model).
Relating bible passages to their daily lives, CEB members began
to perceive the systems of oppression present in their lives as
being unjust and sinful.

The bible also helped them to see these

unjust systems as subject to change.

In Exodus the Lord hears

the cry of the people and liberates them.

A seemingly perpetual

system of slavery and oppression was, thus, altered.

Faith in

God means seeing all things as possible if one believes.

CEB

members believed that if they remained faithful to God, there was
nothing they could not accomplish.
Base communities were, therefore, often instrumental in the
implementation of such direct action as agrarian reforms,
tenant's rights actions, land seizures, and even guerrilla
movements.
of CEB's

Later in this paper I shall show the specific impact
on the societies of Brazil, Colombia and Nicaragua.

It

is important to note, however, that the social impact of CEB's is
not limited to its role in collective, political action.

Even if

political goals never develop, "CEB's fill critical religious and
affective needs and can stimulate deep changes in personal as
well as group life" (Levine and Mainwaring, 1989:207).
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CEB's change

people's view of the world and, therefore, shape their motives,
convictions and goals.

For this reason, even the most apolitical

CEB can have long-term social and political consequences (Levine
and Mainwaring, 1989:214).

The controversy of Liberation Theo1ogy within the Church

The political participation and social impact of CEB's has
led them to become quite controversial within the Church
hierarchy.

Conservatives see the base communities as being too

autonomous and in many countries have implemented efforts to
control grass-roots religious activities more closely (Levine and
Mainwaring, 1989:214).

In a similar action Pope John Paul II has

stressed the importance of spiritual goals within these
communities

and de-emphasized political direct action (Levine

and Mainwaring, 1989:212).
Conservatives' objections to the political actions of CEB's
stems from a larger criticism of liberation theology, which
rejects the association of Christ with politics (Segundo,
1982:134).

Critics like

c. Peter Wagner see a danger in

associating Christianity with the political sphere.

For, "we

come dangerously close to depriving Christianity of its
transcendence and making it just another social institution"
(quoted in Segundo, 1982:135).

Wagner, further, objects to

liberation theology's equation of salvation with the political
and social transformation of society.
no universal plan of salvation.

He contends that there is

Rather, it operates on an

individual level (Segundo, 1982:137).
25

According to Wagner, the

function of the Church should be the individual reconciliation of
humans with God.

It should not identify itself with any human

program of social change, and its priority should be the
salvation of souls (Segundo, 1982:136).
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger is another critic of liberation
theology.

He accuses liberation theology of a drastic

reductionism that ignores the basic elements of Christianity.
Ratzinger objects to the reduction of sin to social structures,
making the struggle for justice the whole essence of salvation
and reducing the gospel to an earthy, worldly one (Berryman,
1987:187).
The presence of conservative trends within the Church
hierarchy greatly affects the Church's progressive grass roots.
bishop has the power to reverse any change in his diocese to
which he objects, while the pope has the authority to impose
sanctions against any individual, organization, movement or
theology that he opposes (Mainwaring and Wilde, 1989:15).

This

phenomenon accounts for the abrupt changes in the Church
according to the particular person in power (for example, the
unexpected calling of Vatican II by John XIII).

It has also

caused many grass-roots organizations to leave the Church in
order to further radicalize and engage in activities opposed by
the hierarchy (Mainwaring and Wilde, 1989:15).

In other cases

(such as in Colombia), conservative members of the hierarchy have
created grass-root communities only to tightly control their
activities (Mainwaring and Wilde, 1989:16).

The effect of the

hierarchy and critics of liberation theology have had on CEB's
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varies from nation to nation.

I shall provide specifics as to

these effects in later chapters of this paper.
Another controversial issue involved in the politicalization
of grass-roots religious groups is that of the use of violence.
Here one encounters dissent among liberation theologians,
themselves.

For example, in a lecture entitled, "Violence in the

Modern World" Dom Helder Camara of Brazil, a renowned liberation
theologian, takes a stand against violence:

We, as Christians, are on the side of
nonviolence, and this is in no way an option
for passivity and weakness. Opting for
nonviolence means believing more strongly in
the power of truth, justice and love than in
the power of hatred, war and killing (quoted
in Nana Conference, 1970:53).

One sees a very different perspective concerning the use of
violence in the Medellin conference.
America:

In the document, Latin

A Continent of Violence (CELAM, 1970a)

the bishops

cited true violence as being within the inhumane institutions of
Latin America.

This violence is manifest in the poor living

conditions of the rural peasants and urban poor of Latin America.
It is rooted in a system based on the profit motive, in which
oligarchies control the masses (CELAM, 1970a:81-82).
The bishops go on to say that one cannot equate the violence of
these oppressors with the "just" violence of the oppressed
(CELAM, 1970a:84).

According to this statement, apparently, some

forms of violence are justifiable.

One sees similar views to

this effect in the case of Christian members of the FSLN in
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Nicaragua and other guerrilla groups.
Many liberation theologians view violence as sadly
necessary.

They accept violence only after concluding that

oppression will not end through pacificism.

Violence, then,

is

justifiable as a realistic method for dismantling oppressive
institutions (Beers, 1986:933).
Thus, as CEB's became more and more politically active and
members of the laity as well as the clergy became involved in
revolutionary, guerrilla movements, controversy and conflict grew
between the hierarchy of the Church and its base.

Members of the

hierarchy felt that the unity of the Catholic Church was
threatened by the autonomy of base communities.

Conservative

members of the hierarchy also objected to the adaptation of
Marxist concepts by many CEB groups.

Furthermore, the Church was

divided in its view of its mission in the world.

Not all Latin

American bishops agreed with the principles of liberation
theology.

Conservatives still perceived the Church's mission as

being purely spiritual and repudiated the idea of its political
involvement.
The CELAM Conference at Pueb1a

In the midst of this controversy and division Latin American
bishops prepared for the second meeting of CELAM to be held in
1979 in Puebla, Mexico.

The meeting had been scheduled for

October of 1978 and had to be post-paned after the deaths of Pope
Paul VI and John Paul I.

Unlike the Medellin Conference, the

conference at Puebla was largely controlled by a conservative
faction led by the Colombian Archbishop Alfonso Lopez Trujillo,
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the secretary general of CELAM (Lernoux, 1980:413).

This

phenomenon marked an overall resurgence of conservatism within
various Latin American churches.
The ever-widening divisions within the Church combined with
the election of a new pope and the renewed rise of a conservative
faction within the Latin American Church caused an atmosphere of
tension and anticipation as the bishops prepared to meet.
Puebla was, in fact, a clash between three mind-sets (Berryman,
1987:103).

The conservatives denounced liberation

theology as being Marxist and stressed hierarchical authority.
On the other hand, the liberationists advocated a continuation of
the principles laid out in the Medellin conference.

They

emphasized the importance of the CEB and renounced capitalism as
a system of sin.

Finally, there were the centrists, who

represented the largest group of bishops at the conference.
These delegates held a middle-of-the-road concerning the debate
of the liberationists and the conservatives.

They were also

concerned with Church unity and the religious role of the Church.
The entire world waited to see where the new pope would stand in
relation to these factions.
The world would be disappointed, however, with the outcome
of the Conference.

For, no group suffered a complete defeat nor

obtained a clear-cut victory.
was inconclusive.

The final, emerging document

All three tendencies could find positive and

negative elements within it.
Victory for the conservatives was seen in Pope John Paul's
criticism of the politicalization of the gospel message and his
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denouncement of the promotion a "people's church" in opposition
to the institutional one.

The document also condemned the

politicalization of theology and warns against "ideologization of
theological reflection when it uses as a point of reference a
praxis with recourse to Marxist analysis" (quoted in Lernoux,
1980:442).

The greatest triumph for the liberationists is the section
of the final document outlining the Church's "preferential option
for the poor."

In this section the bishops state their intention

to continue in the tradition of the Medellin conference and
denounce the institutionalized injustices present in Latin
American society:

From the heart of Latin America, a cry rises
to the heavens ever louder and more
imperative. It is the cry of a people who
suffer and who demand justice, freedom and
respect for the fundamental rights of man.
The Medellin conference reflected that cry.
If it seemed deafening then, it now is clear,
growing impetuous, and, on occasion,
threatening.
In [the people's] pain and anxiety, ·the
Church discerns a situation of social sin, of
a magnitude all the greater because it occurs
in countries which call themselves
Catholic •••• (quoted in Lernoux, 1980:439).

The bishops cite the situation of poverty of millions of Latin
Americans, unemployment, malnutrition and infant mortality as
being situations of sin brought on by the "materialism" of Latin
American elites (Lernoux, 1980:439).

They add:

"The lack of

respect for human dignity is reflected by the lack of social
participation on different levels ••• in the repression of unions
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and political movements" (Lernoux, 1980:439).
Like the Medellin conference, Puebla advocates the creation
of a more just society with the poor being the agents of this
change (Lernoux, 1980:440).

Puebla, also, rejects materialism and

urge~ the Church's clergy to live in poverty so as to live in
solidarity with the poor and to become independent of oppressive
governments.

The Church "desires to become increasingly

independent of the powers of the world, thus to enjoy a greater
liberty to accomplish [its] evangelizing mission (Lernoux, 1980:440).
Puebla's final document, like many of the Medellin
documents, criticizes the inhumanity of the capitalist system.
The bishops at Puebla, however, specifically denounce the power
and oppressiveness of the multinational corporations.

They

propose the establishment of an international organization to
"defend and promote

their [the nations] interests in

relationship to the multinationals" (quoted in Lernoux, 1980:441).
This would help deter the international corporations from
exploiting the nations in which they are located in their search
for profit.
The progressives victory at Puebla was due in some ways to
the actions of Pope John Paul II.

He received an immense welcome

in Mexico City where 18 million Mexicans crowded the streets to
pay homage to him (Lernoux, 1980:425).

The pope's speeches in Latin

America presented a mixed message for liberation theologians.

In

Mexico City he stressed "popular devotion and religious
discipline at the expense of social commitment" (Lernoux,
1980:426).

One day before, however, in the Dominican Republic he
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had spoken out for the rights of the poor.
In his address to the bishops at Puebla the pope affirmed
that the Church's mission was to teach the truth about Christ.
This truth is that Christ was not a political figure or a
revolutionary, but rather a servant of Yahweh with a redemptive
mission (Lernoux, 1980:427).

John Paul warned the bishops of the

danger of reading the gospel from an ideological viewpoint.

To

do so would be to distort the Church's fundamental mission and to
expose religion to "monopolizing and manipulation by ideological
systems and political parties" (Lernoux, 1980:427). The pope made
it clear that he opposed the use of Marxist ideologies by
christian communities.

He also spoke out against violence as a

means of ending injustices.
These statements appear to reject many dimensions of
liberation theology.

This rejection of violence and

politicalization of religion could stem from the pope's Polish
background.

Later in his address to the bishops at Puebla,

however, he emphasizes the Church's mission of the defense of
human rights and a commitment to the needy:

The voice of the Church, echoing the voice of
human conscience and never ceasing to make
itself heard down the centuries in the midst
of the most varied social and cultural systems
and conditions, deserves and needs to be heard
in our time, too, when the growing wealth of a
few parallels the growing poverty of the
masses •.• we cry out once more: Respect man!
He is the image of God! (quoted in Lernoux,
1980:428).
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John Paul's speeches to the Indians in Oaxaca and the
workers at Jalisco were also rich in liberationist themes.
the Indians he said:

To

"You have a right to be respected and not

deprive of the little you have .•. " (quoted in Lernoux, 1980:429).
He reprimanded Mexico's wealthy landowners with these words:

You have at times left the land fallow, taking
bread from so many families who need it.
Human conscience, the conscience of th people,
the cry of the destitute, and, above all, the
voice of God and the Church repeat with me:
it is not right, it is not human, it is not
Christian to maintain such clearly unjust
situations ••• (quoted in Lernoux, 1980:429).

Speeches such as these surprised Trujillo's conservative
faction, who had counted on the Pope's denouncement of liberation
theology.

The pope, in fact, did not even mention liberation

theology in his addresses and speeches.

This lack of

denunciation of liberation theology by the pope was a great
factor in the final document's declaration of a strong commitment
to the poor and lack of denunciation of liberation theology
(Lernoux, 1980:443).
Thus, at the end of the conference at Puebla the Latin
American Church emerged as an institution with mixed purposes and
philosophies.

on the one hand, control of CELAM remained in the

hands of conservatives like Trujillo, who emphasize the power of
the hierarchy and reject the politicalization of the Church's
popular base.

The present pope as also exhibited conservative

orientations in regard to popular mobilization for change.
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On

the other hand, Pope John Paul II has declared himself the "voice
of the voiceless" and shows a commitment to the defense of the
poor and oppressed (even if he does not advocate violence as a
means of ending injustice) (Lernoux, 1980:429).

The progressive

minority still survives in most countries, still calling for a
"Church of the People" and searching for an end to oppression.
I have, thus, presented a detailed social and political
background within which liberation theology exists and influences
Latin American society.

In the following sections I shall

discuss liberation theology in the political and social contexts
of Brazilian and Colombian society. I shall, then, indentify
manners in which this theology has had impact upon these
societies and draw some conclusions as to the sociological
reasons behind my findings.
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Section Il:

Brazil

!

;")

••• o que se exige primeiro para que os homens
se tornem povo de Deus e que sejam um povo de
pobres. Pobres sao aqueles que sabem que
sozinhons nae sao capazes de nada (Brazilian
CEB member, quoted in Ferreira de Camargo,
Candido Procopio et al., 1980:75).

The History of the Transformation of the Brazilian Church

In many ways the Brazilian Church's transformation from an
institution of the elite and dominant classes to one which opted
for the poor and underprivileged follows the model presented
in the overview of this paper.

Before World War II the Brazilian

Church and the State were closely linked and mutually supportive.
On the one hand, the Church's support of the State ensured a
strong influence within the ruling elites and dominant classes,
satisfaction of many aspects of the Church's social doctrine
through State legislation,

a dominant voice in the educational

system and a firmly established religious monopoly legitimated by
the State (Mainwaring, 1986:37).

At the same time, the State

received legitimation for its programs in the form of religious
sanctions (Mainwaring, 1986:31).

In this way, the Church

maintained a weak presence among the greatest part of the
population (the poor and marginalized), but exerted a large
amount of influence in the governing of the country.

The

catholic Church emphasized nationalism, anti-Communism, antisecularism and authority of the hierarchy, while seeking to
influence as many other social institutions as possible in order
to "safeguard the Christian character of social life"
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(Mainwaring, 1986:32).
After World War II, however, Brazilian society underwent a
great many changes, threatening the Catholic Church's influence
within the State and society as a whole.

The rapid urbanization

and modernization of the period following World War II made
the Church's call to halt secularization

a resistance to an

inevitable change (Mainwaring 1986: 38).

Soon, the Church entered

a period of institutional crisis.

The expansion of Protestantism

(increase of 150% between 1940-1964) and Spiritism as well as a
massive decline in attendance of religious ceremonies indicated
the Church's loss of influence among the masses and declining
control of a religious monopoly (Mainwaring 1986:20, 37).

At the

same time, the Church experienced a crisis in its alliance with
the State.

In its close links to governments such as that of

Vargas, the Church maintained a dominance in the education system
and a position of power as the privileged religious institution
of the society.

This position of influence in the State changed

with the emergence of the democratic governments of 1945-1964.
In order to maintain a good relationship with the State, the
Church had to change by toning down its emphasis on authority,
order and a strict, hierarchical system (Mainwaring 1986:39-40).
As Brazilian society became more and more democratic in nature,
the Church was forced to decrease its stress on the importance of
the hierarchy.
During this period of institutional crisis of the Church,
Brazilian society saw an emergence of popular movements.

These

movements were especially prominent in the Northeastern part of
Brazil, where the living conditions of the peasants were
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especially low.

Many theorists see the Church's transformation

and option for the poor as an effect of the political threat
that these popular movements posed 1 (Bruneau 1974:70).

Scott

Mainwaring (1986:16, 40, 45), however, points out that although
these movements did challenge the world view of traditional
Catholics and question the hierarchical nature of society, they
also had the effect of generating awareness among the Brazilian
clergy as to many of the problems and injustices of Brazilian
society.

The movements created an atmosphere of questioning and,

thus, indirectly encouraged innovations in pastoral work among
the popular classses (Mainwaring 1986:45).

Mainwaring (1986:15)

affirms that these movements, in effect, "converted" nuns,
priests and bishops to a new understanding of the Church.

The

"politicalization of poverty" that the popular movements
implemented called attention to long-existing problems and led to
new forms of intervention by the Catholic Church.
Another factor in the transformation of the Brazilian
Church was the Cuban Revolution and expansion of the Communist
Party in Latin America.

As I have already mentioned, this

phenomenon affected Catholic Church policy throughout Latin
America.

In Brazil bishops felt the most effective way to deal

with threat was "to implement reforms that would satisfy the
masses and make them less susceptible to Communist ideas"
(Mainwaring 1986:59).

In 1960 the bishops of Sao Paulo affirmed

"the choice is between a balanced, responsible reform and rural
revolution led by the Communists, exploiting the precarious and
sometimes explosive situation in the rural areas" (quoted in
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Mainwaring, 1986:59).
Although the pattern of the emergence of the "Option for the
Poor" are similar in many ways to the same process in other
countries in Latin America (see overview), I must, here, point
out that there are fundamental differences between the Brazilian
process and that of other Latin American countries.

The most

striking difference is the fact that the Brazilian Church began
the process of "Option for the Poor" five years before Vatican II
(Bruneau, 1982:52).

It was also the first Church in which base

communities emerged.
Scott Mainwaring (1986:237-239) attributes these
differentiating qualities of the Brazilian Church to the
political situation of the country combined with the nature of the
Church's linkage to the Vatican.

I have already indicated the

significance of the Vatican in its influence upon each nation's
church and the level in which each church may be involved in the
political sphere.

Mainwaring (1986:18), again, points out that

the Vatican directly influences the national churches through its
nominations of the papal nuncio (the Vatican representatives
appointed to each country to help name bishops).

For this

reason, the orientation of the papacy directly affects many of
the social and political positions of the national churches.
By the early 1950's the Brazilian Church held strong links
with the progressive sectors of the Vatican.

The encyclicals of

Pope John XXIII were especially significant in influencing the
Brazilian hierarchy.

Furthermore, the papal nuncio between 1952

and 1964 was Dom Armando Lombardi, who nominated several
progressive priests as bishops.

Between the 1960's and 1970's
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the papacies of John XXIII and Paul VI greatly influenced the
evolution of the Brazilian Church in that they strongly
encouraged greater national autonomy of the Latin American
churches (Mainwaring, 1986:19).

I have already discussed the

great impact the Second Vatican Council had on all Latin American
Churches.
Another distinctive quality of the Brazilian Church is its
long history of encouraging lay leadership.

Examples of

movements led by the laity, but tightly regulated by the
hierarchy are:

the League of Brazilian Catholic Women (1910's),

the Feminine Alliance (1919), the Workers' Circles (1930's), the
Catholic University Youth (1930's), the Catholic Youth Workers
(1930's) and Brazilian Catholic Action (1935) (Mainwaring,
1986:31).

Thus, the Church in Brazil was accustomed to the laity

particpating actively in social movements.

The Brazilian Church,

also, has had a limited history of persecutions by liberal
forces and, thus, was not so threatened by the emergence of these
popular movements so as to feel compelled to vehemently repress
them (Mainwaring, 1986:238).
The political situation of the 1950 1 s also played a role in
affecting the Brazilian Church's early "Option for the Poor."
Between 1889 and 1964 there were very few major Church-State
conflicts.

Given this history of good relations, the State was

reluctant to repress Church-based programs or movements.

The

democratic nature of the pre-coup Brazilian society created a
permissive environment for the the newly oriented progressive
socio-political position of the Church (Bruneau, 1982:51).
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Of course, the pre-1964 transformation of the Brazilian
Church was not at all a smooth progression.

The Church gradually

split into three factions--each with a different proposed
response to the changes of Brazilian society and the
institutional crisis which the Church faced 2 (Mainwaring,
1986:41).

Traditionalists endorsed the pre-existing "Neo-

Christendom" strategy for dealing with the crises facing the
Church.

They felt that the most effective way to deal with these

problems was for the Church to strengthen its links with the
State in order to ensure privileges for the purpose of
"Catholicizing" society (Mainwaring, 1986:41).

The

traditionalists believed the Church should combat secularization
at all costs and strongly rejected Communism.
On the other extreme were the Reformists.

These bishops and

clergy memberrs held extremely progressive social positions.
They advocated more intensive pastoral work and religious
education among the poor.

Rather than seeing the shift to a

preferential option for the poor as being a method for gaining
influence in the society, the Reformists perceived social change
and transformation within the Church as an end in itself
(Mainwaring, 1986:42).
(

The Conservative Modernizers represented the largest faction
within the Church.

This group held a middle-ground position.

On

the one hand, they were concerned about secularization and the rise
of Protestantism and Communism; but, on the other hand,

they still

believed that change was necessary within the Church to reach the
people of the more open, modern world (Mainwaring, 1986:42).
In 1952 as a response to the many divisions within the Church,
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the hierarchy founded the CNBB (National Conference of Brazilian
Bishops) through the initiation of Dom Helder Camara and strong
support from the Vatican (Bruneau, 1982:51).

The CNBB is an

extremely influential and significant Church-based organization.
It became a central source for legitimation of the "progressive
process" of transformation in the Church (Della Cava, 1989:151).
After Vatican II in the period before the military coup of 1964,
the CNBB acted as an organized platform for the promotion of the
progressive ideology of the Council.
The CNBB was significant in the transformation of the
Catholic Church and social impact of progressive laity movements.
In both the Emergency Plan of 1962 and the General Pastoral Plan
of 1965, the bishops called for many innovations within the
Church's structure and doctrines and socioeconomic reforms within
the secular society (Mainwaring, 1986:50).

By the late 1950 1 s

the bishops of the CNBB had begun to question the methods of
economic development implemented by the State.

The Central

Commission of the CNBB issued a series of documents which
recognized farmer's needs in the rural sectors and their "natural
right to property" (Mainwaring, 1986:56).

They affirmed that the

process of modernization was hurling many peasants into living
conditions that "affront human dignity" and vehemently called for
agrarian reforms (Mainwaring, 1986:56).
Furthermore, the CNBB acted as a coordinating organization
for several lay movements.

These movements, pre-cursors of the

CEB's and post-1964 movements, existed in a dialectic with the
Church's hierarchy (Mainwaring, 1986:15).
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They depended greatly

)

on the hierarchy for support, legitimation and mobilizing
resources, but at the same time, directly influenced the
hierarchy as they created new conceptions of faith, theologies
and pastoral services (Mainwaring, 1986:15).

The movements

became important sources of political influence and represented
a significant step in the gradual transformation to a lay
oriented Church {Mainwaring, 1986:16).
Movements like the AP (Agao Popular) and the JUC {Catholic ' \
University Youth) became channels for radical Catholic political
activity.

These movements were instrumental in union work,

peasant organizing and popular education.

Pre-Vatican II

phenomena, they foreshadowed the emergence of a trans-national,
popular Church and lay movements.

They preached a familiar

ideology of liberation--searching for a more just society,
applying a Marxist analysis to their approach to social change,
and rejecting capitalism 3 (Mainwaring 1986:63-64).

Furthermore,

these movements promoted a new understanding of the relation
between faith and politics, synthesizing Christianity and
socialism (Mainwaring 1986:72).

Here, we see definitely see the

precursors of liberation theology.
Perhaps the most prominent and exemplary of these pre-1964
lay movements is the MEB (Movement for Grass-roots Education).
The "Conselho Diretor Nacional," a council of nine bishops,
had an oversseeing role in the coordination of

the movement, and

the CNBB provided it with legitimation and funds from the State.
It was, however, the lay people on the local level who
adminstrated and organized the daily routine of the program
(Bruneau, 1974:80).

The movement represente~ an extremely
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ambitious program organized towards change.

Again, foreshadowing

the up-coming emergence of liberation theology, the MEB sought to
implement social transformations through popular education
(Bruneau, 1974:79).

The program stressed "conscientizaQao" (just

as the future CEB's would) and advocated the people's taking
control of their own destinies (Mainwaring, 1986:67).

It

utilized the teaching methods developed by Paulo Freire in which
the teacher begins with the popular world view and teaches
through a dialogue with his or her pupil (Mainwaring, 1986:67).
Moreover, the MEB introduced the belief "that the fundamental
goal of Christian faith is the full realization of all people"
and encouraged greater self-respect among the poor (Mainwaring,
1986:67).
This gradual progressive transformation of the Brazilian
Church and development of liberation-based lay movements was cut
short, however, by the military coup of 1964.

The military coup

of March 31 abolished all political parties, as the new regime
attempted to reduce the fiscal deficit, restore economic
stability and protect the "National Security" of Brazil from the
"Communist Threat" posed by the new popular movements and spread
of the Communist party (Mainwaring, 1986:79).
The "reformist" Catholics that worked closely with the
Goulart administration in building up labor unions, literacy
campaigns and agrarian reforms received heavy sanctions from the
new military regime (Vallier, 1970:133).

Goulart's support of

the reformist Church's progressive programs, his perceived
slide to the left and the Socialist and Marxist content of many
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of the ideolgies of the lay movements earned the clergy and lay
reformers a "Communist identity" (Vallier, 1970:133).

The regime

immediately withdrew government funds for many of the programs
previously sponsored by Goulart.

As a result of this depletion

of funds, the MEB disappeared.
Meanwhile, the Traditionalist Catholics closely linked
itself in support of the military movement.

Catholic support

for the regime increased with the 1967-1973 "Brazilian Miracle"
of substained economic growth and harsh anti-communist
orientations of the regime.

Even the CNBB came to support the

coup with the conditions the search to "purge the causes of
disorder" could not justify tyranny (Mainwaring, 1986:81).

After

the coup the CNBB became more and more dominated by conservative
bishops and as a result more bureaucratized and concerned with
internal affairs (Mainwaring, 1986:83).

The rise of conservatism

within the Brazilian Church hierarchy and within the CNBB was
largely responsible for the Church's (with the exception of the
Northeastern Church) relative silence concerning the social
concerns of the poor (Mainwaring, 1986:83).
Between 1964 and 1973, however, this silence and
conservatism of the Church ended as the bishops changed from
supporting the regime to violently opposing it.

This change was

largely initiated by the clergy and hierarchy of the Northeastern
Church 4 •

Popular lay movements were most prominent in this part

of the country.

As a consequence, the Northeastern clergy were

the most sensitized as to the social problems of the people there
(Mainwaring 1986:95).

The developmentalism of the Branco

government and the internationalization of the Brazilian market
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meant more foreign investors in Brazilian enterprises (Evans,
1979:80).

As the economy shifted from agricultural to

industrial-based, multinational corporations acquired huge tracts
of land, which once belonged to peasants.

In 1950 19.2% of the

land in the Northeast was run by farmers who did not own the
land.

This was increased to 38.1% in 1975 (Mainwaring, 1986:85).
As the regime continued in its programs of import-

substitution and industrialization, it became apparent that the
sole beneficiary's of this developmentalism were the upper
classes and foreign investors.

Meanwhile, the masses were

sinking further and further into a state of poverty.

The changes

in Brazilian income distribution between 1960 and 1970 reflects
the divergences between the expected benefits from
industrialization and the actual results.

During this decade the

production of television sets tripled and the top 5% of the
population almost doubled their average income.

At the same

time, the 80 million people at the bottom remained at stagnated
incomes averaging below $200 a year (Evans, 1979:96).
statistics on infant mortality are further indications of
the disaccord between human benefits and industrial performance
in Brazil.

The rate of infant mortality in Sao Paulo in 1969 was

84 per 1000 live births (Evans, 1979:96).

This is about one

third higher than the rates for the entire nation of Argentina.
In Recife, the largest and most industrialized city of the
northeast the rate was 263.5 per 1000 in 1971.

Living conditions

such as these raised grievances and dissatisfaction among the
peasants and members of the working class in the northeast.
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The military regime, under the pretense of defending
"National Security," violently repressed the peasants and
prevented any form of independent popular mobilization.

This

violence combined with other apparent social problems of the poor
such as lack of legal assistance, schools, unions and hospitals
led the Church to assume a broad range of functions and the
clergy to meet to discuss the increasing violence (Mainwaring,
1986:86).

The pastoral agents at the grass-roots level urged the

bishop to defend the poor.

In 1965, when most other regional

clergy were quiet on social issues, the Northeast bishops were
the first to critique the regime by publishing progressive
documents, denouncing government policies and the violence of the
entrepreneurs (Mainwaring, 1986:97).

The bishops' public

denunciation of the government and foreign investors led to a
series of clashes between the State and Northeastern Church and
the repression of bishops and clergy members (Mainwaring
1986:98).
imprisoned.

Clergy members and lay leaders were tortured and
Landowners waged campaigns against the Church and

threatened to murder clergy members (Mainwaring, 1986:90-91).
The violent repression solidified clergy members' resistance.
On May 25, 1969 security forces assassinated Father Antonio
Henrique Pereira Neto.

Violence such as this directed at Church

clergy members caused previous moderates in the hierarchy to join
the Northeastern lay and clergy in critiquing the regime
(Mainwaring, 1986:99).

By 1971 after the continued murder,

torture and oppression of Catholic clergy and laity, the Church
stood as an almost entirely united force in direct opposition to
the regime.

Its "preferential option for the poor" had begun.
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CEB's in Brazi1

The most significant creation of liberation theology is the
CEB.

In the overview section I have already discussed the

origin, organization and implications of this phenomena.
were born in Brazil.

CEB's

They formed even before the coup of 1964

(predominently in the rural areas of the Northeast during the
late 1950's and early 1960's) as the partial result of the
institutional crisis of the Church during the pre-1964 period of
democratic governments and Church reform.

Due to a dramatic

shortage of clergy, " ••• rural areas tried a new experience in lay
responsibility:

a Sunday religious celebration without a priest"

(Mainwaring, 1986:52).

This marked the beginning of the

emergence of the first base communities.
In this study I am primarily interested in the social and
political impact of liberation theology.

The CEB is, perhaps,

the singular most politically, theologically and socially
significant element of liberation theology 5 •

For this reason, I

shall concern myself with its social and political effect on
Brazilian society as a way of indicating these same effects of
liberation theology.

Specifically, I shall focus on the CEB's

impact on popular movements, transformations of State doctrines
and political parties.
C.P. Ferreira de Camargo et al. (1980:62) cite the political
and social importance of the CEB as being "that they constitute a
promising scheme of experimentation and of systematic exercises
of new forms of popular associations for the discussion and
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search of solutions to the problems that afflict the working
classes in the country and the city peripheries" (my
translation).

Previously, in the overview of this paper I have

indicated that the process of "conscientization"
(con~cientizaci6n or conscientizao).

Ferreira de Camargo et al.

(1980) discuss this process (which McAdams (1982) refers to as
"cognitive liberation") and its effect of promoting group
cohesion.

The authors quote an informant from Vila Flavia, who

tells how a CEB

emerged as community members began

"meeting in

several houses to get to know each other better and to discuss
issues like problems of the family--why the husband fights with
the wife,

what the children need, the lack of money ••• and it was

the lack of money that led to the unification of the group"
(Ferreira de Camargo et al., 1980:71).

This form of

consciousness-raising leads community members to identify with
one another.

Residents form a community implement practices of

mutual help and support.
Ferreira de Camargo et al. (1980:72) present the case of
the community of Jardim Machado.

A CEB member tells of a

communal cashbox:

"Functioning for three to four years, the
communal cashbox is the fruit of bazaars, used
clothes sales etc. It can be used by any one of
the members of the community for transportation, to
pay electric, water and gas bills, to buy medecine
etc. "

Mutual support and collective identification does not only
occur within each individual community.
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As CEB's developed and

became a more and more viable political and social force, they
developed systems of inter-community communication and
organization.

For example, in 1976 15 Brazilian bishops met in

Vitoria with representatives from the country's 80,000 CEB's.
The peasants drew up a list of priorities for the Christian base
communities.

During the meeting, the representatives agreed that

if the peasants were driven off their land; they should lodge a
protest with the authorities, hire a lawyer, study the law to see
that it is properly enforced, and join with other people from
other communities with the same problems (Lernoux, 1980:390).
Penny Lernoux (1980:390-391) in her book cry of the People cites
a worker at the end of the Sao Paulo meeting.
affirmed:

The worker

"Up till now, I thought we were struggling alone in

our own corner.

Now I know that all over Brazil we have brothers

and sisters involved in the same struggle and living the same
faith."
In the discussion of the CEB in the above overview, we saw
that members of base communities reach a level of raised
consciousness through reading the gospels and celebrating the
word of God together.
question:

We are left, however, with the following

How is it exactly that CEB members make the move from

religious faith to political action?

I shall, here, endeavor to

explore in greater depth the process of concientizaci6n within
the CEB and its link to political, collective action.
It is clear that community unity has an effect on the
creation and action of a CEB.
Flavia confirms this.

The above-cited CEB member of Vila

W.E. Hewitt (1988:151) points out that
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CEB's tend to form among the "affluent" poor, that is, the urban
working class on the outskirts of Sao Paulo and rural peasants.
These people own at least some land and their own homes.

Hewitt

(1988-:151) speculates that the reason that the poorest of the

poor are, generally, not "successful targets of Church-directed
CEB promotion efforts" is that "these individuals have little or
no stake in the community."

They, usually, are planning to move

as soon as possible and invest little of their energy in trying
to better their present surroundings.

Father Roberto (1991) (not

his real name), a parish priest in Ciudad Guyana, Venezuela also
comments on his experience with bible discussion groups within
his parish.

Speaking of a bible study group revolving around the

family Father Roberto says:

••• our success is proportionate almost to the
economic resources the people have. The more
marginated--they just struggle to get
people there (to the meetings). The dad doesn't
come .•• Both parents are supposed to come. The more
marginated, the more likely he's out drinking or he
isn't home at all or there's just a little less
family stability ••• " (Roberto, 1991)

Thus, perceived poverty within the community does not always lead
to the indivdiual's participation in CEBs.
The bible is the most significant instrument of the process
of consciousness-raising within CEBs.

Carlos Mesters (1983:81)

focuses on the role bible reading plays in CEB social action.

He

concludes that for a community to become collectively active
three factors must somehow be present.
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According to him, to move

from the religious to the political sphere, a group must come
together not solely for the purpose of reading the bible, but
also as a community.

Furthermore, the community cannot simply

read and discuss the bible together, but must place the biblical
selections within the concrete context of their own lives
(Mesters, 1983:79-81).

Discussion of the bible in this manner

serves to unite the community as members relate their own
struggles with those presented in the gospels and Old Testament.
Mesters (1983:80) affirms that the three fundamental elements
necessary for a community to make the shift from a purely
religious and spiritual orientation to a socio-political one are
the bible, the community and reality.

He concludes that when a

community takes shape solely on the basis of reading the bible,
it faces an immediate crisis as soon as it encounters political
and social issues.

Such a group has no collective identity and

is not prepared to discuss common problems or experiences.
Members of this type of group often adhere to a more literal
interpretation of biblical texts.

Discussions in such a group

generally remain on the spiritual, rather than temporal plane. on
the other hand, a group that interjects its individual, real-life
problems into its biblical interpretation perceives the bible as
an enormous reinforcement of the community's commitment to social
change (Mesters, 1983:81).

It is, then, a specific kind of

biblical interpretation that is necessary for a base community to
make a religious-to-political transformation.

Elements of

community are not enough for the process of conscientizaci6n to
take place.
Thus, a special type of direct contact with the biblical
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text within the CEB helps create a bond of legitimation between
that which one believes and that which one does (Betto,
1983:501).

Through the long and gradual process of

concientizaci6n, community members come to see God as a "padre
bueno" who wants his children to fight for social change as a
united community (Mora, 1991).
As we have already seen from Mesters, the process of
conscientious-awakening results from a comparison of reality and
the Word of God.

Reflection of the concrete reality of the

individual's life takes the form of a series of outreaching
circles (Deelen, 1980-1981: 398).

Emilia Mora (1991), a Spanish

Maryknoll laity leader, describes this process in her barrio in
Barinas, Venezuela.

She contends that CEB members envision

themselves as creating a better world, but that this betterment
begins in the home.

Members' first concerns are the problems in

their own family--fights between spouses, disputes between
parents and children and family feuds.

It is only slowly that

some CEB members extend their reflection first to the barrio,
then to the town, and finally to society in general (Deelen,
1980-1981: 398).
I have already indicated that the process of
conscientizaci6n is by no means an inevitable transformation
which occurs in all base communities.

Some communities never

make the jump from a religious to a political orientation.

Other

communities never extend their concerns beyond their own personal
spiritual and temporal lives.

In other words, consciousness-

awakening is not a concrete, easily defined phenomenon.
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J.B. Libanio (1977) offers an in-depth exploration of the
process of conscientizaci6n in his book Spiritual Discernment and
Politics.

Libanio discusses the process of consciousness-raising

within base communities.

According to him, the first step in

this process is that individuals come to question their own
reality or social position.

He contends that a change in

conscience is characterized by a dialectical comprehension of
reality.

One's social position often determines this perception

of reality (Libanio 1977:10-12).

Thus, a suspicion or

questioning of one's social position is involved

in the larger

questioning of the overall reality of the individual.
According to Libanio, the cultivation of suspicion or
questioning of the individual concerning his or her reality is
dependent upon the orientations and perceptions of the larger
civil or religious society to which he or she belongs.

"A

community (such as the Church) that is embedded within the
established order is not aware of any threats to itself and is
satisfied ••• it does not present to its members the possibility of
developing a consciousness oriented toward change" (Libanio,
1977:14).

Thus, structural changes in the larger society which

affect the Church's perceptions of social reality will, in turn,
affect the individual's transformation of his or her
interpretation of reality.
We can extend this interpretation to the specific, Brazilian
context by noting that emergence of many socially and politically
active base communities occurred during the crisis of the
Catholic Church under the pre-coup democratic governments.
orientations of members of the Brazilian hierarchy directly
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The

affected the raising of consciousness of individuals within base
communities.

A document issued by the Archdiocese of Sao Paulo

for distribution within CEBs is a good example of how hierarchy
openness to political and social change is imparted to the
individuals at the base:

Everyone should participate in politics,
because everyone is a free and responsible
citizen. The citizen has a right and an
obligation to give an opinion, criticize what
is wrong, suggest new paths and indicate the
real needs of the people (quoted in Levine and
Mainwaring, 1989:215).

On the level of individual consciousness Libanio discusses
the source of the suspicion necessary for prompting the
individual to question his or her view of reality and way of
acting upon it.

Libanio contends that the interaction between

ideology and praxis determines the individual's perception of
reality.

Thus, the source of questioning of one's reality is a

new experience or praxis which casts doubt or suspicion upon
one's former praxis and corresponding ideology (Libanio,
1977:15).

This new praxis and the questioning of the former

ideology creates a new way of perceiving reality.
experience can come in many forms.

Said praxis or

It can be the result of

direct contact with a distressing social reality, an apostolj_g _ -experience shared with suffering persons or new access to
theological insights (Libanio, 1977:15).
deprivation" among the masses:

fostered "relative

"Restlessness, dissatisfaction,
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the perception of a lack of essential values and of meaning in
existent structures are factors that promote a possible change in
social position" (Libanio, 1977:14).
In this manner, concientizaci6n is not solely the result of a
newly obtained ideology or theoretical world view.

Raised-

consciousness comes out of the individual's quotidian experience
and is then complemented by a new ideology (liberation theology).
As Paulo Freire, the founder of the liberating educational method
within Brazilian base communities and the first to use the word
"conscientizao," puts it:

••• the illiterate peasants do not need a
theoretic context to arrive at an awareness
of their objective oppressed situation.
This awareness occurs in the concrete contexts
of their lives. It is by way of their daily
experience with all of its dramatic evidence
that they become aware of their oppressed
condition. But what their awareness-coming out of an immersion in daily life
conditions--does not give them is the reason
for their exploited condition. This is one
of the tasks that we have to accomplish in
the theoretical context (CIDOC 396:5).

Of course, the effect of this praxis or experience on a
group is dependent on several factors.

Many communities

experience extreme poverty and violence without ever changing
their fatalistic perceptions of their social reality or moving to
organize for social change.

Libanio sees the new praxis' effect

on the cultivation of new suspicion and questioning of social
reality as being related to structural interpretations of the
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greater religious society and basic characteristics of the
community involved.

In other words, certain conditions are

necessary besides just the daily experience of the individual for
a group to redefine its reality according to a new ideology.
Self-confidence of the group as a community, an ''openness" to new
ideologies and a critical awareness of prevailing perceptions of
reality are all characteristics that facilitate the creation of
the suspicion necessary for consciousness-raising (Libanio, 1977:
17).
Once individuals within a base community come to question
previously formed ideologies and perceptions of reality, they
gradually extend their reflection to their social and political
setting.

Analysis of the individual's socio-political reality

within the context of his or her christian faith leads the
individual to take action to remedy the sin and injustice
manifested in society's contradictions.

Christianity, then,

forms the basis of the individual's decision-making process
(Libanio, 1977:52,59,61).
Ultimately, concientizaci6n is the link-up of faith and
life experience.

The individual's religious faith becomes the

stimulating force which urges him or her to social action in
order to change the individual's reality or life position.
Leonardo Baff describes this relationship between religious faith
and socio-political interpretations or ideology:

"Faith

incorporates a ~olitically clear vision because here faith
basically means a practice or 'an active conception of the
world"' (quoted in Azevedo, 1987: 146).
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Base ColllJllunities and Socia1 llovements

After having investigated to some degree the process of
concientizaci6n on the individual level within the base
community, I turn now to consider the base community as a center
for collective mobilization.

The role of the base community in

the process of social change has been extremely significant in
Brazilian society.

Often individuals, first become active in a

CEB and then move on to active participation in a political
party, social movement or other politically oriented
organization.

The PT (Worker's Party) formed through the

migration of individuals from CEBs to partisan politics.

As we

have also seen, base communities themselves often act as social
movement organizations in an effort to effect social change.
The relationship between base communities and social
movements in Brazil is varying and complex.

Here I shall give

some examples of different social and political movements and
their relationship with CEBs.

I shall then draw some conclusions

as to the specific role of the base community and its ideology of
liberation theology in Brazilian social change.
Most popular movements in Brazil during the 1970's and 1980's
involved large numbers of individuals who were previously active
in CEBs or other base, laity groups. 6

As Herminia Maricato stated

in an article in Em Tempo in December of 1978:

"The Church is

the great organizer of social movements in the barrios of Sao
Paulo ••• without her 90% of the popular movements that exist today
would not exist; I would say" (quoted in Evers, 1981:1385 my
translation).
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The Public Transportation Movement in Vitoria began in 1978
in Vila Velha.

This movement formed around the shortage of public

transportation vehicles and the monopoly of the Alvorada company
within the transportation system (Doimo, 1989:194).

CEB and

pastoral linkages with this movement were extremely strong.
The publication of the CNBB document Christian Requ irements for
A Political Order and discussions within CEBs directly prompted
the mobilization of the people around the issue of
transportation.

Furthermore, CEBs provided the movement with an

organizational model and settings for discussion.

The movement

utilized the pre-existing network of twenty-six CEB
neighborhoods, which insured unity and facilitated communication
within the movement (Doimo, 1989:198).

Pastoral agents were

active in the movement's general commission and had coordinating
roles in demonstrations and marches (Doimo, 1989:198).

In 1979

after a series of demonstrations, bribes and manipulations the
mayor gave in to the demands of the movement and accepted bids
for transportation companies from other states.

Shortly after,

the Verdun company established itself in the city and broke the
intra-city monopoly (Doimo,1989:199).

After this victory many

pastoral agents decided to reduce their participation in the
movement's General Commission.

They felt the movement needed to

be more autonomous in its coordination and actions.

On November

4, 1979 the assembly of neighborhood associations decided to end
the movement.

This shows the movement's great dependency both on

the pastoral agents and on base communities.

At this point, all

the established neighborhood transportation commissions were
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virtually indistinguishable from the CEBs.

After the pastoral

agents diminished their participation, the movement became more
and more decentralized according to CEB territories.

Members

became involved in more specific problems in their own
neighborhoods, and gradually dropped out of the larger collective
movement (Doimo, 1989:200).
Another large-scale popular movement with strong linkages to
laity organizations was the Construction Worker's Movement of
1978-1979.

This movement involved an extremely impoverished

category of workers who demanded higher wages, public
transportation and safer working conditions.

The leaders of the

movement were all active members of the Pastoral Workers
Commission in Vitoria (Doimo, 1989:200).

The commission held

discussion groups in which the workers discussed their concerns.
As they raised more and more issues and reflected upon the
injustice of their situation, members of the workers' group
gradually developed the idea that they had to educate and
organize their fellow workers.

They were no longer satisfied

with the small church meetings and were anxious to apply the
organizational experience and new awareness they had gained in
the Commission to organize and act collectively to change their
situation (Doimo, 1989:203-204).
The workers received full support from the Archdiocese of
Vitoria, who ratified the ideas and actions of the group in its
various sessions of the Pastoral Council.

In the minutes of one

of these sessions, distributed to grass-roots, ecclesiastical
groups, the Council defined the workers' plight as a
" ••• situation of poverty, which impedes the puilding of this
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kingdom (God's) ••. "

They declared the solution to this problem:

"overcome exploitation and achieve the future" (Doimo, 1989:204).
The Pastoral Worker's Commission and the auxiliary bishop of
the Archdiocese of Vitoria put the workers into contact with
leaders of the Metalworkers' Union Opposition.

In this way

workers from both groups worked together to create an autonomous
union movement organized from the bottom up (Doimo, 1989:204205).

In September of 1979 the movement culminated in a

trade-wide strike.
Church support was extremely significant in the organization
and continuation of the workers's strike.

CEBs collected funds

for the workers and held discussions concerning the issues
proposed in the strikes. These discussion groups, in effect,
"completed in the barrios the mobilization initiated in the
factories" (Betto, 1983:498, my translation).

Parishes printed

strike leaflets with Church newsletters (Mainwaring, 1989:168 and
Doimo, 1989:202).

When the State declared the strikes illegal

and imprisoned various movement leaders, the Church intervened,
opening its doors as meeting places for striking workers.
Claudio Hummes was one of the union negotiators.

Bishop

Such obvious

support of the Church was a decisive factor in the movement's
ability to continue and to gain ground in pressuring leaders to
draw up new contracts (Mainwaring, 1989:168).
The Cost of Living Movement of the 1970's and early 1980's
demonstrates a distinct relationship between social movement
and Church.

In 1973 a group of members of Mothers' Clubs wrote a

letter to the State authorities, proclaiming the rise of the cost
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of living and the many problems it creates for the poor.

The

press published this letter, and it became a significant issue in
the elections of 1974.

In June of 1976 4000 people (mostly

women) met to discuss the continued cost of living.

Various

politicians and Church representatives were present, and
participants read a letter directed to the authorities, listing
their concerns (Singer, 1980:97-98).
By 1977 the movement had spread throughout the greater Sao
Paulo region.

Delegates of different communities met to elect a

general assembly for the movement.

In addition, regional and

sector meetings were established.

These groups mobilized large

sections of the periphery and organized petitions in churches and
community centers.

Soon, new groups had formed in other cities

like Salvador, Vitoria and Nova Iguacu (Singer, 1980:98).
Unlike the other movements I have described, the Cost of
Living Movement did not develop directly from CEBs or laity
church groups, nor did it exhibit the same open affiliation with
the Church institution.

This is not to say that the movement

had little to do with the Church.

On the contrary, priests,

seminarians and church members all participated actively in the
movement.

Even selected members of the hierarchy publicly

expressed their support of the movement in the face of criticism
by the State (Evers, 1981:1386).

There did not, however, exist a

direct and exact correlation between CEBs or other Church groups
and movement organizations (such as in the case of the emergence
of workers movement from the Pastoral Workers Commission).
CEBs were especially influential in the organization of the
Cost of Living Movement.

Most of the movement's members had had
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previous experience within CEBs.

Like the CEBs, MCV groups

developed in the periphery of the city and was initiated and
organized on the base level.

Regional groups from the movement

collaborated with local CEBs in the coordination of activities
and other tasks (Evers, 1981:1385-1386).

Furthermore, the MCV

(Movimento do costo da vida) relied heavily on the infrastructure
and network of the preexistent organizations of the barrio-especially CEBs.

The sub-divisions within the movement's groups

followed the episcopal circumscriptions of the Catholic Church
(Evers, 1981:1374).
The organization and the structure of the MCV groups closely
followed the same model patterns of the local CEBs.

Members of

the MCV groups made decisions through discussions at the base,
and no formal hierarchies existed in the movement structure.
Discussions at all levels of the movement's organization were
characterized by respect for all speakers and the democratic
process (Evers, 1981:1375).

In fact, the very agenda of the MCV

groups was almost exactly the same as most CEBs.

MCV members

discussed problems of the family, human rights and workers'
concerns--the same issues treated in most CEBs (Evers,
1981:1386).

Finally, the MCV groups worked on the neighborhood

level to mobilize residents through raising their
consciousnesses.

Established leaders employed the same methods

as Paulo Freire (which they learned of during previous CEB
experiences) to awaken the consciences of individuals in the
group.
Finally, I shall mention the many groups of land squatters
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and agrarian reform struggles that exist throughout Brazil.

In

1976 a particularly pronounced land squatter movement took place.
This movement emerged and took place almost exclusively through
local CEBs.
Amaro.

It was supported by the Pastoral Commission of Santo

In movements such as this one CEBs themselves invade

nearby government or privately-owned land.

In the case of this

particular land squatter movement, the Pastoral Commission
contracted lawyers to aid in the proceedings. To pressure city
authorities who often refuse to supply such areas with urban
services, inhabitants of confiscated land appeared in mass at the
seat of the regional administration.

Pressure such as this often

causes officials to receive squatters and begin land negotiations
(Singer, 1980:94).
community.

Again, CEBs often perform these seizures as a

The Church institution often holds a protective role

against state repression and provides other resources for such
small movements such as meeting places, lawyers and limited
financial aid (Mainwaring, 1986:194).
All of the above-mentioned movements have in common some kind
of relationship with ecclesiastical base groups.

One notices,

however, that despite this relationship only one movement
consisted of CEBs performing collective, political action as a
base community.

Instead, members of CEBs or other base church

groups move on to form new organizations with the purpose of
organizing collective political or social action.

Collective

action performed by CEBs tends to be just that--collective
action--rather than sustained, long-term social movements.

Also,

most social movements that emerged directly from CEBs or base
groups gradually separated from the Church, ~ecoming more and
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more autonomous. {The Workers' Movement and the Neighborhood
Movement are good examples of this tendency).
It is obvious that the process of concientizacion is
particularly significant in stimulating individual members of
CEBs to participate in social movements.

The CEB promotes

critical consciousness among its members.

Concientizaci6n

enables the individual to perceive contradictions in society.

He

or she comes to question his or her own poverty as well as other
social injustices.
Furthermore, the structure of the CEB stimulates new
sources of leadership by stressing self-expression and
participation within the group.

Education is always an important

ingredient of the base community.
read and write.

Community members learn to

Through discussions they analyze their life

situation and reflect upon new issues.

The group listens to each

individual member and respects his or her opinion.

Members of

the group bring out one another's capabilities and support them
{Levine and Mainwaring, 1989:219).

Collective decision-making

helps members gain self-confidence and insight.

The individual's

participation in the decision-making in the group also provides
him or her with a source of motivation {Doimo, 1989:217).
Exercising this right to shape society's future can become a
means of self-realization for the individual within the base
community {Mainwaring, 1986:230).

CEB members feel that they

have a role in determining their future.

Their raised-

consciousness gives them a heightened awareness of the injustice
of their situation, while new leadership skills and confidence
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make them feel capable of changing their life conditions.
Awareness of contradictions and leadership skills of a
number of individuals, however, do not assure the emergence of a
social movement.

A unified movement needs a source of

mobilization, collective identity and motivation (see
introductory section desc~ibing McAdam's political process model
for social movements).

Ana Maria Doimo (1989) proposes another

theory of why CEBs are such a source of the emergence of social
movements.

According to Doimo, it is the religious aspect of the

CEB that makes them such a source of social action Doimo states
that religiosity provides the people of the CEB with a unifying
force and creates a sense of group identity even among
individuals of a socially heterogeneous population.

Religion is

already deep-rooted in the Brazilian people's consciousness and
culture and,thus, forms a mobilizing force within the community.
Religiosity prompts community members to make a commitment to the
participation and organization

of collective action.

Under the

principles of liberation theology community members participate
in collective action or social movements in the name of Christ.
This creates a point of deeply-rooted identity among members of
the community (Doimo, 1989:216-217).
christian duty.

Collective action becomes a

The social movement organization is transformed

into an instrument of God, and commitment to the movement is
strengthened.
In social movement terms what Doimo is stating is that
religion (and more specifically liberation theology) forms the
ideology of the group.

Ferree and Hess (1985:26) speak of an

ideology of a movement as being a "way of explaining reality that
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makes sense to potential participants and justifies their
involvement." "The ideology must support identification with the
group (which is probably prior to feelings of grievance) and
perceptions of opportunities for change (which is prior to taking
advaJ'.ltage of them)" (Ferree and Hess (1985:26).

Obviously,

concientizacion and other elements of liberation theology
develop in the individual a particular interpretation of reality.
We have already seen how liberation theology urges the active
participation of the oppressed to achieve their liberation and
bring about the kingdom of God.

In the context of the social

movement, then, liberation theology becomes an ideology.
Religious beliefs become the reasons behind collective
mobilization.

Commitment to Jesus Christ becomes commitment to

the social movement.

The principles of liberation theology

mobilize and motivate members of the CEB in their
participation in collective action.
Liberation theology also provides CEBs and social movements
that emerge from them with another important resource--that of
collective identity.

Through concientizacion and discussions of

biblical texts, individuals come to see themselves as members of
"el pueblo de Dios."

Liberation theology teaches them that it is

the oppressed who must liberate themselves and bring about the
kingdom of God.

Individuals come to identify with this group of

"oppressed," and unite with other members of this group to
implement social change.
community.

The nature of the CEB is that of a

Community-building unites different individuals, who

come to see themselves as belong ing to a specific group.
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Thus, a

community or group consciousness forms.

This stimulates cohesion

and commitment within the group and facilitates collective
action.
Although there is much evidence supporting the fact that
CEBs are instrumental in cultivating all the necessary resources
for a social movement, to end our investigation here would be to
greatly simplify a complex phenomenon.

For, despite the

mobilizing and unifying effects of the principles of liberation
theology within the CEB, most initiators and leaders of Brazilian
social movements were previous members of these communities, who
left their base communities in order to form new groups
specifically for the purpose of mobilizing for collective action.
If all the necessary ingredients for a social movement were
present within the CEB, then why did individuals feel they had to
leave the community in order to establish social movement
organizations?
Brazilian CEBs that did organize and participate in
collective action commonly struggled for immediate, local reforms
(land squatter movements and protests for securing urban services
such as water).

They rarely mobilized around broader, long-

ranging objectives. but rather attacked specific, local problems
which affected the individual lives of the community members
(Deelen, 1980-1981:403).

Although the great majority of CEBs

stated support for popular movements, they maintained a principle
of not becoming the vehicle for channeling popular demands
(Mainwaring, 1989:167).

When individuals within a group felt

they should organize around a long-ranging, country-wide issue,
they chose to move to a different median through which to
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accomplish mobilization.
We can see examples of this tendency of individual's leaving
the CEB in order to mobilize for deep, structural socia change in
the case of Azuleika Sampio of Brazil (Levine and Mainwaring,
1989:216-220).

Azuleika became the leader of a neighborhood and

woman's movement in her district.

Her initial impulse for

political involvement came from her participation in a local CEB.
There, her vision of the world radically transformed, as she
became increasingly conscious of the injustices present in her
society.

As Azuleika became more and more active in lay groups,

such as the diocese's chapter of the Justice and Peace

r

Commission; members of the clergy encouraged her to become active
in politics.

Although Azuleika still participated in CEB

meetings, she soon became active in the neighborhood movement, a
secular, mass movement which emerged from various church
organizations and later became an autonomous, popular movement.
The neighborhood movement shared many of the same concerns and
objectives as did the CEBs.

The majority of its members had CEB

experience and shared the same common liberation-theologyideology as the base communities.

And yet, individuals

interested in long-term collective action chose the MAB
(Movimento de Amigos de Bairro) as their platform for action.
When asked about the reasons behind her decision to become
involved in the MAB, rather than acting within her CEB, Azuleika
responded:
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The CEB was important for me because it gave me
a chance to read the bible, to get involved in
the neighborhood, to begin to sense the
importance of politics ••• But few people in the
CEB have a political vision. The CEBs discuss
a lot, but they don't act ••• I couldn't realize
my objectives in the CEB. The CEB is concerned
with the narrow world of the neighborhood and
community (Levine and Mainwaring, 1989:220).

Various other analysts have offered explanations for this
phenomenon.

Gottfried Deelen (1980-1981:403) suggests that

although CEB members share common beliefs in the principles of
liberation theology, they still lack a class consciousness and,
for this reason, do not envision long-term objectives.

He, also,

postulates that "when CEB members discover that oppression is not
occasional, but embedded in the system, they realize that
politics is an autonomous, temporal reality" (Deelen, 19801981:404).

According to Deelen, individuals like Azuleika Sampio

feel that to effectively act for social change, a movement must
operate completely in the political plane--separated from the
Church.

Paul Singer (1980b:214) puts it:

" ••• soon it becomes

clear that transformations must take place in the political
plane, to gain influence in the apparatus of the State."
Apparently, individuals see deep, structural political change as
only occurring through political channels--that is, through ·a
secular-based social movement.
Marcello de

c. Azevedo (1987) holds a similar theory.

Azevedo holds that CEBs cannot have a lasting political impact.
Their contribution to social change is the consciousness-raising
that occurs within them.

For true political change to take
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place, the people, themselves, must change existing structures
through purely political channels.

It is up to the common people, and especially
the ever increasingly conscientized lay
people of Brazil to expand their participation
and exert pressure on politicians and the
outmoded political structures of the country
(Azevedo, 1987:150).

r·

According to Azevedo, CEBs exert a great impact on society in
areas where there are land disputes or other forms of oppression,
because state repression prevented the civil society from
expressing itself.

In cases such as these (for example, during

periods of military regimes and National Security Doctrines) the
Church adopts a proxy role of civil society and stimulates
f

struggle (Azevedo, 1987:148).

Such actions by the Church should

not, however, become institutionalized.

Azevedo contends that

CEBs must preserve their own identity by separating their
religious vision from the political one of the popular movements.
Only in this way can long-standing social change be accomplished
(Azevedo, 1987:151).

Thus, Azevedo seems to say that

individuals that leave the CEB in order to mobilize popular
movements are simply acting in the optimal manner for
implementing social change.
Azevedo is, in fact, restating the redefined position of the
Church hierarchy in the late 1970 1 s.

I have already indicated

the great influence the hierarchy exerts over the entire
institution of the Catholic Church, including the seemingly
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independent, radical base.
level of investigation.

It is important not to neglect this

During the greater part of the 1970's

the Church represented the only channel of popular expression
capable of confronting state repression.

For this reason, many

popular movements began as church-based programs or
organizations.

At the turn of the decade, however, the political

situation had changed.

The "abertura" and

reorganization of

political parties promised greater political freedom in the
future.

This caused the Church hierarchy to redefine its

relationship with popular movements.

As in the case of the

Public Transportation Movement, pastoral agents began to
encourage movement autonomy and separation from the Church
(Doimo, 1989:205).

Instead, clergy members urged movement

activists and CEB members to unite and work with the new
political parties within the newly existent political channels.
Frei Betto explains this position:

The idea is to assure the autonomy of
the grass-roots community and workers'
organizations and, at the same time, to
create the condition for them to have an
impact through a political channel of the
system of legislative, judicial and
executive powers (quoted in Doimo, 1989:206).

At the same, new conservative strains were becoming more
expressive within the Church hierarchy.

The 1978 election of

Pope John Paul II and the 1972 election of conservative Bishop
Alfonso Lopez Trujillo as the Secretary General of

71

CELAM

signaled the beginning of a renewed conservative restoration in
the Church hierarchy (Della Cava, 1989:153, 159).

Members of the

conservative Latin American hierarchy, allied with conservative
European hierarchy members began a campaign of pulling the
"People's Church" out of politics.

This alliance gave the Latin

American conservatives a substantial mobilizing strengths in that
it provided them with money and a firm base in the European
hierarchy.

This presented a contendable force against the laity-

based "People's Church" (Della Cava, 1989:153, 160).
Conservative members' of the hierarchy main concern was Church
unity, which they felt was being threatened by CEB and other
church organizations involvement in politics.
This shift in the hierarchy greatly affected the orientation
of CEBs.

Pastoral agents adopted more conservative positions and

urged a separation between church-based organizations and

r

political movements.

This new orientation of the pastoral

sectors from the late 1970's was a prominent factor in the
general decline of massive urban movements from 1980-1982 (Doimo,
1989:210).

Bishops and Archbishops of the nee-conservative

alliance pushed for closer supervision of CEBs by the hierarchy.
Archbishop Salles clearly states the conservative hierarchy's
position:

"The CEBs are Church and, therefore, are born from

Christ; their mission is not determined by the people"
(Mainwaring, 1989:172).

Thus, the tendency of CEBs to not be,

themselves, vehicles of popular action can be partially
attributed to processes within the hierarchy which directly
affected the base.

For, even the nearly-autonomous CEBs remained

part of the Catholic Church institution.
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Liberation Theology, the CEB and Political and Social Change

To determine liberation theology's effect on social change
in Brazil,

I turn, first, to politics and the influences this

theology has had in this sphere.

Obviously, the greatest

political change that occurred during this
"abertura" of 1979.

time period was the

Scott Mainwaring (1989:183) analyzes the

popular movements role in the political liberalization of the
party system:

"It is difficult to argue that grass-roots

movements (Catholic or otherwise) played any significant role in
the military government's initial decision to promote political
liberalization." The government began the process in 1974 when
most popular movements were extremely weak.

Once the process

began, however, popular movements (including CEBs) greatly
influenced the formation and orientation of the newly-forming
political parties (Mainwaring, 1989:184).

With the opening of

the military regime, the electoral process became more
meaningful.

For the first time in more than a decade, the

government sought to respond to popular demands in order to gain
support in the up-coming elections.
Although popular movements comprised only a small percentage
of the over-all population of Brazil, the government considered
them a threat in that they were difficult to co-opt (Mainwaring,
1989:184).

The firmness of the popular movements in their

position and their unified stand were greatly due to a the common
ideology developed within the CEBs.

Concientizaci6n and

discussion within CEBs had sharpened member's capacity for
critical thinking.

Therefore, popular movement members'
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experience in CEBs was an important factor in strengthening them
against cooptation.
At the end of the Geisel administration and the beginning of
the Figueiredo period, the government implemented various changes
in policy that reflected broader changes in attitude towards the
popular sector (Mainwaring, 1989:.184).
these changes.

Party reform was one of

Although the government's ulterior strategy in

party reform was to divide the opposition and, thus, maintain the
regime's control over the political sphere, they were forced to
make some concessions to some of the demands of the opposition in
order to maintain popular support.

One of these concessions

appeared in the form of economic reorientation.

The Figueiredo

administration implemented policies of promoting income
redistribution toward low-income sectors of the population.

In

urban areas the government improved services and built housing
projects (Mainwaring, 1989:184-185).
Besides influencing the government's policies in the
political and economic fronts, popular, Catholic groups
(including CEBs and social movements emerging from them) were
active in supporting opposition parties.

As in the case of their

relationship with popular movements, CEBs maintained a somewhat
separated stance from political parties (for reasons I have
already discussed).

This is not to say that CEB members were not

active in the newly-emerging parties, rather, the base community
as a group did not involve itself directly in party proposals and
formation (Betto, 1983:499).

Instead, CEB leaders maintained

themselves attentive to the emerging party proposals so as to
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facilitate better party discernment among their members.

In the

tradition of concientizaci6n, CEB discussions of political party
agendas maintained a sense of critical awareness.

Political

education was an important element of the agendas of CEB
meetings.

Thus, party preference of CEB members often fell upon

opposition parties in accordance with specific regional concerns
and popular bonds of each party (Betta, 1983:499).
Thus, CEB members seemed to be able to make independent,
political decisions in the elections.

Adherers to various

parties live peacefully within the same base community.

The

first elections after the abertura confirmed that not even the
party option of the pastoral agents within the CEBs was able to
influence the vote of the community (Betta, 1983:499).
maintained their autonomy

CEBS

vis-a-vis politicians by avoiding

clientelistic linkages and, thereby cooptation.

This

characteristic of the CEB was carried over into many Catholicinfluenced grass-root movements and helped strengthen many
popular movements in the face of political cooptation
(Mainwaring, 1989:171).
Again, this is not to say that CEBs and the other catholic
groups had no part in party formation or orientation.

CEBS and

popular movement organizations were especially influential in the
formation of the PT or Worker's Party.

The party formed through

the unification of various organizations of the popular sectors
of the Sao Paulo region--progressive organizations of the Church,
sectors of the Brazilian labor movement, remnants of the 1960's
leftists, and union opposition organizations (Doimo, 1989:207).
Its structure was similar to the CEB in that it was a grass75

roots-based organization.

The PT emphasized popular needs in its

political agenda and many of its active members were catholic
grass-roots leaders (Mainwaring, 1989:174).

Scott Mainwaring

(1989:174) describes the PT's relationship with the Popular
Church:

"The PT was inspired by progressive Catholic ideas

emphasizing popular participation, grass-roots democracy, popular
organization, and basic needs ••• In 1983, according to one study,
71 percent of the CEB participants who made a party option
supported the PT."

CEBS, Liberation Theo1ogy and Long-term Change

Despite the liberation of the political system and the end
of the military regime in 1985, few of the living conditions of
the poor had changed by the mid-1980's.

In 1987 the minimum real

wage reached an all-time low and interest rates soared to nearly
double the 20% per month rate of inflation (Hewitt, 1989:130).
The new democracy of 1985 was a disappointment to many grassroots leaders who saw the changes it brought about as being
superficial and not deep structural ones (Levine and Mainwaring,
1989:221).

In spite of the change to a democratic system, many of

the politicians associated with the Brazilian military
dictatorship managed to retain a considerable amount of
popularity and were able "to negotiate a transition to democracy
(

that maintained intact the broad parameters of the political
system" (Levine and Mainwaring, 1989:221).

Although the

Brazilian Congress elected Tancudo Neves to be the transitional
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president until direct, popular elections could be established;
his untimely death led to the establishment of the Sarney
government.

Sarney was Neves' vice president and a militarist!

The 1980's saw a much weakened political impact of the
CEBs, as the governmental administration became more and more
conservatively oriented.

Part of the reason behind the CEB's and

other popular movements' silence in the face of the changing
tendencies of the government has to do with institutional
processes within the Catholic Church hierarchy.

In the overview

of this paper we saw how the neo-conservative movement within the
Latin American and European Church emerged in the late 1970's.
This process of conservatization (which to some degree was led
by Pope John Paul II) translated into a weakened "option for the
poor" in the Brazilian context (Hewitt, 1989:127).
Traditionally conservative members of the Brazilian hierarchy
and even radical ones began a steady move to the right in their
positions (Hewitt, 1989:129).

This tendency, again, reflected a

general down-playing of the theme of social justice by Rome,
itself.

The Vatican showed a preference to the appointment of

more moderate clerics to key posts in Brazil.

For example, in

May of 1984 the pope appointed Jose Freire Falcao, a well-known
opponent of liberation theology, as the archbishop to Brasilia.
Also, in 1984 Rome sent Cardinal Josef Hoeffner to Brazil to
review its seminary instruction.

The Cardinal warned Brazilian

bishops against the use of the image of Christ as a revolutionary
(Hewitt, 1989:131).

In 1988 the Vatican removed CNBB president

and social reformer Luciano Mendes de Almeida from the position
of the archbishop of Sao Paulo (Hewitt, 1989:132).
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Brazilian members of the hierarchy exhibited equally
conservative orientations.

In January of 1987 the archbishop of

Maceio disbanded a local "political education" team of the MEB
because of its connections with the radical left.

The Archbishop

defe~ded his action by stating it was "to preserve the authority
of the Pope and to ensure that the pastoral mission of the Church
would not be depreciated" (quoted in Hewitt, 1989:128).

In 1985

Cardinal Eugenio Sales of Rio de Janeiro barred liberation
theologian Clodovis Baff from instructing in any schools (Hewitt,
1989:131).

Finally, in the spring of 1986 Cardinal Arns of Sao

Paulo called in the military police to disperse rioting students
at the Pontificia Universitaria cat6lica.

The students rioted

after being prohibited from viewing a controversial film on the
life of the Virgin Mary (Hewitt, 1989:129).
Present also in the conservative tendencies of the Brazilian
hierarchy was a renewed preoccupation with traditional religious
questions of morality.

For example, Dom Serafim Araiyo, runner-

up in the elections for the presidency of the CNBB, repudiated the
Minas Gerais state government for promoting the use of condoms
for the prevention of AIDS (Hewitt, 1989:128).

Similarly, in

1987 Dom Benedito Vierira, the former vice president of the CNBB,

warned federal authorities that programs of family planning
11

should be undertaken only under 'moral' conditions" (quoted in

Hewitt, 1989:129).
This removal of the Brazilian hierarchy's support for the
political action of the CEB's can also be attributed to new
social and political developments in Brazilian society.
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A lack

of military repression of popular movements meant that the Church
was no longer the only channel for the masses to bring about
political change (Hewitt, 1989:133).
redemocratization

Similarly, the

of the political system meant that popular

organizations could work within established political channels to
express their demands and did not necessarily have to resort to
collective action.

Thus, there no longer existed an urgent need

for the Church to act as a leader and principle organizer of the
popular classes in search of social justice.
Like all members of the Latin American hierarchy, Brazilian
clergy became newly concerned with Church unity as parishioners
seemed more involved with political party activities than with
Church-based ones.

The Church began to feel it was competing

with secular value movements such as labor unions.

Furthermore,

the new democratic leaders often had liberal ideas, which the
Church viewed as challenging its moral authority within Brazilian
society. (For example, some state administrations began family
planning and sexual education programs) (Hewitt, 1989:133).
The fact that the removal of clergy support coincided with a
decrease in CEB and popular movement political activity indicates
the relative dependence of these organizations on clergy
mobilization skills and other resources.

We saw a similar

phenomenon in the case of the public transportation movement
how, due to strong movement-CEB ties, support of the clergy was a
critical factor in the unity of the movement.

Also, the case of

Azuleika Sampaio exhibits this tendency for CEB dependency on
clergy members.

When the progressive priests left Azuleika's

barrio, local CEB activity ceased (Levine and Mainwaring,
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1989:220).

Instances such as these indicate that, although

liberation theology urges clergy members to encourage lay
autonomy, a great deal of laity dependence upon the clergy, both
within base communities and CEB-influenced popular movements
still existed.
Despite the limits of CEB's .and liberation theology's
influence, we can still cite elements of significant impact upon
Brazilian society.

The most prominent of these is the

process of consciousness-raising--a fundamental

element of the

CEB organization and a major principle of liberation theology.
Concientizaci6n greatly changed the way the popular classes
viewed themselves and the world around them.

For the first time,

members of the masses saw themselves as capable of changing the
conditions in their lives.

Within the CEB everyone had a chance

to speak and the opinion of each individual was respected.

The

encouragement by clergy members for popular participation and
expression of opinion and the emphasis on respect and
egalitarianism developed important popular leaders.
Concientizaci6n caused members of the popular classes to
participate in politics.

This phenomenon directly challenges the

tradition of elitist, authoritarian structures within the
political sphere and little or no political participation by the
masses.

Scott Mainwaring (1986:211) points out:

"traditionally

political parties went into neighborhoods at election time, made
promises and then disappeared."

Processes within CEB's were

directly responsible for a renewed "popularism" or "basismo" in
Brazilian society.

For the first time, peasants and members of
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the periphery were not afraid to speak out against elitist
domination of politics.
Liberation theology reinforced popular unity within the CEB.
In turn, CEBs and other grass-roots Catholic . organization greatly
influenced many popular, social movements.

CEBs provided social

movements with organizational and mobilizing strengths including
a sense of "cognitive liberation," a common ideology and strong,
popular leaders (Macadam, 1982).

Frei Betto (1983:500) contends,

"The appearance of the popular movement is the new phenomenon in
the political scene."

New, organized and unified popular

movements challenged elitist governments in that they were
difficult to co-opt.

The ideology of liberation theology and

common CEB experiences were prominent elements of popular
movement organization.
The emergence and actions of popular movements may not have
been the only causes of governmental policies in the late ?O's
and early 80's, but it seems clear that these movements
contributed to the administrations changing attitudes towards the
popular sector (Mainwaring, 1989:184).

The party reform of 1979

and process of redemocratization were in partial response to the
threat that popular movements posed to the established order.
CEBs were also instrumental in the encouragement of popular
participation in elections and encouraged and supported
opposition parties with popular views (Mainwaring, 1989:185).
Although the Sarney government steadily remained in the
center and implemented superficial, rather than deep, structural
changes in the political system; it did implement an agenda of
social reform in response to the demands voiced by the popular
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sector.

In 1985 the Brazilian government began resisting the

austerity measures imposed by the IMF and Brazilian international
creditors.

President Sarney in an address to the United Nations

in September of 1985 exclaimed:

"Brazil will not pay its foreign

debt with recession, or unemployment or with hunger!" (quoted in
Beers, 1986:950).

The government also implemented programs of

agrarian reform and literacy (Beers, 1986:951). Thus, popular
movements--greatly influenced by liberation theology and CEB
experiences--did receive some governmental responses to their
demands.
Another important, although not entirely obvious, manner in
which liberation theology has had a significant impact on
Brazilian society has occurred on the individual level.

One

cannot neglect to note that the process of concientizaci6n is a
tremendous experience of personal and religious growth for the
individual.

The teachings of liberation theology transform the

individual's way of viewing his or her relationship to the world.
CEB members come to see themselves as occupying a significant
place in the scheme of the universe.

This experience becomes a

source of great individual empowerment and a view of increased
self worth.
Central to liberation theology is the reading and discussion
of the scriptures.

Thus, one cannot fully participate in the

principles of liberation theology if one is illiterate.
Perhaps the single most significant contribution of liberation
theology is the education of the poor.

Education expands the

individual's awareness and completely changes the way he or she
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perceives the world.

such a drastic transformation of the world-

views of a large group of people is, indeed, a form of social
change.
Finally, liberation theology within base communities is
largely responsible for a new sense of community and fraternity
among members of the popular class (Mainwaring, 1986:211).
People that at one time only came in contact with one another at
mechanical and cold religious services came to see themselves as
a community.

Instead of searching for individualistic solutions

to problems, CEB members began to work together as a community to
help one another to collectively solve problems.

For the first

time the group exerted unified efforts to better the conditions
of the community as a whole.
belonged.

People came to feel that they

Individuals, instead of suffering in isolation from

one another, came to work together for change.
Liberation theology, then, is an ideology responsible for
the transformation of many individuals world and self views.
This transformation, in turn, greatly affected the mobilization
of individuals within popular movements.

The emergence of

unified popular movements created a perceived threat to the
established government and was a factor in the changes of
policies and attitudes towards the popular sector.

Thus,

liberation theology cut through various levels of the social
structure.

Although its greatest influence lies on the

individual and community level, it is apparent that it has also
had impact upon broader social and cultural structures within
Brazilian society.
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Rotes

1Many theorists have treated the question of why the Brazilian
Church came to opt for the poor. Most theories fall under two
categories--the "institutional" and the "grass-roots" approaches.
W.E. Hewitt (1989) provides a detailed overview of the various
theorists and their positions. Social scientists who adhere to
the institutional approach see the preferential option for the
poor as a calculated response to institutionally related
challenges such as the rise of Protestantism, the emergence of
Marxism, and the process of modernization. Under this approach,
the institutional church reacts perceives these challenges as
threats to its influence in society. See Vallier (1970), Bruneau
(1974) and Della Cava (1978) for detailed presentations of this
approach. The "grass-roots" approach is often the position of
liberation theologians. This approach draws upon a Marxian
interpretation of social change. Theorists such as Enrique
Dussel say the church's preferential option for the poor
emanates from the a base-rooted Christianity. See Gustavo
Gutierrez The Power of the Poor in History . Maryknoll, Ny:
Orbis Books, 1983 and W.E. Hewitt (1989) for explanations of this
approach.
2 see Scott Mainwaring (1986) and Thomas

c. Bruneau (1974) for
discussions of the different church factions, their origins and
rise and deline of influence.
3 see Scott Mainwaring (1986), Florencia A. Mallon•s "Peasants and

Rural Laborers in Pernambuco. 11 Latin American Perspectives. v.
5, n. 4. 1978, 49-68. and the sources cited therein for a
more detailed descriptions of these popular lay movements, their
origins and ideologies.

5 For an analysis of the social class membership, race and gender
of CEB participants in Brazil; see John Burdick. "We are All
Equal: Social Differentiation in a CEB in the Brazilian Urban
Periphery." July 9, 1989.
6 Here

I have selected a few representative social movements. I
do not at all pretend to present a definitive list of cases.
Because of the plethera of issues concerning race and gender and
social movements, I have chosen not to discuss CEBs and the
Brazilian feminist movement or African-Brazilian movements. An
excellent opportunity for further research would be an analysis
of the process of concientizaci6n within CEBs and its effect on
consciousness-raising within the communities of women and
African-Brazilians. See chapter 6 of Paul E. Singer and Vinicus
Caldeira Brant (1980) for various articles concerning AfricanBrazilian movements in Brazil and chapter 5 of the same source
for a discussion of the feminist movement. Also see Anazir Maria
de Oliveira and Odete Maria da Concei9ao, "Domestic Workers in
Rio de Janeiro: Our Struggle to Organize." Pp. 363-372 in
Muchachas No More. Elsa M. Chaney and Mary G~rcia Castro (eds.),
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Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1989 for a discussion
of the movement to organize domestic workers. The article
provides some insights as to the influence of Catholic
organizations like the Joe in the mobilization of this movement.
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Section III:
Colombia

r

We don't worry that there is hunger in Africa;
we are hungry here. Or that in Africa,
Vietnam, Israel, Egypt of Korea there is war.
Here we are also at war. What happens is that
in some places the fight is one way, and in
others it is different (CEB lay leader quoted
in Levine, 1986:207)

Bistorica1 overview of the Political Situation in Colombia

In the overview presented in the first section I outlined the
general political and social processes occurring in Latin America
from World War II up until the Puebla Conference of 1972.
I showed how Brazil generally adheres to this model.

Later,

This

section of my investigation, however, will show that the case of
Colombia greatly differs from the model presented in the overview
and, consequently, contrasts greatly with Brazil.

Whereas in

Brazil we saw the pre-Medellin emergence of groups with
liberationist orientations, in Colombia we shall see how fearful
bishops rejected any "political" involvement Church-affiliated
groups.

Brazil, the birth-place of the CEB and the home of Paulo

Freire, appears in many ways to be the antithesis of Colombia
with its conservatism and intolerence for popular mobilization.
While in the case of Brazil we saw examples of pastoral
agents and even bishops calling for the politicalization of base
communities, in Colombia we shall see how the rigid
conservatism of the hierarchy and clergy in many cases stymied
CEB politicalization and coalition with any popular groups.
Similarly, the Colombian case will represent the opposite end of
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the spectrum from the "popularism" of Brazil.

Instead of acting

as a mobilizing resource for popular movements, in Colombia
tightly, vertically controlled base communities limited their
activities to local social improvement or religious projects.
Unlike Brazil, Colombia has not experienced long periods of
military regimes or political unrest due to popular movements.
Instead, Colombia has a history of a democratic, bi-partisan
system.

From the late 1800's the Conservative and Liberal

parties were in constant opposition in a struggle for control of
the government.
Of course, a democratic government does not insure political
or social stability.
extreme.

Competition between the two parties was

Rural communities especially would develop strong

partisan identifications.

These forms of identification were so

ingrained in the community life-style that they became manifest
in what one could refer to as "hereditary hatreds."

To be born

into a particular community came to mean to be socialized into an
inherited and strongly felt commitment to a political party
(Medhurst, 1984:17).

This intense popular party identification

led to extremely violent partisan conflicts.

During the 1930's,

40's and 50's La Violencia, as became known, claimed the lives
of over 700,000 people (Levine and Wilde, 1977:227).
Inherited partisan commitment in the rural communities
established a series of regionally based patron-client political
relationships.

This meant the political conflict cut across

lines of social class 1 (Medhurst, 1984:17).

Geographical

barriers to communication contributed to the development of "a
plurality of discrete regional entities" (Meqhurst, 1984:17).
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Kenneth Medhurst (1984:18) posits that the networks of patronclient political relationships established within the rural
villages impeded the mobilization of an effective nationwide
opposition by counter-elites--thereby preserving the two-party
system.

Most of the violence occurred between such regional

communities of different political affiliation in the form of
mass slaughters.

Guerrilla groups, associated with these

"peasant republics" formed and, later gave rise to powerful
guerrilla groups such as the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces
(FARC).

The assassination in 1948 of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, a popular
liberal leader, sparked the most intense period of La Violencia.
The conservatives reacted to the violent liberal opposition with
equally violent repression, using the police, army and informal
vigilante groups (Levine, 1981:62).

With the approach of the

1949 elections conservative President Mariano Ospina Perez formed
a coalition government of interparty cooperation in the face of
the outbreak of violence.

Despite these efforts, the liberals,

fearing the ever-increasing violence, withdrew from both the
coalition and balloting for the up-coming elections (Dailey,
1973:392-393).

consequently, the ultra-conservative Laureano

Gomez won the elections unchallenged.
Gomez immediately established near Franco-style power.
censored the press and limited all political activities.

He

His

police force, in an effort to quell violence, generally
aggravated it (Dailey, 1973:393).
remained strong.
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La Violencia intensified and

In an unusual step in Colombian history the military
arranged a coup, removing Gomez and establishing General Gustavo
Rojas Pinilla as the president.

The military dictatorship

initially received public favor as a way to escape La Violencia.
During the first year with promises of rehabilitation offered to
the guerrillas the level of violence decreased (Dailey,
1973:393).

Soon, however, the regime became discredited by

economic failures, official mismanagement and blatant corruption
(Medhurst, 1984:23).
By 1957 the military had come to the realization that it had
replaced one dictator with another and removed Rojas Pinilla from
office.

It established in his place a military junta which ruled

for one year before returning governmental power back into
civilian hands (Dailey, 1973:393).

In 1958 the military turned

over the government to the National Front.

This coalition

government provided desperately needed solutions to the problem
of La Violencia.

It presented a plan for a sixteen-year-long

arrangement in which the presidency would alternate between
parties on a four year basis.

All government posts below the

presidency were to be shared between parties, and the seats in
both Houses of Congress would be equally divided between them
(Medhurst, 1984:23).

In 1974 conventional elections were to

resume but party sharing would still occur at levels beneath the
presidency.
Although the National Front did quiet La Violencia, it could
not erase some long-ranging effects which this period had upon
society.

A significant result of La Violencia is the formation

of several guerrilla groups.

The "peasant republics," which
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formed during the years of La Violencia proved fertile ground for
the formation of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC)
(Wickham-Crowley, 1989:134).

This guerrilla group was closely

allied to the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) and became the
largest such group in Colombia, eliciting very strong peasant
support in some regions of the country (Wickham-Crowley,
1989:171).

The Cuban Revolution sparked the formation of the

Fidelista Army of National Liberation (ELN) in Santander and
Chinese-oriented Communists formed the Popular Army of Liberation
(EPL)

(Wickham-Crowley, 1989:134).
The military periodically attacked and suppressed these

groups who inhabited the rural, mountainous areas of the country.
The groups gained strenth in the 1970's, reaching a membership
count in the thousands by the early 1980's.

Reoccurring

skirmishes between the military and guerrillas were proof
that violence was still alive and well in Colombia (WickhamCrowley, 1989:135).

The catholic Church in Colombia:

A Historical View

In many ways the Colombian Catholic Church represents the
polar opposite of the Church in Brazil.

It is the most

conservative and influential of the Latin American Catholic
Churches.

The Constitution of 1886 established the Catholic

faith as the official religion of Colombia, and the Concordat of
1887 gave the Church jurisdiction over education at all levels
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and its own internal affairs, while at the same time establishing
a union of Church and State (Weis, 1970:144; Daily, 1973:382).
Unlike in other Latin American countries, the Colombian Church
has managed to firmly retain its influence within most spheres of
society.

Its presence and power are still visible at many levels

of Colombian society.

For instance, the possibility of civil

divorce and civil marriage without a public declaration of
abandonment of the Catholic faith did not exist until 1973
(Levine, 1981:71).

A Catholic primate still sits alongside the

President at most official functions, and it is said that through
the 1960's the government could not pass a law without the tacit
approval of the Archbishop of Bogota (Dailey, 1973:382; Schoultz,
1971:102).

No bill which received his open disapproval could

pass as a law.
Theorists have have discussed the reasons that the Colombian
Church is so integrated into society.

Robert H. Dix (1967:307)

attributes the Church's influence in society to the rise of the
Antioquefios, who are some of the most Church-oriented Colombians
and also among the leaders of the modernizers.

Thus,

"modernization and support for the position of the
Church ••• coincided rather than conflicted" (Dix, 1967:307).

The

Church's strong ties to the Conservative Party and the latter's
political dominance from 1886-1930 could also explain the
Church's position of influence (Dix, 1967:307).

Politics, La Vio1encia, and the Church

As noted in the above paragraph, the Catholic Church has a
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long history of strong linkages with the Conservative Party.

The

Conservatives typically used religious sentiments as part of
their electoral campaigns and received direct support and
legitimation from the clergy and hierarchy (Weiss, 1970:143).

In

the initial phases of La Violencia the Church wholeheartedly
threw all its support behind the Conservative party.

Members of

the hierarchy and clergy saw La Violencia as a strategy of
revolution implemented by the Liberals in order to destroy (among
other things) the Church (Levine, 1981:64).

They condemned the

liberals as communist atheists (Levine and Wilde, 1977:229).
During this period, Bishop Angel Builes of Santa Rosa de Osos in
Antioquia proclaimed in a Lenten message that no Colombian could
be a member of both the Catholic Church and the Liberal Party,
which was "the enemy of Christ and his Church" (Wilde, 1984:8-9).
Prior to the 1949 elections, clergy in Popayan repeatedly
threatened lower-class liberals with excommunication if they
voted for their party, bishops issued pastorals which forbade the
faithful from voting for liberal candidates.

The pastorals

indicated that the Liberals would "implant civil marriage,
divorce and co-education, which would open the doors to
immorality and communism" (Dix, 1967:308-309).
As La Violencia increased with such acts of animosity as the
burning of Churches and convents and even the killing of priests;
the attitudes of the Church towards politics changed.

The

continuation of intense violence combined with the breakdown of
the political system and military rule in 1953 led the hierarchy
and clergy to the consensus that the Church should not intervene

92

in party politics (Levine, 1981:65).
It became apparent to members of the Church that peace would
come to Colombia only if the two parties could coexist.

Church

involvement in party politics would simply reinforce the
"hereditary hatreds" which fostered La Violencia (Levine and
Wilde, 1977:231).

Thus, in 1958 the Church enthusiastically

endorsed the National Front and opted for a neutral position in
active support of the coalition (Levine, 1981:65).
La Violencia had a long-ranging impact upon the Colombian
hierarchy and general orientation of the Colombian Church,

for

the memory of the savagery of the Violence prompted an almost
automatic rejection of grass-roots "politics" (Levine, 1986:192).
The bishops see any form of political activism as leading to
renewed violence.

According to the bishops of Colombia La

Violencia is an example of how violence is counterproductive to
social transformation in that it mostly harms the poor, who serve
as shock troops for the upper-class partisan cliques (Levine,
1981:192).

Thus, they conceive as any involvement in any popular

movements for radical change as being potential sources of
renewed, massive violence.
To the bishops of Colombia, "political" involvement of the
clergy or laity groups represented other dangers besides just the
potential for the outbreak of violence.

Politics could divide

the Church, limiting both its unity and effectiveness as an
institution (Levine, 1981:193).

Political activism would divide

the Church community and, so, such endeavors
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far from having helped to create sensitivity
and awareness about the grave problems of our
society, not only represent a discouraging
factor which even leads to harmful reaction
among those who situate the meaning of their
commitment within the lines set by the Church,
but in addition they delay and hinder possible
actions. The useless tensions they generate
within the Church itself are, without a doubt,
an obstacle for the inteniive and coherent
kind of action which is necessary in important
areas of social pastoral work ••• (quoted in
Levine, 1981:93-94).

Stress on Church unity and hierarchical authority became a
prominent theme in the Colombian Church.

To preserve the

Church's unity, bishops emphasized the hierarchical structure of
the Church and the distinctions between the clergy and laity
(Levine, 1981:87).

An essential component of "Church unity" is

the loyalty of members of the hierarchy and clergy to the
traditional structures of the Church.

In the previous section

of this paper we saw how the politicalization of the popular
Church occurred in dioceses in which the bishops exhibited liberal
orientations (such as in the Northeast).

To ensure that all

members of the hierarchy maintained a strong degree of loyalty to
the Church structure, potential bishops were required to become
thouroughly socialized in the values of the institution before
they were able to rise to positions of leadership.

They spent

long years in isolation within ecclesiastical structures and were
expected to develop a strong loyalty to these same structures and
a desire to maintain unity within the Church (Levine, and Wilde,
1977:240).

Because of the process involved in becoming a bishop,

few Colombian bishops developed liberal postitions or desired to
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work for change of the hierarchical structures of the Church.

llodernization and Social Reforms in the Co10Jlbian Church

The "intensive and coherent kind of action which is necessary in
important areas of social pastoral work" is in reference to the
efforts of social reform which the Church exerted in response to
the social crisis manifested in La Violencia.

Anti-catholic acts

such as attacks on churches, the Archbishop of Bogota's palace
and other symbols of ecclesiastical authority gravely disturbed
Catholic leaders.

These acts provided insight into the Church's

loss of influence within the urbanized lower social strata, while
La Violencia cast doubts as to the Christian foundations of
Colombian society (Medhurst, 1984:31)

In responseto the "moral

decay" that was evidenced in the vicious violence of the previous
years, the Church shifted its prioritiesto pastoral activities.
It turned to the strengthening of its own structures by creating
new dioceses and parishes especially in the urban areas and
stimulating new clerical vocations through the the construction
of new seminaries (Levine and Wilde, 1977:231).

The Church also

expanded its social and pastoral outreach through the Acci6n
Popular radio schools and trade unions.

It established a group

for the national coordination for Catholic social action and
created institutes for sociological research (!CODES and CIAS) to
interpret social problems and help to focus the Church's pastoral
action upon them (Wilde, 1984:20).
Although these programs directly involved pastoral
outreach to the laity and a newfounded concern for social
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problems, their goal was not radical, structural change.

The

basic orientation of the Colombian clergy and hierarchy remained
conservative.

Members of the hierarchy and pastoral agents

accepted the existing stratification of society and preached the
need for harmony among the different classes (Wilde, 1984:20).
To maintain unity within the Church community, social
programs and pastoral publications stressed loyalty to the
hierarchy and reinforced its authority within the Church
structure.

A pastoral document entitled "Pastoral Instruction"

of 1954 discusses the authority of the bishop within the Church
structure:

There is a substantial difference between the
Church and democratically constitiuted
nations. While citizens of these nations may
intervene in public affairs according to
particular circumstances and laws, in the
Church those who pretend to exercise functions
which the will of Jesus Christ reserved for
the pastors of his flock, the Pope and the
bishops, are guilty of a real usurpation,
reckless and unjustified, and undermine the
very foundation of the society established by
the Son of God (quoted in Levine, 1981:87-88).

Social programs operated under clerical paternalism and were
closely linked to the larger Church and hierarchy (Kadt,
1967:93).

This comfortable scene of a conservative, yet

reforming and unified Church was suddenly disrupted by the
efforts of a single, radically oriented priest and his following.
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cami1o Torres

Father Camilo Torres was born into one the most noble
families in Colombia.

As a youth, his travels with his mother,

who was married to a diplomat, provided him with unusual contacts
and a broadened world perspective (Gozzer, 1969:239).

He entered

the priesthood under the influence of the Dominican priests of
Colombia, who espoused French social Catholicism (Levine,
1981:41).

In 1954 he traveled to Louvain University in Belgium

to further his clerical education.

There, he came into contact

with new reform-oriented currents of Catholicism and returned to
Colombia in 1958 inspired with ideas of Catholic action (Weis,
1970:147).

He founded the sociology department in the National

University, where he was both a professor and a chaplain.

In 1959

he formed a movement in the university for community development
to organize the popular classes and to raise the consciousnesses
of those in the "barrios" (Weis, 1970:147).
Torres' initial orientation was toward direct political
action, but he exerted caution with regards to the Catholic
hierarchy.

He carefully searched for hierarchical consent for

his early social reform actions.

Also, he avoided as much as

possible controversial, theological and doctrinal themes
(Gozzer, 1969:241).

As time passed, however, Torres became more

and more oriented towards radical change.

He proclaimed the need

for drastic ecclesiastical reforms, declaring that the Church
should become a church of the poor.

As for his fellow

Christians, Torres affirmed that the duty of all Christians is to
give a "revolutionary testimony" and direct their actions towards
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structural change (Weis, 1970:148).
By 1965 it had become clear to Torres that it was impossible
for him to effectively lead a revolutionary struggle from within
the structures of the Church.

Reluctantly, he wrote a letter to

the Cardinal, requesting that he (Torres) be relieved of his
priestly obligations.

The Cardinal Concha Cordoba whole-

heartedly agreed, adding that Torres could never again be
readmitted in the priesthood.

By this time, Torres' radical

platform of revolution of the underclasses had attracted the
attention of the ruling classes and Church hierarchy, who had
lauched a campaign of persecution through the press and
ecclesiastical publications (Weis, 1970:148-149).

The Cardinal,

upon relieving Torres of his priestly duties, accused him of the

incitation of the subversion of the public
order which could lead even to the use of
violence ••• Therefore, the ecclesiastical
authorities, to avoid any responsibility,
inform all Catholics that we categorically
condemn the activities of Camilo Torres as
they are opposed to the Church doctrine
(quoted in Gozzer, 1969:254).

Now, positioned entirely within the political realm, Torres
organized the revolutionary "Frente Unido del Pueblo" to bring
together all progressive forces in the country in order to bring
about revolution.

Finally, in late 1965 Torres, who sought an

even more revolutionary mobilizing force for change, joined the
Army of National Liberation (ELN).

This guerrilla group had

begun operations in the mountains of eastern Colombia where it
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combatted government troops sent by the threatened ruling
classes.

In early 1966, gun in hand, Torres died in a skirmish

with an army patrol in the mountains of northeastern Colombia
(Dix, 1967:280; Levine, 1981:41).
The figure of Camilo Torres is especially significant in
that he provided a model which many see as a precursor of
liberation theology.

Like the liberation theologians who would

come after him, Torres saw religion and politics as necessarily
joined.

For Torres, the true Christian was obliged to be

political.

He saw authentic religious faith as requiring action

to transform unjust social structures (Levine, 1979:27).

Torres

summed up his position as revolutionary in the following citation:

I am a revolutionary as a Colombian, as a
sociologist, as a Christian and as a priest.
As a Colombian, because I cannot be a stranger
to the struggles of my people; as a
sociologist, because thanks to the scientific
knowledge I have of reality, I have arrived at
the conclusion that technical and effective
solutions [to social injustices) cannot be
accomplished without revolution; as a
Christian, because the essence of Christianity
is love of our fellow man, and only through
revolution can we arrive at a state which
benefits the majority; as a priest, because
devotion to one's fellow human being that
exists in revolution is a requirement of
fraternal charity, indispensable in the
carrying out of the sacrifice of the mass,
which is not an individual offering, but is,
rather, from all of God's people (quoted in
Oliva,1970:137-138).

Torres shook the comfortably established, politically
neutral Church in Colombia.

He created within the Church and

among Colombian catholics the image of a Catholicism committed to
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political revolution and introduced the conception of a Christian
commitment to the oppressed sectors of Colombian society (Weis,
1970:149).

Torres pointed out in his call to reform of the

Colombian Church that the Church's support of the National Front
legitimized, de facto, the hierarchically patterned order of
society in which both parties originated.

According to Torres,

the Church's new policy of political neutrality masked an
underlying support of the status quo (Medhurst, 1984:34).
As one would expect, Torres' critics accused him of
communist orientations and violent intentions.

The case of

Camilo Torres was, indeed, a forerunner of the future dialogues
between catholics and Marxists which would occur in the soon-toemerge theology of liberation.

When asked if he believed that

the process of revolution would lead to socialism, Torres
responded in the following manner:

11

•••

It is indubitable that

only two forces can direct these changes, only they possess a
global conception of the world:

Christianity and Marxism"

(quoted in Concha and Ifiguez, 1977:55).

The same interviewer

asked what his position would be if the revolution he so desired
would have a Marxist direction, and Torres responded:

"In this

case our work is not to blindly oppose, but to colaborate in the
revolutionary changes and save the permanent, Christian values in
them" (quoted in Concha and Ifiguez, 1977:55).

Torres, like the

liberationists who would come later, criticized the government
and Church hierarchy's rigid anticommunism, saying:

"Anti-

communism is at times a sophism distraction used by the directors
(within the hierarchy] to excuse them from having to resolve the
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problems of the base" (quoted in Guzman:367/5).
Torres' analysis of the Colombian social structures rings of
liberation theology.

In 1963 in a paper presented at the First

National Congress of Sociology in Bogota, Torres pointed out that
the channels of ascending social mobility in Colombian were
structurally obstructed for the great majority of .the population.
This social immobility, which was especially accentuated in the
rural areas of the country, was responsible for the violent
outbreaks of the guerrilla groups (Guzman:367/6, 367/8).
Father Torres' view of violence was especially controversial
both within the Church hierarchy and ruling government.

In a

response to the reporter Jean Pierre Sergent, Torres expressed
his position:

"My conviction is that the people have sufficient

justification for the use of a violent route" (quoted in
Guzman:367/8).

This idea that violence was a necessary evil

reminds one of the more revolutionary spheres of liberation
theology such as that found among the revolutionary priests and
laity in the FSLN in Nicaragua.
Vatican II' and the Colombian Church

The case of Father Torres was not an isolated, unconnected
phenomenon.

It reflected existing pressures within the greater

Colombian and Latin American society to combat injustices and
search for methods of social change.

These same ideas of social

action were reflected in the Church hierarchy in the Second
Vatican Council.

The Colombian Church played very little part in

the debates that led to the Vatican Council's conclusions.
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As

in the case of Father Torres and his following, the Colombian
hierarchy was shocked and, indeed, taken aback by the results of
Vatican II.
Members of the Colombian hierarchy generally accepted the
Council's pronouncement on religious liberty and the liturgical
reforms.

The bishops, however, tended to see Colombia as a

"special case" in that its overwhelmingly catholic nature meant
that many of the Council's conclusions did not apply {Medhurst,
1984:187).
The hierarchy openly resisted many of the changes urged by
Vatican II.

After the Council the Colombian chief Catholic

newspaper El Catolicismo published many debates concerning the
conclusions of the Council.

The editorial staff of the newspaper

used its columns to develop arguments which were in tune with
many Vatican II themes.

Members of the staff published columns

arguing for reforms to make the liturgy more accessible and
posited programs to enhance the openness and reciprocity between
the clergy and laity {Medhurst, 1984:189).
In September of 1966 Cardenal Luis Concha Cordoba, the
Archbishop of BogotA demanded the editorial staff's resignation.
He reprimanded the team, saying, "the ideological orientation
that you have given to the newspaper in recent times brings with
it serious problems which I as Archbishop feel obliged to avoid"
(quoted in Medhurst, 1984:189).

The Archbishop, later, commented

to bishops who asked for guidance in interpreting the Council's
conclusions:

"The prescriptions of the Council did not

oblige .•• the Colombian Church to take immediate action in the
social field, only in the liturgical sphere" _(quoted in Medhurst,
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1984:190).
Pressures from the Vatican and progressive Post-councilor
currents did, however, eventually, lead the Colombian Church to
espouse a structural critique of society and to seek ways to
become more integrated within the daily life of the community.
Although the Colombian Church implemented new pastoral action
programs, it retained its reluctance to become involved in
"politics."

Memories of La Violencia were still intact,

the

majority of bishops still objected to the participation of the
hierarchy and pastoral agents in the direct promotion of social
change.

They saw the role of the institutional Church as

providing legitimation for such actions to take place and guiding
the laity in its actions by establishing in them Christian
orientations, while not participating directly in social actions
(Levine and Wilde, 1977:235-236).

A document from a Post-

councilor episcopal conference sums up the Colombian Church's
view of its role in social action.

Only the constructive and humanizing renovation
is an object of acceptance and of interest for
the Catholic Church ••• Change can affect
neither the essential conception nor the
structures of the Catholic Church ••• one could
speak of reform, rather than change ••• The
temporal order is the realm of the laity;
guided by a Christian conscience, they should
orient structures, the culture, and human
accomplishments in a Christian fashion. We
insist upon the autonomy of the temporal realm
and the existence of spheres which do not
compete with the Church ••• (guoted in Weis,
1970:152).
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Vatican II-inspired programs in Colombia included the
launching of the Institute for the Study of Development, whose
activities were to be "oriented to elaborating and diffusing a
Christian vision of economic development adapted to Colombia's
particular situation" (Medhurst, 1984:191).

In addition, that

year's episcopal conference strongly reaffirmed the Church's
commitment to land reform.

The Colombian of Church continued its

campaign of pastoral Action as pressures for social involvement
increased with the Medellin Conference and emergence of
liberation theology.

The Colombian Church's Reactions to the Medellin Conference and
Liberation Theology

At the time of the Medellin Conference CELAM's bureaucracy
was largely in the hands of more progressive leaders with whom
the Colombian bishops were out of sympathy.

This lack of

influence of the Colombian hierarchy in CELAM during the time of
the Medellin Conference was evidenced in the organization's
reaction to the Colombian document presented at Medellin.

The

document which the Colombian bishops presented at the conference
was largely out of synch with the prevailing themes of Medellin.
Instead, it reflected the concerns of the Colombian bishops
withChurch unity, hierarchical authority and fear of political
activism.

The document called for solidarity among the social

classes and all people and condemned the "negativism" of
comparing one's own condition to that of others who are better
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off, the underestimation of spiritual, and the excitement of
hatred toward those who are prospering (Mutchler, David E.,
1971:138).

CELAM refused to even consider this document.

Its

silence was a direct rebuff of the conservative orientations of
the Colombian bishops.
As might be expected, the majority of Colombian bishops
were extremely critical of the final documents of the Medellin
Conference.

They especially rejected the picture portrayed in

the Conference of South America as a continent in
pre-revolutionary stages and the explanation of underdevelopment
in terms of unequal distribution of income.

According to the

bishops, attempts to explain underdevelopment in this manner was
"a facile tendency that distorts investigation, disfigures the
problem and can impede the possible development of the continent"
{quoted in Mutchler, 1971:135).

The bishops were reluctant to

place any blame on the rich for the underdevelopment of Latin
America, seeing this as a possible source of disunity in the
Church:

"To propose [the unequal distribution of wealth] as the

sole cause ••. of underdevelopment ••• stimulates discord, focuses
all energies upon an internal struggle and sterilizes the
opportunities for fraternal action" {quoted in Mutchler,
1971:135).

In a statement in complete opposition to the themes

of the Medellin Conference,

the Colombian bishops in a

collective document published on September 5 following the
conference actually called for increased private investment and
"solidarity" among nations in the form of foreign aid in order to
combat underdevelopment and speed up the industrialization
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process (Mutchler, 1971:134).
It is not surprising that the Colombian bishops rejected
liberation theology as being fundamentally wrong.

The notion of

a popular church with its own liturgy, theology and lay ministers
was a direct threat to the bishops' image of church unity
(Episcopado de Colombia, 1977:201-202).

Members of the Colombian

hierarchy saw liberation theology's conception of "populismo" and
stress on class solidarity and shared authority as a challenge to
the fundamental structures of the institutional church.

Attempts

"to question the age-old structure of the Church, and to begin
only from the people, from their values, struggles and
contradictions; to rethink faith only from the perspective of the
commitment to the liberation of the poor and oppressed"
threatened the very existence of the Colombian Church (Levine,
1986:192, 195).

According to the bishops, the authentic "pueblo

de Dios" was all members of the Church, regardless of social
class, who exist in the Christian faith (Episcopado de Colombia,
1977:203).
Liberation Theology also challenged the Colombian bishops'
central view of hierarchical authority.

The bishops contended

that the authority of the hierarchy should occupy a central
position in any catholic organization.

They considered links to

the bishops and clergy as being the only core around which a
coherent and legitimate religious life could be constructed.
loosening of such links could become a source of social and
political conflicts; their reaffirmation was the only sure
foundation for the resolution of national problems (Levine,
1986:194).
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The

The socio-political interpretation of the bible espoused by
liberation theology was also problematic and challenged the
authority of pastoral agents and the hierarchy.
bishops complained

Colombian

that "the texts of the prophets are removed

from their original spirit and used as orders of a subversive
nature" {Episcopado de Colombia, 1977:209).

They saw this as an

intolerable alteration and a profanation of the Word of God.

The

true believer would know that the official interpretation of the
Word of God has only been granted to the Church Magistery who
exercises it in the name of Jesus Christ {Episcopado de Colombia,
1977:

209,211).

Another fundamental objection to liberation theology
which the Colombian bishops expressed was in relation to its
Marxist connotations.

The Colombian bishops saw Marxist ideology

weakening and eventually destroying Christian faith.

To them,

class struggle was fundamentally anti-Christian in that it often
involved violent solutions to social problems {Episcopado de
Colombia, 1977:188-189).
Here, the bishops' critiques of liberation theology reflect
their memories of La Violencia.

They cite Pope Paul VI to

support their argument against Marxism:

The Church can accept neither violence,
especially the use of armed forces ••• nor the
death of anyone as part of the road to
liberation, because she knows that violence
engenders inexplorably new forms or oppression
and of slavery {quoted in Episcopado de
Colombia, 1977:189).
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Indeed, any element of liberation theology which minutely
suggests the possibility of social revolution or violence was
incompatible with the bishops of Colombia's position.
This did not mean, however, that the Colombian hierarchy
completely rejected all aspects of the Medellin Conference and
even of liberation theology.

For example, the bishops did affirm

a strengthened commitment to the poor:

"The Church works for the

poor and we must intensify this commitment" (Episcopado de
Colombia, 1977:198).

They also maintained that the Church would

continue to search for "just and necessary" social reforms as
long as they did not involve antagonistic encounters (Episcopado,
1977:199; Levine, 1981:95).
The Colombian Episcopal document La I g lesia ante el cambio
reflects these renewed commitments within the Colombian Church.
This document represented the Church's reassessment of its image of
itself and the world.

It stressed the need for structural change

both in the economy and society and openly discussed poverty,
unemployment and dependency.

The document expressed an openness

to change and to social reform and sought new ways to reach the
masses (Levine, 1981:89-90).

It seemed that the bishop's mix of

triumphalism, strict anti-communism and moral lamentation had
given way to "studied denunciations of poverty, inequality and
injustice" (Levine, 1986:196).
It is important to note, however, that this initial
enthusiasm for social action was neither long-lived, nor radical
in nature.

The hierarchy and clergy, in general, approached

critiques of society from the position of the institution giving
guidance as part of a general rechristianiza~ion of the social
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order.

Church leaders criticized the injustices of society and

promoted reform while remaining within a tradition of clerical
domination (Levine, 1986:196).

They saw the Church's role as

activating capable lay people who would directly act to transform
society.

Valid orientations concerning social reform, then, were

to come from Church leaders and be transmitted to the laity.
Members of the laity were not encouraged to independently define
their positions on social change, but were to do the direct
action to bring about these changes (Levine, 1986:196)

Pastoral

agents, as representatives of the larger Church, were still to
refrain from direct intervention in the political sphere.
Monsefior Anibal Munoz Duque's (1970:72-73) public declaration in
1970 entitled "The Obligatory Denunciation of Injustice"
instructed poor parish priests as to their role in the new
reform-minded Church.

In keeping with the mandate received from the
Episcopal Ministry, priests• ••• duty is to
preach the faith with liberty, teach the
social, Christian doctrine and form the
conscience of the faithful, even in relation
to moral problems which have a connection with
the political order •••

The Monsefior continued, further outlining priests' obligations in
relation to politics.

The priests of the archdiocese, distinguishing
well their duty as sacred ministers and as
citizens, cannot intervene in political
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struggles in favor or against any candidate,
and the faithful should labor with their own
responsibility in accordance with their
Christian conscience correctly formed (Munoz
Duque, 1970:73).

Thus, the Colombian hierarchy still insisted upon political
neutrality even while calling for social reform.

The bishops

rationalized this seemingly contradictory position by deeming any
social reforms implemented by the Church as being "pastoral" and
not "political" in nature (Levine, 1981:195).

Daniel H. Levine

(1981:194) points out that this "pastoral" action was, indeed,
political in the sense that it viewed social problems in
structural terms.

He also contends that the local actions of

priests often drew the bishops into political positions.

If, fo~

example, members of the clergy were arrested, the bishops were
forced to make a political decision of whom to support (195).
As I have indicated this initial enthusiasm for social
action did not last long.

Soon it gave way to signs of caution

and withdrawal by the bishops.

The pastoral document published

by the bishops in 1971, entitled Justice in the World

reflected

the bishops new, more cautious position regarding social action.
Although in this publication the bishops continued to analyze the
Colombian situation in structural terms and spoke directly of
such issues as poverty and unemployment, this analysis was
accompanied by a concern that the predominance of temporal issues
and Church activity in social and political affairs threatened
Church unity (Levine, 1981:92).

According to this document both

extremes of total passivity and revolutionary violence were
dangerous.

caution is the predominant note (Levine, 1981:91-92).
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Perhaps in the past his [the Christian's]
revulsion from violence led him to minimize
injustice or to resign himself to it, but
today sensitivity to injustice and oppression
tends to aggravate itself and run the risk of
contributing to escalation of the struggle
between men who should be brothers (quoted in
Levine, 1981:92).

The document also included a harsh critique of the catholic
Left and liberation theology.

They rejected the conversion of

faith into a purely temporal notion by radical Catholics and
liberationists.

Similarly, the bishops objected to the

principles of liberation theology which transform the

"poor" of

the gospels into the proletariat, convert sin into purely social
injustices and identify evangelization with concientizaci6n
(Levine, 1981:92).
Justice in the World reflected tendencies that would soon
gain predominance in the larger Church with the papacy of John
Paul II and the resurgence of the Nee-Conservative movement.

The

document reemphasized the mysteries of the Church and the need
for unity of all classes within it (Levine, 1981:9'3).

Caution

replaced enthusiasm as the bishops reverted to former
conservative positions.
So far I have devoted this consideration of the Colombian
Church to an analysis of the general orientations of the
hierarchy at an institutional level.

To truly investigate the

effects of liberation theology, however, we must consider the
activities at the local and base levels of the Church.

For,

liberation theology is geared to affect the laity, and,
accordingly, a true investigation of this "ideology's" effect
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could not exclude this group.

CEBs in Colombia

With the Medellin Conference of 1968 and the subsequent
emergence of liberation theology, even the conservative Church of
Colombia became concerned with pastoral action at the grassroots.

The Colombian hierarchy, however, still feared the

political consequences of grass-roots activism.

Thus, all grass-

roots, Church sponsored organizations were marked by an emphasis
on ideological reliability.

This was ensured by strong,

subordinate links of vertical control with the hierarchy (Levine
and Mainwaring, 1989:222).

Daniel H. Levine and Scott Mainwaring

(1989:223) outline how these forms of vertical control operate.

"Reliable intermediaries" (pastoral agents and lay leaders
specially trained with an eye for loyalty to the institutional
Church structures) closely monitor all grass-roots activities,
so that their very organization reaffirmed the authority of the
hierarchy.

Pastoral agents made sure that grass-roots groups

undertook all projects in close coordination with the official
Church structures.
The practice of the Colombian hierarchy of carefully
training pastoral agents and orienting them towards loyalty to
the Church structures is significant.

In the case of Brazil we

saw how important radical clergy was to the implementation of
social action and establishment of CEBs (see page
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).

The

example of Camilo Torres also shows how influential a progressive
member of the clergy can be.
In Colombia after the Medellin Conference the institutional
Church closely guarded the training and identification of
pastoral agents (Levine, 1986:198).

The Bishop's Conference ran

a number of national programs and developed special courses and
pamphlets for training purposes.

Such programs involved long

expositions of the official social doctrine.

The training of

pastoral agents involved an emphasis on the strict distinctions
between the role of the laity and that of the clergy.
Seminarians were taught that the laity always occupies a
subordinate position to that of the clergy within the Church.
Teachings such as this were geared to create "reliable
intermediaries" who would represent the central interests of the
institutional church in their work with the base (Levine,
1986:199).
As we have seen in the Brazilian case, it was the members of
the clergy who established CEBs, and it was only later that laity
leaders took over the every-day mechanics of the organizations.
In Colombia, then, because the clergy was so indoctrinated with
the orientations of the hierarchy, the very establishment of the
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CEBs directly involved principles set up by the institutional
Church leaders.

Unlike in Brazil, the Colombian clergy and

hierarchy maintained tight control over all CEB activities.
Colombian clergy set up CEBs with a specific image, which
the hierarchy imparted to them, of what these groups should
become.

For the bishops the crucial dimension of the CEB was the

"ecclesial," rather than the "base" (Levine, 1986:200).
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Bishops

saw the ideal group as being "a seedbed for future clergy and
sisters" (Levine and Mainwaring, 1989:223).

A citation from a

preparatory report for the conference in Puebla reflects the
bishops• predominant image of the base community.

The best conditions for nurturing a vocation
of service to the Church are found in the
heart of the Christian community~ •• It is the
hierarchy which is charged with discerning
their proper content and exercise. Today,

these different conditions converge
principally in the CEBs as the beginning of an
era of lay ministries in the Church ••• CEBs are
fertile ground, as much to find and nurture
vocations of deacons as to exercise their
ministry as promoter, animator and unifying
link between the communities and their
pastors ••• (quoted in Levine, 1986:200 emphasis
is mine).

This quotation suggests that, for the Colombian bishops, the
production of clergy was a principal function of base
communities.
Daniel H. Levine 2 (1986, and Mainwaring, 1989) provides
detailed descriptions of two Colombian base communities.

These

accounts are extremely useful to the investigation of the
formation and daily activities of CEBs in Colombia.

Levine

{1986, and Mainwaring, 1989) provides examples of CEBs
in the diocese of Facatativa.

The CEBs were located in largely

poor and isolated communities.

The diocese had targeted this

area for CEB formation and had channeled much of its resources
for that purpose.

u.s.

Catholic Relief Services also provided

financial aid for the formation of base communities (Levine and
Mainwaring, 1989:230). The diocese concentrated a large group of
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religious personnel, designated to stimulate and encourage
groups there.

A full-time, professional staff maintained links

among the various organizations in the diocese, up to the
national and regional training programs and down to the network
of pastoral agents and lay ministers who ran the day-to-day
activities of the communities (Levine, 1986:204-205).

In the

case of one CEB in Agua Fria, two sisters, who staff the regional
center, maintained connections to the specialist staff of the
diocese (Levine and _Mainwaring, 1989:227).
The sisters played an extremely significant part in linking
the local CEBs to the diocese hierarchy.

They frequently visited

the various CEBs in the area, interpreted the diocesan plans
to the lay leaders, and, ran monthly meetings of the CEB lay
ministers (Levine and Mainwaring, 1989:227).
Within the CEBs, themselves, clerical domination was
predominant, while little internal democratization existed.
Pastoral agents would often run bible-study groups in which the
priests or sisters would precede to explain how passages should
be interpreted.

If a clergy member or sister was not present,

then carefully trained lay ministers would lead the discussion
groups.

Clergy members carefully monitored the behavior of such

leaders, who met monthly to receive instructions at the regional
center from the staff of sisters (Levine, 1986:205).
Such systems of clerical domination greatly inhibited the
autonomous actions of the CEBs.

Sister and priests, while

simultaneously denouncing paternalism, would draw up plans for
detailed programs and then instruct the CEB members in their
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implementation.

All CEB action had be cleared with the clergy

before it could take place (Levine, 1986:205).
Such vertical structuring also impeded
building.

local coalition-

Unlike in Brazil, where CEBs joined with other popular

groups to mobilize around social issues, Colombian CEBs were
often unable to join in common efforts with any existing
political or popular groups (Levine, 1986:205).

For example, it

is interesting to note that, unlike in Nicaragua, Colombian CEBs
never joined forces with the active guerrilla groups, nor have I
found documentation of CEB members joining the guerrilla movement.
Despite the limits that close links to the clergy and
hierarchy imposed upon CEBs, many laity members saw such an
organization as valuable.

These ties brought legitimacy to the

grass-roots organization in an atmosphere (rural Colombia) which
was extremely suspicious of any popular organizations as part of
the heritage of La Violencia (Levine, 1986:205, Levine and
Mainwaring, 1989:227).

Linkages to the diocese also tied groups

into a network of contacts and resources--very valuable
commodities, indeed, when one considers that CEB members were
generally quite poor and with little social status (Levine,
1986:205).
Levine's (and Mainwaring, 1989) description of the Agua Fria
CEB provides some interesting observations as to the impact of
the CEB organization on the community as a whole as well as on
its individual members.

Despite the vertical control systems

described above, this group

exhibited many of the same

tendencies as did the Brazilian CEBs.

As the group read and

discussed the bible, it uncovered shared problems and developed
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new initiatives of self-help and mutual aid (Levine and
Mainwaring, 1989:227).

The agenda of the group's concerns arose

both from shared needs and experiences and also from the themes
and programs that the diocese circulated in its close contact
with the group.

Members developed a system of rotating voluntary

labor to aid those in the community who were in need.

They would

help one another complete tasks such as house-building,
harvesting and paying off emergency medical bills (Levine and
Mainwaring, 1989:227).
The group also pooled their labor to establish a small
school and playing field and a community, cooperative store.
Patricio Alvarez, CEB member and lay leader, describes this later
project:

At first, we only got together to read the
bible. Later, we started talking about our
own family problems. We began to see that one
of the problems everyone in our hamlet had was
buying things in the markets, which everyday
is harder and more costly. Finally, we got
the idea of creating the cooperative (quoted
in Levine and Mainwaring, 1989:227).

The cooperative began in 1975 with the use of community-pooled
resources.

It is interesting to note that, later, Patricio and

other CEB participators joined an existing cooperative in the
nearby town of Quebradanegra and, there, pressed for better
prices and conditions (Levine and Mainwaring, 1989:227).
one must remember, however, that such achievements of social
action occurred within the constrained system of the diocese.
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Reforms remained limited to localized action of community
improvement.

There was little horizontal contact with other CEBs

or possible allies in social or political groups.

Moreover,

such actions more than likely received approval from the clergy-legitimation flowed from the top down.

As Daniel H. Levine and

Scott Mainwaring (1989:231) point out, "In Colombia ••• most
religiously inspired grass-roots activity remains deliberately
bound to church structures and programs in a way that reinforces
hierarchical visions of the world, in the process setting clear
limits to the potential political impact of CEBs. 11
Although the model of the CEBs of Facatativa was predominant
in Colombia, there did exist a small number of CEBs whose
organization was more in keeping with the CEBs of Brazil.

Daniel

H. Levine's (1986) description of the CEBs of Cali provides and
example of this type of community.

Unlike the case of the CEBs in

Facatativa, the Cali CEBs were urban communities on the periphery
of a major industrial city.

Also, instead of the Archdiocese

initiating the formation of CEBs, in Cali base community
organization represented an autonomous effort of small groups of
priests and nuns. These urban CEBs, then, did not have the
advantage of the access to the many resources the Archdiocese of
Facatativa could supply (Levine, 1986:204-205).
Constrasts between the two types of CEBs demonstrates how
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influential the orientations of pastoral agents are in CEB
development.

The CEBs in the barrios of Cali was the result of

small groups of sisters who lived in the neighborhoods and created
a cultural centers there.

These sisters lived in the barrios for a
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long period of time before initiating any programs, and
idenfified very closely with the community.
a library

They, later, set up

and offered courses on topics like theology, community

affairs, sewing and nutrition.

Activities such as these

attracted many residents and became the base for CEB formation
(Levine, 1986:209).
A group of foreign priests who staffed the local parish
helped the sisters by making churches available and legitimizing
CEB activities.

They made efforts to reorient the religious

rituals of their parish, making their content more communityfocused.

Their homilies gave the symbols of Christ's

resurrection and suffering a "more social and political
interpretation" (Levine, 1986:209).
Unlike in the Facatativa CEBs, the Cali CEBs did not involve
such strict systems of clerical domination.

The founding sisters

purposely avoided directive roles, allowing for a much greater
degree of democratic goverance and participation of the laity
members (Levine, 1989:208).

An active CEB participator's

statement indicates the openness of this group .

••• We all work to understand better, even me,
because you know there are so many things a
person doesn't know. No? The bible. We read
the gospels and we study every little bit.
And here we have people who have never known
anything. They read it there [in church], the
Father reads the gospel and that's it.
Because he says a whole world of things people
pay no attention to. But here we try to
explain things ourselves. We don't have them
explained to us, but ourselves we draw it out,
we discover what ve think (Levine, 1986:208,

emphasis is mine).
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Thus, the orientations of this group were much more in
keeping with the teachings of liberation theology--emphasis on
the base solving its own problems through concientizaci6n and
political interpretation of the scriptures.

Personal contacts

with the CINEP (I will discuss this group in more detail later in
the paper) allowed CEBs in the barrio to finance delegates to
national meetings.

The communities participated in networks of

similar groups of the Catholic Left.

Laxity on the part of the

Archdiocese and the progressive orientations of the local
pastoral agents were definite factors involved in this horizontal
contact (Levine, 1986:209).
Levine (1981:262) points out that the Archbishop of Cali's
openness to innovative, but centrally controlled, change along
with the weakness of Church institutional structures greatly
contributed to this particular CEBs' highly democratic and active
nature.

The commununity•s continued politicalization could,

however, lead to a sudden loss of church toleration as could the
appointment of a less sympathetic archbishop 3 •

A Catholic

activist describes the precarious situation of grass-roots
organization in Colombia.

This is not Brazil, where one has the
bishop's support. Here in Colombia the
hierarchy is opposed, and as we are few, it is
easy to destroy us. So this is our plan: sow
the seeds, let them grow, and later, when
these seeds are trees, with stength of their
own, then to be ready for the ecclesiastical
and official onslaught. But should it come
now, when the people are not mature, all this
will collapse (quoted in Levine, 1986:201).
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The withdrawal of clerical support would be equally
devastating to the CEBs' future.

As I have already shown, links

to the clergy provide base communities with a great deal of
legitimation and moral authority.

Such resources are extremely

significant to a group of poor people in an environment hostile
to popular organization (Levine, 1986:210).

Furthermore, the

parish priest (especially in rural areas) has traditionally
carried a great deal of authority in the community.

Often, he

was the only educated member of the community, and represented
a connection to the powerful, institutional church 4 •

Gustavo

Jimenez Cadena concludes from a 1965 series of interviews and
surveys of parish priests and lay people in Central Colombia
that, traditionally, the priest "is obeyed, both in material and in
spiritual affairs simply because he is the representative of God"
(quoted in Kadt, 1967:94).
Despite the constraints the institutional Church places on
all CEBs, base communities were sources of social transformation.
In the Brazilian case we saw the significance of concientizaci6n
as a source of personal change.

Even if the vertical control

of the hierarchy impeded the political action of base community
participators, CEBs raised people's awareness and changed their
lives.

Discussions within the communities, in spite of clergy

limitiations, still prompted the process of concientizaci6n of
the base.

A Colombian CEB members remarks:

Yes, programs come from the diocese, but
lately they are difficult and boring, too long
and too complicated. So people get bored.
And they have become more aware. They say,
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"Let's talk concretely about the problems we
have in the group, the families in our hamlet,
and see what solutions we can find." So we
search in the gospels where Jesus tells his
disciples to do this and that, and there we
find ideas. Just as yesterday the Lord told
this to his disciples, today he is speaking to
us in the same way: do good for others, and
there we end the meeting ••• so we get together
to discover what is going on, to see if we can
solve things (quoted in Levine, 1986:207).

Here we definitely see the same processes that occurred in the
Brazilian CEBs.

Discussion brings about the discovery of common

problems and forms cognitive liberation.

Readings of scriptures

provide legitimation for the group's search for change.

Members

of the base come to their own conclusions about what is to be
done in their community.

They formulate their own solutions,

even if those solutions do not involve radical, structural
change.
The life of CEB member and lay minister Patricio Alvarez
reflects the CEB's impact on the individual lives of it's
participators.

In 1972 Don Patricio became involved in a Cursillo

de Cristianidad 5 , which a Spanish priest had established in the
community.

In the cursillo Patricio learned to read and write to

be able to discuss the bible.

All of his education came through

church-sponsored programs (Levine and Mainwaring, 1989;224-225).
Patricio comments on this aspect of his life:
have done have been Christian ones.

"All the courses I

My formation for entering

society is owed entirely to the meetings in our hamlet" (quoted
in Levine and Mainwaring, 1989:225).
Don Patricio's participation in this cursillo and, later, in
the CEB has had~ great impact upon his life._
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Besides teaching

him to read and write,

base community participation expanded

Patricio's knowledge of religion.

This broadened image of

religion has caused it to become a fundamental part of his life.
Patricio says, "I learned that Catholicism isn't learning prayers
by rote, but rather that we have to incarnate prayers in
ourselves, and live in them our actions" (Levine and Mainwaring,
1989:225).

Patricio's statement indicates a view of religion

greatly shaped by the principles of liberation theology.
Although Don Patricio remains poor, he has become a
respected local leader.

His participation and leadership roles

in the CEB has prompted him to travel extensively to local and
regional meetings as well as national reunions of CEB leaders.
One of the few peasants in the diocese to become a lay leader,
Don Patricio played a key role in the establishment of the
cooperative store in the hamlet (Levine and Mainwaring,
1989:225).

Patricio takes his position as lay minister very

seriously.

To him it is a great responsibilty, one which carries

a great deal weight both in the community and within the Church
(Levine and Mainwaring, 1989:225-226).
In spite of leadership skills and raised consciousness that
Patricio has adquired in his work in the CEB, his goals and
visions of the world very much reflect the orientations of the
greater national Church.

For example, his personal goals are

centered on the church's pastoral work rather than on structural
social change.

He describes his fundamental goal as being, "To

prepare myself better for the apostolate.

I want nothing else.

I don't care about things connected with the cooperatives,
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communal action or any of that.

It isn't important.

I am going

to dedicate myself entirely to the apostolate" (Levine and
Mainwaring, 1989:226).

This statement seems to contradictory

when one takes into account that Don Patricio was instrumental in
establishing a cooperative in his own community and joined a
cooperative in the neighboring Quebradanegra to press for better
prices.

Such actions hardly seem to come from someone who cares

nothing about "things connected with the cooperatives."
The case of Patricio Alvarez is an indicator of some of the
individual transformations which CEB participation and
concientizaci6n spark in the Colombian context.

Consciousness-

raising involves more than individual transformations.

The

community as a whole changes as it forms a collective identity
(cognitive liberation).
Alberto Melucci (1989:35) affirms that the formation of a
collective identity involves at least three fundamental
dimensions:

••• first, formulating cognitive frameworks
concerning the goals, means and environment of
action; second, activating relationships among
the actors, who communicate, negotiate and
make decisions; and, third, making emotional
investments, which enable individuals to
recognize themselves in each other.

All these dimensions of collective identity creation are evident
in the structure of the CEB in both Brazil and Colombia.
of the community discuss bible readings and share their
experiences and problems.

Soon group members come to see
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Members

individual problems as communal ones and; consequently, the group
begins to search out collective solutions.
community.

The group becomes a

Members establish relationships with one another and

no longer see themselves as isolated individuals.

Self-help

programs like the system of voluntary labor in Don Patricio's
community are evidence of community formation.
The established communal relationships within the CEB break
down barriers of mutual suspicion common in the post-Violencia
rural regions where guerrilla groups still exist.

A woman from

such a region comments on how relationships within her hamlet
have changed since the establishment of a CEB .

••• People here lived in fear, fear of the
army, of the guerrillas. This fear hasn't
gone away, but it is better now. Now people
talk among themselves with more confidence •••
[Why?] It must be the meetings, the Church.
Because as for the rest, what is there? What
is there? We don't even have a schoolteacher.
The only thing that functions is this. This
the on1y way people can meet others apart from
those in their own ham1et (quoted in Levine,
1986:208, emphasis is mine).

Even if a CEB never participates in political acts geared towards
affecting broad social changes, the simple fact that the
organization brings people together to share experiences and meet
one another is an element of signficant social impact.

The

isolation of oppressed people from one another has historically
been a useful tool of those in positions of power 6 •
Community formation, shared discussions and concientizaci6n
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have motivated even members of the conservative Colombian CEBs to
move beyond clerically established limits and create independent
structures.

Daniel H. Levine (1986, 206) describes an incident

of CEB independent action in Colombia.

In one CEB a diocesan

team initiated the formation of a savings and loan cooperative to
provide credit to peasants in the region.

The cooperative "rests

above all on the base provided by CEB members" (Levine,
1986:206).

In spite of the clergical origins of the cooperative,

it soon expanded to include both members and non-members of the
local CEB to act as an independent organization.
As one might expect, especially in the context of the
Colombian Church, such CEB independence has prompted conflict
between members of the clergy and the laity.

Colombian Church

leaders see such actions as threatening to Church unity.

In this

case the parish priest complained that the cooperative was no
longer integrated into the parish.

A CEB member reactioned to

these complaints.

The priests say these are not intergrated
into the parish, but this is absurd. All our
leaders are the same leaders promoted by
education or pastoral who are now in the
cooperative. They are members, activists,
leaders ••• How can they say that they are not
linked to the parish? ••• They say this is not
integrated, but I believe that no matter how
tied a leader may be to the parish, this does
not mean he must depend on the parish for
everything ••• this is what they want, but it is
not possible. The cooperative needs
independence, pastoral and education, too,
because each has programs specific to it.
What we need is coordination, not control
(Levine, 1986:206).
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The same CEB member expresses desires to branch out beyond the
defined limits of the clergy:

"People want more.

for hard facts, works you can touch and see.

They now look

People don't

believe any more in the Eucharist all by itself.

I think Jesus

came not only to save souls, but also to fill bodies" (Levine,
1986i207).

Despite these incidences of CEB independence, the majority
of such groups exist under the tight control of the hierarchy and
laity and rarely participate in forms of collective, political
activism.

Theorists have posited structural reasons behind this

relative lack of politicalization of the CEBs in defiance of
clergy-imposed limitations.
most CEBs is one factor.

Of, course the extreme poverty of

Links to the Church and compliance with

clerical instructions means access to important resources as well
as moral authority and legitimation.

As we have seen, the

atmosphere of post-Violencia Colombia was far from conducive to
popular mobilization and collective action.
The existence of a relatively open system of government in
Colombia has also affected the political activities of CEBs and
other popular organizations.

Since 1958, a contained and

competitive electoral system has been the rule even when
guerrilla groups have challenged the status quo.

An open system

has meant that the Church was by no means the only safe sphere
for political activity as was the case in Brazil 7 (Levine and
Mainwaring, 1989:222).

The absence of a dictorship has meant the

corresponding absence of a single force to draw all opponents of
the government together.

Similarly, Colombia does not have a

history of state repression of popular movements or of peasants.
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During La Violencia and in the cases of guerrilla groups, the
state exerted violence according to political orientations-across class lines.

State repression, then did not become a

common repression of all peasants or of a particular class and,
thus, was not a mobilizing force for popular organization or CEB
politicalization (Levine, 1987:103).
Another important factor in the politicalization of
Colombian base communities is the traditional position of the
parish priest within society.

I have already shown how the

Colombian hierarchy has exhibited great care in maintaining close
ties with members of the clergy in order to insure priests'
loyalty to the established Church structures.

Gustavo Jimenez

Cadena•s (1966) sociological study concerning the role of the
parish priest within Colombian communities confirms that
conservative orientations among parish priests influenced social
action.

This is due in part to the traditionally influential

position the parish priest holds within the community.

In 1965

Jimenez Cadena (1966) surveyed a number of parish priests and
members of the laity in Central Colombia.

His findings reflect

the great deal of power and influence that both lay and clerical
members ascribe to the position of parish priest.

In Jimenez

Cadena•s (1966:216) surveys and interviews the great majority of
the laity indicated that the priest's participation in the
organization of community activities or programs was either
convenient or absolutely necessary for their success.

The local

people viewed the parish priest as the active factor in the
development of social programs, while they viewed their own role
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as a passive one.

In general, they considered the priest as the

director of all such projects, who ought to be in control of
every phase of their development.
The interviewed clerical members shared this paternalistic
definition of their position, maintaining that when the priest
acts as project director, "more progress is made this way, and
the peasant feels more confident" (Jimenez Cadena, 1966:163).
Another priest added:

"When the priest doesn't attend the

meetings, the peasants don't either" (Jimenez Cadena, 1966:163).
The great majority of priests interviewed by Jimenez Cadena
(1966:187) expressed a rejection of the idea of priests'
participation in political activism.

One priest expresses his

view of the priest's political role:

If a priest wants to perform his apostolic
work, he must not be involved in politics, not
even within his own party. I used to be
active in politics when I was younger. In
(name of a town) I came even to hand out
ballots, and I won the elections there in
favor of Mariano Ospira in 1945. I am not
like that anymore (Jimenez Cadena, 1966:187).

This repudiation of ecclesial, political involvement reflects the
greater trend throughout the Church in Colombia after the
Violencia.

The clergy's close ties to the hierarchy meant

that the local priests actions and positions reflected (for the
most part) the orientations of the bishops and cardinals
(especially in issues of social action).
Thus, the power and influence ascribed to the position of
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the priest meant the conservative positions he shared with the
hierarchy concerning social action had prominence in the
community.

Jimenez Cadena•s (1966) findings confirmed this.

Community development projects needed a priest to be successful.
Jimenez Cadena (1966:208-209) indicates in his study that the
programs of social action led by 80% of the interviewed priests
were characterized by authoritarian and paternalistic procedures,
a lack of concern for long-term solutions to local problems, and
an emphasis

on certain economic improvements of the peasant

class within the current socio-economic system, rather than an
emphasis on structural changes.

Like the Colombian hierarchy of

the late 1960 1 s, these priests had a certain sense of
satisfaction with the status quo.

The majority conceived of

existing structures and institutions as being the natural order
(Jimenez Cadena, 1966:210-211).
Thus, as in the case of Brazil we see that the very
structure of the Church greatly affects Catholic group's capacity
for collective, social action.

Whereas the liberal orientations

of the Brazilian bishops and priests of the Northeast allowed for
the rapid politicalization of CEBs and other Catholic groups; in
Colombia the conservative hierarchy's close ties to the clergy
and the latter's tight control over the actions and orientations
of the laity

acted in the opposite manner, impeding social

action to a great extent.

Once again, one sees the great

influence of the connections between the hierarchy and base and
their effect on the mobilization and actions of Catholic groups-in spite of the principles of liberation theology.
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Liberation Theology and the Colombian Clergy and Bishops

Despite the domination of an extremely influential and
conservative hierarchy, a number of radical Catholics groups
still managed to survive in Colombia.

The majority of these

groups formed on the coat-tails of the Medellin Conference or
shortly after Camilo Torres' death.

These groups operated

quietly, loosely linked and scattered in the interstices of the
Church structure.

Their existence and survival depended upon the

tolerance of the members of the hierarchy in their dioceses
(Levine, 1985:313).

Groups like Golconda, SAL (Sacerdotes Para

America Latina), Cristianos Por Liberaci6n, Cristianos Por
Socialismo, and the Jesuit research and social action center
CINEP directly challenged the orientations of the hierarchy by
proclaiming themes of liberation theology such as class unity,
the utility of a Marxist analysis of society, the need for new
structures of authority in both the Church and the society and
the importance of the role of political action in religious
organization and commitment (Levine, 1985:312-313).

Other groups

such as Los Camilistas, formed around the more radical positions
of Camilo Torres and pledged solidarity to the poor and
commitment to the revolutionary struggle to liberate the masses
(Oliva Lopez, 1970:155-156).

With the exception of Golconda, all

these groups were made up of members of the laity and clergy, and
many were linked with other popular groups such as local trade
unions.
As Daniel H. Levine (1985) points out, documentation of many
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of these radical groups is difficult due to the intense hostility
exerted towards them by both the Church and the State.

Radical

publications such as Solidaridad and Controversia .normally
published their articles anonymously to protect authors and to
avoid direct encounters with ecclesiastical or political
authorities (Levine, 1985:312).

Since the basis of this paper is

second-hand research, this lack of available, detailed
documentation is problematic.

Therefore, I have chosen to

outline one such group to show its ties to liberation theology
and its relation to the Colombian institutional Church.

Later, I

shall describe an incident of popular social action which
occurred in 1976.

Both this incident of a bank strike in which

hunger strikers sought asylum in a local catholic Church and
received support from various priests and Catholic organizations
and an account of the declarations of Golconda reveal much about
the nature of the Colombian hierarchy in relation to radical
Catholic groups and autonomous popular movements.
Golconda

In July of 1968 a group of fifty priests from various parts
of the country came together on a plantation known as Golconda in
the municipal of Viota.

Monsefior Gerardo Valencia headed the

group, which met to discuss the implications of Populorum
Progressio in the Colombian context after the death of Camilo
Torres {Golconda, 1969:27).

Inspired by the new currents within

the Church, emerging from the Medellin Conference, the
group met again in Buenaventura from December 9 to 13 of the same
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year.

The final document produced by this second meeting

reflected many of the conclusions of the Medellin Conference and
expressed themes which are in keeping with liberation theology.
Like the concluding document of the Medellin Conference, the
document from "Buenaventura" described the social situation of
Colombia as being one in which a small ruling class oppressed the
masses ("The Golconda Declaration," 1970:49).

In fact, the

document bases most of its claims on the conclusions of the
Medellin Conference.

In this way, the group attempted to gain

legitimacy before the conservative Colombian hierarchy.

In

a proclamation greatly reflecting principles of liberation
theology, the document declares that priests must make commitments
to the temporal sphere:

The act of faith is by no means merely
intellectual. It is, rather, a posture of
commitment to everything human--on the
individual, social, economic, political and
educational levels. Thus, as the Medellin
Conclusions affirm, our evangelizing efforts,
and the acts of faith that by God's grace
follow them, blend easily with human
aspirations and the yearnings of the human
heart (The Golconda Declaration, 1970:51).

Such a unification of the spiritual and temporal spheres
indicates the group's adherence to the principles of liberation
theology.

In keeping with these principles Golconda emphasized

the temporal world as an important component of religious faith:
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The realities of manual and industrial labor,
social life, economics and politics should all
be considered integral parts of God's design
for personal and social development. They
are, consequently, indispensable for the
answer of faith in God (quoted in Belalazar,
1969:82).

The concluding documents from the three meetings of
"Golconda" exhibited further principles of liberation
theology.

For example, the priests of Golconda, like the

liberationists, cited the social problems of Colombia and the
underdevelopment from which the country suffered as being "the
historical product of economic, political, cultural and social
dependency on foreign centers of power •.• " (quoted in Belalcazar,
1969:43).

The group pledged a commitment to the poor and

solidarity with those who "are struggling for change in the
socio-economic and political structures" {quoted in Concha and
Ifiguez, 1977:233).
Golconda's declarations echoed themes of "populismo"-typical of liberation theology.

The group called on the laity

for action, affirming that all revolutionary, societal changes
were to take place through the popular classes {Belalcazar,
1969:67).

Similarly, Golconda strongly rejected the traditional

political parties and their repression of the popular struggles
of peasants, students and workers (Concha and Ifiguez, 1977:233).
In its consideration of the Catholic Church Golconda
committed itself to the struggle for Church independence from the
State {Concha and Ifiguez, 1977:233).

It criticized the Church's

system and structures, affirming that the present system was
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opposed to the "spirit of poverty," which the Church should
possess.

Furthermore, the practice under this system of charging

fees for the administration of the sacraments and religious
services detracted from the grace bestowed during such procedures
(Concha and Ifiguez, 1977:235).

The group contended that "the

most suitable environment for an authentic liturgy is the base
community, in which the Christian encounters the personal
experience of the communion to which he has been called" (quoted
in Belalcazar, 1969:98).
In light of the unjust situation of their time, the Golconda
group, like all adherers to liberation theology, cited the
need for action, and not just theory and reflection (Belalcazar,
1969:99).

The group, however, differed from other liberationists

in that it had formed under the influence of Camilo Torres and as
a result of his death.

In this context Golconda's orientations

tended to be more revolutionary in nature than those of
liberationists, such as Juan Segundo, who proclaimed principles
of non-violence.

Father Rene Garcia, a member of Golconda

explained the relationship between the group and Camilo Torres
in this manner:

(Golconda) is not just a repetition of the
"hecho Camilo~" nor is it an isolated
occurrence with no relation to Camilo ••• For us
"Buenaventura" signifies our being fully
conscious of our duty as instruments and
servants of the people and of the revolution,
which we wish to incorporate ••• Camilo was
present in us when we made this public
commitment ••• Camilo is for us the new path,
honest attitude, total commitment and
efficiently liberating love ••• (quoted in
Weiss, 1970:151).
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Golconda strongly rejected the system of capitalism as a
"situation of sin" and affirmed the need to install a socialist
society "which permits the elimination of all forms of
exploitation of man by man" (quoted in Belalazar, 1969:69).

To

install this system, however, the priests of Golconda, following
the lead of the late Camilo Torres, advocated the incorporation
of a violent (if need be) revolution.

Although members such as

Padre Velez affirmed that "this revolution is equivalent to
change, not to violence," many of Golconda's actual declarations
contained violent overtones (Belalcazar, 1969:136).

For example,

in one statement from the concluding document of the Buenaventura
meeting Golconda declared:

Indubitably, this situation [the Colombian
socio-political situation] is impossible to
surpass without a true revolution which would
produce the displacement of the ruling class
of our country, through whom the dependence
upon the exterior is exerted (quoted in
Schoultz, 1971:105).

As one might expect, these revolutionary orientations and
violent overtones of the Golconda group greatly undercut its
legitimacy within even the most progressive sectors of the
Colombian Church (Vallier, 1970:125).

The group's use of a

Marxist analysis of society and their advocation of deep
structural changes and the incorporation of socialism prompted
harsh, public criticisms from the hierarchy, other Christians and
the State.

For example, in 1969 the periodical La Republica
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published several letters which repudiated Golconda and its
declarations.

Jose Restrepo Restrepo in a February 19 article

criticized the group's violent orientations stating, "We do not
want the doors to be opened to violence and Communism in
Colombia ••• " (quoted in Belalcazar, 1969:136).

He went on to

accuse the priests of proclaiming the "masses for the masses"
and, not the masses by Christ and for Christ.

Another critic in

the same publication remarked that Golconda's formation of a
revolutionary front could only lead to "blood, sweat and tears"
and commented that the Golconda declarations were so Marxist in
nature that they could have been edited in Moscow (Belalcazar,
1969:141).
Golconda's use of the Medellin Conference and of Vatican II
pronouncements to back up their statements, thereby providing
them with legitimacy in their revolutionary proclamations was
another source of sharp criticism from other Catholics.

One such

critic in an article in La Republica, commenting on the group's
attribution of their analysis of Colombian society to a Vatican
II pronouncement stated:

"You can't stretch the sheet of paper

that far without tearing it" (quoted in Belalcazar, 1969:141).
Members of the traditional political parties resented
Golconda's intervention in politics.

The group's pronouncements

were directly opposed to the hierarchy's post-Violencia rejection
of all ecclesiastical, political involvement.

Vicent Laverde

Aponte, a former party leader, contended in a January 17, 1969
letter in El Tiempo that the party "has opposed and does oppose
the invasion of the clergy in areas where by nature they are
strangers" {Belalcazar, 1969:142).
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The threatening orientations and proclamations of this
group caused episcopal authorities to work quickly to neutralize
Golconda.

In early 1969 the hierarchy expelled four of Spanish

members of the group from the country.

Members of the hierarchy

isolated Golconda sympathizers by moving them to remote parishes
or into bureaucratic positions.

By 1971 the group had ceased to

exist (Medhurst, 1984:195; Schoultz, 1971:105).

Radical catholic Groups and the Hierarchy

Sanctions by the hierarchy of radical Catholic groups
were not uncommon.

In response to these sanctions and to insure

the survival of their organizations, radical catholic groups
acted cautiously to avoid dissolution and expulsion from the
Church.

The Church institution was a great source of, power,

legitimacy and organization.

Members of groups like the CINEP

recognized this power and operated with the fear of becoming too
political.

A CINEP organizer commented on the strong, influential

position the hierarchy holds in Colombian society and the
potential for alienation which sanctions from the hierarchy
presented:

"The hierarchy has meaning to the people.

the hierarchy means losing contact with the people.

Attacking
Attacking

the hierarchy only sows suspicion toward us among -t he people"
(quoted in Levine, 1985:313).
Political involvement of Catholic groups posed a threat to
the hierarchy, and any political actions by such groups could
result in dangerous repression by the hierar~hy.
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For example, in

1981 the Colombian Church launched a campaign against the CINEP,

changing its leaders to more "reliable" members of the Church and
lobbying in Rome in an effort to curb the organization's actions.
This campaign began with an unprecedented public denunciation of
the CINEP which stated that the organization and its publications
Controversia and Solidaridad were "infused with ideologies and
goals in grave conflict with the doctrine and discipline of the
Church" (quoted in Levine, 1985:313-314).
An incident exhibiting the hierarchy's lack of tolerance
of any political actions of radical Catholic groups, regardless
of their non-violent nature, occurred in relation to the 1976
strike of the employees of the Banco Popular.

On February 25,

1976 the employees of this bank declared an indefinite strike

after failed direct negotiations and the presentation of a list
of complaints in the form of a petition.

During the first one

hundred days of the strike, approximately 1,000 workers were
arrested, 450 were fired and fifteen were condemned to three to
six months in jail.

On May 12 300 employees began a hunger

strike and, to escape police, sought refuge in eleven Catholic
Churches in different cities.

The Archbishop of Medellin and

the Bishop of Armenia offered asylum to the hunger strikers.
Various groups of priests joined in a show of their solidarity
with the strikers by dedicating to them a celebration of the
eucharist in the Church of San Francisco that served as the place
of asylum for hunger strikers.

Another group of priests

celebrated such a eucharist in a park known as Parque Santander
in solidarity with strikers. (Centro de Investigaci6n y Educaci6n
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Popular, 1976:6).
On May 25, a group of priests and religious met to create
"The Committee of Priests and Religious for the Defense of Human
Rights."

This committee gave a public statement in favor of the

bank employees and drew up a document in which they called on the
Senor Cardinal Anibal Munoz Duque to mediate the conflict before the
President of the Republic.

The group proceeded to the cardinal's

palace to personally deliver the communication.

Upon their

arrival, they were refused entrance to see the Cardinal and,
after presenting their petition with 97 signatures of priests and
religious to the Chancellor, left peacefully when the police
arrived to "impede the sabotage."
read:

The next day, press headlines

"Confrontation of Rebel Priests and Nuns with the

Cardinal" (Centro de Investigaci6n y Educaci6n Popular, 1976:78) •

Five days later, in response to the group's presentation of
the petition, the Cardinal issued a radical report in which he
reprimanded the priests for their show of solidarity with the
strikers.

The Cardinal harshly announced:

Since all these brothers are or wish to be
another supposed "Church," I believe that
their celebrations of the eucharist are not
valid; and for my part, as Bishop, I cannot in
good conscience afford jurisdiction or permit
them to celebrate the eucharist in the
archdiocese ••• (quoted in Centro de
Investigaci6n y Educaci6n Popular, 1976:9).

Days later, the Cardinal issued a communication, which officially
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canceled the ministerial licenses of all the priests who
celebrated mass in el Parque Santander and all members of SAL and
ORAL (Organizations of Religious for Latin America).

The

sanctioned clergy members and nuns could regain their licenses if
they showed signs of "sincere conversion" {Centro de
Investigaci6n y Educaci6n, 1976:~7).

It is important to note

that the organization SAL was not even involved with the
presentation at the Cardinal's palace or with the celebration of
the eucharist.
This case is especially useful for the purposes of this
study because it indicates the existence of various radical,
catholic groups of which little documentation is available.
Controversia published various letters of support and solidarity
with SAL and the other sanctioned priests from organizations with
clearly liberationists orientations.
like the

In these letters groups

Asociaci6n Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos and Grupos

de Cristianos Laicos por la Liberaci6n were sharply critical of
the hierarchy.
proclaimed:

The latter group in a biting statement

"To whom do we owe our loyalty:

to the cardinal or

to Jesus Christ, who came to liberate the poor?

We say to Jesus

Christ" (quoted in Centro de Investigaci6n y Educaci6n,
1976:131).

Another laity group directly criticized the Cardinal

for his actions:

The pronouncement of Cardinal Anibal Munoz
Duque against the priests, who would not permit
the violent eviction of the bank workers from
their parishes, and his condemnation of the
masses held for the workers, calling them
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subversive, clearly shows the perfect
identification of those of the high hierarchy
with the group that exploits and oppresses us
(quoted in Centro de Investigaci6n y
Educaci6n, 1976:125).

Grupos Cristianos Laicos por la Liberaci6n (Christian Laity
Groups for Liberation) clearly showed their identification with
liberation theology in their letter to SAL and the other
sanctioned individuals.

The letter spoke of two Churches in

Colombia--that of the rich and of most of the hierarchy, which uses
the gospels to conserve the structures of exploitation and
oppression and that of the poor and oppressed, which calls for a
"new society, a new type of politics and a new form of
distribution of wealth" (Centro de Investigaci6n y Educaci6n,
Popular 1976:129).

According to the letter, this popular Church

"predicates that Christ came to urge the exploited to construct
an egalitarian, just and free society" (Centro de Investigaci6n y
Educaci6n Popular, 1976:130).
These letters show that radical Catholic groups with blatant
identification with liberation theology did manage to survive in
Colombia despite harsh repression from both the Church and State
and strong criticism from the press.

The latter often referred

to the priests as Marxists and spoke of the incident of the
presentation of the petition at the Cardinal's palace as a
"siege" (Centro de Investigaci6n y Educaci6n Popular, 1976:11).
Thus, radical groups existed under the constant threat of
repression or dissolution by State or Ecclesiastical Authorities.
Unlike in Brazil, where supportive members of the hierarchy aided
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radical clergy and laity groups, defending them before a
repressive State; members of the Colombian hierarchy (with a few
exceptions) impeded popular groups' collective actions and
reprimanded clergy for any forms of political involvement.
Conclusions

The Colombian picture of the social impact of liberation
theology differs greatly from that of Brazil.

Colombia's long

history of Church-State relations shows little or no conflict
between the two.

Catholic orientations in the government and the

great influence the Church hierarchy exerts in state affairs
confirms this strong relationship.

The Church's history of

extreme conservatism is due partly to these harmonious relations.
We have seen how La Violencia led the Colombian hierarchy to
change its former close connection with party politics and adopt
a rejectionist

approach to all forms of political involvement.

Fear of violence and the loss of Church unity prompted the
hierarchy to exert tight control over the training and
orientations of clerical members.

In the same manner, candidates

for bishops were carefully screened to insure their loyalty to
the Church structure.
In general, the Colombian Church seemed to be satisfied with
the status quo.

A relatively open system of democracy and lack

of long-term military regimes or large-scale State repression of
Church officials contributed to this attitude.

The existence of

a somewhat open electoral system meant that the Church did not
become a haven for forbidden popular expression (as it did in
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Brazil).

Thus, autonomous, popular movements occurring outside

of the established political system were the object of suspicion
on the part of both the Church and State.

Ecclesiastical

authorities perceived political actions of Church groups as a
threat to Church unity and to the very structures of the
institution.

They worked to tightly control any such groups and

to quell their politicalization.

Members of the hierarchy did

not hesititate to isolate or remove any pastoral agents who
exhibited radical tendencies.
As the hierarchy closely supervised the clergy, so did the
clergy exercise tight control over any laity groups.

Unlike in

Brazil, where the clergy encouraged laity autonomy (even before
the Medellin Conference), most Colombian pastoral agents directed
any laity organizations in paternalistic manners, creating the
agenda of their meetings and planning any activities or projects.
The tradition of the position of the priest's great power and
influence within Colombian communities facilitated his
adoption of a

paternalistic role.

Despite these many impediments to the incorporation of
liberation theology in Colombian society, we can still note
various influences of this ideology and forms of social change
which it spawned.

Social change resulting from the influences of

liberation theology are most notable on two levels--on the level
of pastoral agents and a few bishops and on the level of the
base, itself.
The work of Daniel H. Levine describes the existence and
everyday activities of CEBs in Colombia.
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These base communities

formed after the Medellin Conference, as new, liberationists
currents spread throughout the Latin American Churches.
Membersof the hierarchy and "loyal" pastoral agents tended to
exert tight control over all such communities' activities,
emphasizing "the ecclesiastical" part of the CEBs by limiting the
group's actions to bible studies and liturgy-oriented activities.
Bishops perceived these communities as seed-beds for the
formation of new pastoral agents.

In most cases local priests

and nuns in constant connection with the bishops and higher-ups
in the diocese directed and led CEB meetings and activities.
They discouraged laity autonomy and any "political activities."
Church unity and connection with the hierarchy were a constant
concern of these agents.

Most projects undertaken by the CEBs

involved self-help and mutual aid programs to better the
conditions within the community.

Activities rarely had as an end

broad, political or structural changes.
Despite this system of close supervision of all CEB
activities by the hierarchy and tight, controlled

direction on

the part of local pastoral agents, CEBs did have a great impact
on the individual lives of its laity members and, indeed, of the
community as a whole.
apolitical

Even within the most controlled,

CEB's, individual laity members developed new

leadership skills and voiced for the first time personal
concerns.

In rural areas the formation of a community where

people came together to discuss their lives and to help one
another was significant in that it broke barriers of isolation
and formed collective identity.

Depending on the individual

orientations of the local pastoral agents and the tolerance of
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the diocese's bishops, laity activities could retain some degree
of autonomy.

Some programs, such as cooperatives, began as CEB

and clergy-run projects and, eventually became solely, communitydirected organizations.
Regardless of the level of collective action of the CEBs or
the conservative nature of Church agents, the CEB inherently
contained elements significant to social change in the lives of
the individual members.

As we saw in the Brazilian case,

education played an important part of CEBs.

Many illiterate

members learned to read and write through CEB programs.

The

implications of this phenomenon alone are extremely significant
to social change.

Consciousness-raising also occurred even in

the conservative, Colombian CEBs.

Concientizaci6n may not have

had the same political results as it did in Brazil, but, members
did come to see their poverty in a new light.

They came to see

that they could change conditions (at least local ones) in their
lives.

CEB bible studies caused them to identify with Jesus as

another poor, oppressed person.

Members of the CEBs turned from

fatalistic attitudes concerning their poverty and began to see it
as a changeable phenomenon--not a punishment inflicted by God.
The other great impact liberation theology exhibited in
Colombian society is apparent in the various radical laity and a
clerical groups, resulting from the Medellin Conference and the
death of Camilo Torres.

These groups maintained orientations in

keeping with the more radical currents of liberation theology.
Some of the groups adhered to the revolutionary principles
established by Camilo Torres.

These groups contrasted with the
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politically oriented ecclesial groups in Brazil in that they
were, generally not popular organizations.

In most cases, they

were composed of solely clergy members (and even some bishops!)
with little or no direct connections with popular groups.

The

radical orientations of these groups of "curas rebeldes" (rebel
priests) meant they were in constant danger of repression from
both the Church and State.

Groups like the CINEP operated

quietly in dioceses of relatively tolerant bishops.

Due to the

central place the Church hierarchy occupied in Colombian society,
Catholic groups could not risk expulsion from the institutional
church.

Such an alienation would cause them to lose legitimacy

among the people and would disconnect them from a powerful system
of resources.

And yet, as we saw in the incident of the strike

of the Banco Popular employees, these groups did participate in•
some political acts and showed their solidarity with other popular
groups struggling for change.
In the Colombian case one would be hard pressed to show
evidence of long-term political change influenced by liberation
theology.

"Populismo," as in the case of Brazil, has never

existed to any great extent in Colombia,

nor have Church

structures or orientations changed to any great degree after the
emergence of liberation theology.

With the papacy of Pope John

Paul II vertical authority relations within the Colombian Church
are stressed more than ever.

A "Popular Church" has not managed

to form in the same prominent manner as in Brazil.

Colombian

bishops, generally, quickly condemn any efforts to form such a
Church. The radical, Catholic groups, which do still exist, have
not been capable of mobilizing any significa~t movement.
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The

groups remain relatively isolated with little influence in
society (Levine, 1985:315).
Strangely, here we see a parallelism between the Brazilian
and Colombian cases.

In both instances we find the principle

source of lasting social change occurs on the individual, microlevel within the lives of CEB members.·

Stories like those of

Patricio Alvarez and Azuleika Sampaio confirm the great impact
CEB membership exhibits in the lives of the individuals involved
(Levine and Mainwaring, 1989).

One should not undervalue this

grass-roots level of social change.

In the words of Black

feminist Patricia Hill Collins {1991:221):

" ••• both the changed

consciousness of individuals and the social transformation of
political and economic institutions constitute essential
ingredients for social change."

In the next section of

conclusions I shall further investigate the implications of this
individual change of consciousness as a component of social
change.
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Rotes

1 Timothy Wickham-Crowley {1989:151-152) disagrees with this

statement. He contends that La Violencia was closely related to
the displacement of peasants, which accompanied the expansion of
coffee production across Colombia. This would imply that the
violence did, indeed, have class-related origins.
2 I regret my exclusive reliance on the work of Daniel
H. Levine in the documentation and description of CEB
organization and day-to-day activities in Colombia. The limited
quantity of available research focusing on this topic is,
however, significant in that it is an indication of the tight
control the Church hierarchy maintained over such groups.
Furthermore any highly politicalized CEB would probably fear the
publicity research would bring as it could very well lead to
sanctions from the institutional Church.
3This danger did, in fact, become a reality. In 1982 the bishops
replaced the foreign priests with a series of local, more "loyal"
clergy (Levine, 1986:210).
4 see Emanuel de Kadt's article "Paternalism and Populism:
Catholicism in Latin America." Journal of Contemporary History
2(4), 1967:89-106 for a further discussion of the priest's role
in Colombian communities.
5These cursillos were usually week or weekend-long retreats,
which included biblical instruction and pastoral guidance.
Priests, generally, directed their activities and led discussions.
6see Chaney, Elsa M. and Mary Garcia Castro. Muchachas No More.
Philadelphia, PA: Temple UP, 1989: especially Adelinda Diaz
Uriarte's "The Autobiography of a Fighter" Pp. 389-406 in the
same for accounts of how Latin American domestic employers
attempted to isolate their employees from other domestic workers
to prevent their organization.
7An exception to this statement could be the Church formed unions
such as the UTC. See Medhurst (1984) for a complete discussion
of labor organization in Colombia. An opportunity for research
would be to investigate if liberation theology had any effect
upon the organization, activities or orientations of the UTC.
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Section IV:
Conclusions

An

analysis of the two cases presented above would not be

complete without the presentation of some sociological
observations concerning the factors determining the degree of
social impact liberation theology exerts in a society.

I

have already attributed this phenomenon to the historical,
political, and social contexts of each country.

Here, I

shall explore these differences and give theoretical reasons
as to their effect on upon the societies of Brazil and
Colombia.
Although these differences are significant to this
analysis, the cases of Brazil and Colombia have indicated
certain, general characteristics of liberation theology's
effect on social change.

I shall, also, then, outline these

continuities in the social impact of liberation theology and
offer some sociological explanations as to their existence.
An

anonymous commentator in Daniel Levine's (1987:103-

104) article "From Church and State to Religion and Politics
and Back Again" states:

"Liberation theology is like a tree.

If you plant it in the right place,

it is good for the

place, it is good for the place and good for the tree."

An

important deciding factor in determining if this "tree" will
flourish has to do with the context of the particular church
of the country in question--the orientations of the Church
authorities and prevailing religious currents.

In Brazil the

Church entered a crisis with the emergence of the democratic
governments of 1945-1964.

Faced with new uncertainty in its

relations with the State, the Church changed its emphasis on
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hierarchical authority.

Nevertheless, it lost a great deal

of influence in state affairs.
The emergence of various popular movements at this time
caused an atmosphere of questioning in the Brazilian Church,
prompting many clergy members to adopt new programs of
pastoral action.

These innovations were facilitated by the

approval of a progressive hierarchy.

Brazil's Church's

linkages with the progressive sectors of the Vatican coupled
with the appointment of progressive Papal Nuncio Dom Armando
Lombardi, who, in turn, nominated liberal priests as bishops,
made for an institution open to the implementation of liberal
ideas.

Traditions of laity autonomy dating back to the

1930's meant that both the laity and the clergy were
accustomed to independent, non-clerical, religious
activities.
Meanwhile, the military takeover of 1964 and the
regime's violent repression of the popular classes and Church
officials stimulated the politicalization of the clergy and
hierarchy.

The repression of any popular attempts at

mobilization meant the Church became the only available
sphere for the people to express demands for change.

The

Church as an institution still carried enough influence in
the world and society to protect the individuals acting in
the name of social reform.

As

a powerful institution, the

Church also possessed important resources which Catholicoriented social movements could utilize.

Such resources as

Church buildings, mimeograph machines, money,
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communication

networks or

and authoritative and spiritual legitimacy were

significant to popular movements, which often emerged out of
CEB organizations.
Zald and McCarthy (1987:71) give examples of other
social movements which utilized-the existing infrastructures
of established religious groups in the development
formation of social movement organizations.

and

CORE and NAACP

chapters grew out of local congregations just as the Cost of
Living Movement and the Construction Worker's Movement grew
out of CEBs and the Pastoral Workers Commission.

Zald and

McCarthy . (1987:71) note the same phenomenon of SMOs with
separate, independent structures but strong linkages with
religious groups in the Right-to-Life SMOs which have grown
out of local U.S. Catholic parishes.
Doug MacAdam (1982:46) in his political process
model for social movements notes the importance of
organizational strength of an aggrieved population in that it
creates a communication network whose size and efficiency can
determine the speed and expansion of the social movement.

In

the case of the Brazilian Church, popular movements like the
Cost of Living movement relied heavily on the networks of
CEBs in various parishes across the country in the
mobilization of support.

It is important to remember that

these networks were based on the infrastructures of the
institutional Church.
The relationship between the institutional Church and
CEBs and the popular movements of post- 1964 Brazil is
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comparable in many ways to the black Church's role in the
Civil Rights movement.

Aldon D. Morris (1984:4) speaks of

the resources this church provided the movement.

Churches provided the movement with an
organized ·mass base; a leadership of
clergymen ••• skilled in the art of
managing people and resources; an
institutionalized financial base through
which protest was financed; and meeting
places where the masses planned tactics
and strategies and collectively
committed themselves to the struggle.

Zald and McCarthy (1987:72-73) cite other examples of the
"direct provision of personnel and material resources to
social movements by church groups." They cite the Right-toLife-Movement and the Nuclear Freeze movement as examples.
Participation of pastoral agents in the meetings and
formation of social movement organizations was an extremely
important component of the mobilization and organization of
many Brazilian popular movements. Not only did priests
provide the movement with legitimacy and a connection to the
larger institutional Church, but they possessed
organizational and leadership skills which greatly aided the
movements. Some movements {such as the Public Transportation
Movement) dissolved when pastoral .agents stopped active
participation in movement meetings.
Connections to the institutional Church and the resources
it possessed were not, however, the only mobilizational and
organizational strengths the CEBs offered popular movements.
CEBs and liberation theology were fundamental in the
formation of popular, collective identity. Through
concientizacion people in CEBs came to see themselves as both
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members of a community and members of an oppressed group.
Liberation theology became a useful ideology which
legitimated the members' right to act politically and
collectively for change.
Doug MacAdam (1982:44) speaks of one of the strengths of
indigenous organizations as providing an arena for
interaction among individuals in the aggrieved population.
This interaction prompts the formation of "cognitive
liberation," another essential component for a social
movement's formation. Potential social movement members come
to "collectively define their situations as unjust and
subject to change ••• " (MacAdam, 1982:52). Concientizacion
functioned in this manner in the CEBs. As the members of the
community prayed, shared their experiences and read the bible
in the context of the teachings of liberation theology, they
came to perceive themselves as members of an oppressed group
with the power to change the sinful, unjust conditions of
their lives. Morris (1984:4) speaks of a similar phenomenon
taking place within the Black Church during the Civil Rights
Movement:

The Black Church supplied the Civil
Rights Movement with a collective
enthusiasm generated through a rich
culture consisting of songs, testimonies,
oratory and prayers that spoke directly
to the needs of an oppressed group.

Zald and McCarthy (1987:81) speak of a similar "collective
enthusiasm" generated in Church organizations. They refer to
this organizational resource as "solidarity incentives." Such
incentives include the "social and communal sense of
association with like-minded people" (Zald and McCarthy,
1987:81). In the case of Brazil this "enthusiasm" or
"solidarity incentive" was part of the CEB organization.
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Since most participants in the popular movements in Brazil were
also CEB members, these resources carried over to the
movements.
MacAdam (1982:46) cites the emergence of leaders as
another asset which grass-roots organizations provide a social
movement. Literacy programs and discussion groups in the CEBs
helped formerly passive and fatalistic members speak out and
share their experiences and grievances. CEB participation
sharpened leadership skills by encouraging members to lead
discussion and study groups. Aldon Morris (1984:279),
similarly, links charisma in leaders with the institutional
organizations present in the social movement.
Finally, the CEBs provided the movements with an ideology
in the form of liberation theology. Liberation theology was
not only an important component of the consciousness-raising
process, but also played a role as a religious and even
political ideology for the popular movements. The teachings of
liberation theology proclaimed the people's right, and even
obligation to rid the world of the sin which their oppression
represented. CEB members felt that political activism was
doing "God's work." This was an extremely powerful form of
motivation for the laity participants. Aldon D. Morris
(1984:96) offers some interesting observations of how the
refocusing of an institution (in our case the adoption of
liberation theology by the local parishes, although Morris is
referring to the Black Church during the Civil Rights Movement)
can transform members' attitudes and perceptions of reality.

The point is that people's attitudes are
heavily shaped by the institutions with
which they are closely affiliated. This
is especially true of such institutions
as schools and churches, whose primary
purpose is to interpret ·social r~ality
and make moral pronouncements regarding
155

the "right" relationship for people with
the world around them. These
institutions provide the cultural content
that molds and shapes individual
attitudes. Therefore, fairly rapid
transformation of those attitudes may be
accomplished by refocusing the cultural
content of the institutions engaged in
defining reality.

Thus, the refocusing of the parishes to include principles of
liberation theology was significant to the transformation of
the parishioners' perceptions of reality.
Colombia represents, in many ways, the opposite end of the
spectrum, when one considers liberation theology's impact upon
society.

If in Brazil the "tree" of liberation theology found

fertile soil in which to take root, in Colombia it encountered
a hard, almost impermeable, ground and struggled in its slow
growth.

Whereas in Brazil the Church was linked to progressive

sectors of the Vatican, and a progressive Papal Nuncio
appointed liberal priests as bishops; the Colombian Church has
traditionally represented one of the most conservative Churches
in the world.

In order to insure the perpetuation of Church

unity, the hierarchy was careful to appoint only "loyal"
candidates as bishops.

Similarly, seminaries carefully

instructed soon-to-be priests in the doctrines of the Church
and emphasized the priest's role as being directive of a
passive laity.

The priest was to be "over and above" the laity

in any Church function.

This contrasts greatly with Brazil's

pre-Vatican II traditions of laity autonomy.
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Since it is the

clergy who establishes CEBs, the conservatism of the Colombian
priests carried important implications in the formation of CEBs
there.
In Colombia harmonious relations between Church and State
were the rule.

Unlike the Brazilian Church, which lost much

influence with the State with the emergence of the democratic
governments of 1945-1964, the Colombian Church has,
traditionally, held a powerful position of influence in
relation to the government.

The Church controlled such areas

as education and marriage.

Unofficially, the approval of the

Cardinal was necessary for a bill to become a law.

Although

this phenomenon has changed in some ways since the 1970's (for
example, civil marriages are now permitted in Colombia), it
still exists to some degree in Church-State affairs.
It is interesting to note the different effect that
violence had in Colombia as opposed to Brazil.

In Brazil State

violence against the popular classes helped to mobilize even
the most conservative members of the hierarchy in criticizing
the State.

Repression of the popular classes and of Church

officials caused pastoral agents and members of the hierarchy
alike to encourage the people to mobilize in demand of social
change.

Popular movements with Catholic affiliations emerged

in response to State repression.
prominent social

"Popularism" became a

and political phenomenon.

In Colombia violence had just the opposite effect.
Instead of politicalizing the orientations of Church
authorities, it prompted a rejection of any "political"
157

involvement on the part of the Church.

This, of course, was in

special reference to partisan involvement, since La Violencia
was a result of partisan conflicts.

La Violencia, rather than

stimulating popular mobilization, caused Church and State
officials to be highly suspicious of any independent, grassroots mobilization.

Any such attempts were immediately

repressed.
Colombian CEBs, then, did not become seed-beds for popular
movements.

Tightly controlled by the hierarchy and directive

clergy, they remained rather apolitical, focusing any programs
of social reform on local problems of the community.

Bishops

were, in most cases, quick to isolate or remove any pastoral
agents who seemed

threaten Church unity by displaying

progressive orientations.
Another curious difference between the two countries is
the effect liberation theology had on pastoral agents.

While

in Brazil priests and nuns urged laity autonomy and encouraged
CEB members to act politically, in Colombia most pastoral
agents rejected ideas of CEB political action (outside of
community-improvement projects) , stressing, instead, loyalty
to the Church and Church unity.

Although some CEBs did go

beyond clergy-defined limits and maintained such independent
projects as cooperatives outside the sphere of the Church, the
majority of them limited themselves to clergy-directed social
improvement and pastoral projects.

The priests' rejection of

political activism stemmed directly from the orientations of
the conservative post-Violencia bishops.
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This is not to say that all priests behaved in this
conservative and paternalistic manner.

Upon the emergence of

liberation theology, after the death of Camilo Torres, several
radical groups of priests formed.

Such groups as Golconda, the

CINEP and los Camilistas made declarations which incorporated
many of the themes of liberation theology.

To legitimize their

positions, the groups cited the concluding documents of the
Medellin Conference and Vatican II.

Their criticisms of the

~ierarchy and use of socialist and Marxist terminology,
however, caused them to appear as a threat to existing Church
structures and unity.

Many of the priest members received

harsh sanctions from bishops or were expelled from the country.
Despite sharp repression from both the State and Catholic
hierarchy, these groups of radical clergy (and sometimes laity)
survived, existing in dioceses of relatively tolerant bishops,
being careful not to become "too political" in their actions.
The remarkable thing about these groups of radical priests
is that although they utilized principles of liberation
theology in their declarations, their very existence and
organization is in some ways contradicts the theology.
Liberation theology calls for the mobilization of the popular
classes to change the "situations of sin" that oppress them to
bring about the Kingdom of God.

"El pueblo de Dios" should

work to liberate themselves from sin and, in so doing,
liberate their oppressors from the oppression of their own sin.
Base communities, the principle organization of liberation
theology,

are communities of the "base."
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Although clergy

plays an important role in the establishment of such
communities, the work of liberation is meant (according to the
prominent liberationists) to be done by the laity, themselves.
The very fact that groups such as SAL# ORAL and Golconda
were made up of only clergy seems to contradict this principle
of "populismo."

Although some groups, like the CINEP,

worked

in conjunction with CEBs and laity groups, the organizations,
themselves, had only pastoral agents as members.

Groups like

Golconda declared themselves in solidarity with those who
struggle for change, but did not seem to work directly with
popular organizations or movements to bring about social
change.

For example, they did not follow the example of their

Brazilian counterparts in helping to mobilize popular
organizations or the example of Camilo Torres, who joined a
revolutionary group in an effort to displace systems of
domination.
Of course, the Colombian ecclesiastical and political
context is largely

responsible for this phenomenon.

Church

and State intolerance for popular mobilization meant that any
such coalitions would probably be quickly destroyed.

This

intolerance has been even more pronounced since the papacy of
Pope John Paul II and

the appointment of Lopez Trujillo as

Secretary General of CELAM.
Despite the great disparities evident in the cases of
Brazil and Colombia, one still can note certain similarities
concerning the social impact of liberation theology.

For

example in both cases, we saw evidence of the great impact of
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concientizacion on the individual lives of CEB participants.
Even within the strict constraints of the Colombian CEBs, the
processes of community-building, self-help, and collective
identity-formation represented significant transformations in
the lives and consciousness of

base community members.

CEB

members came to redefine their life situations and claim a
collective identity as "el pueblo de Dios."
Although such processes may appear to be significant
on the micro-social level,

only

as Patricia Hill Collins (1990:222)

notes, they have powerful implications in relation to a broader
sociological analysis:

"Offering subordinate groups new

knowledge about their experiences can be empowering.

But

revealing new ways of knowing that allow subordinated groups to
define their 2!fil. reality has far greater implications."

Hill

Collins (1990:111) contends that social change manifests itself
in collective and individual actions, but also occurs in the
private space of one's individual consciousness.

She speaks of

"consciousness as a sphere of freedom" and describes this
change of consciousness as an important source of empowerment
(

for oppressed groups (she refers, specifically to black women
in the U.S.).

Hill Collins agrees with Toni Cade Bambara that

"revolution begins with the self in the self" (quoted in Hill
Collins, 1990:229).
The CEB organization allowed individuals to claim their
own identity and defy cultural and social definitions of
dominations with those in power had imposed upon them.

bell

hooks (1989), another black feminist, points out that this
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identity claiming is an important step in the defiance of
systems of domination.

For many exploited and oppressed peoples
the struggle to create an identity, to
name one's reality is an act of
resistance because the process of
domination--whether it be imperialist,
colonization, racism or sexist
oppression--has stripped us of our
identity, devalued language, culture
appearance (hooks, 1989:109).

Thus, despite constraints of the political and ecclesiastical
environment of the base communities,

the processes of

identity-claiming and consciousness-transforming

within them

represented important points of social impact and important
components of social change.
Another important factor in determining the degree of
social impact of liberation theology,which becomes evident in
the cases of both Brazil and Colombia, relates to its
connection with the institutional Catholic Church.

The

hierarchical structuring of the Church and the unconditional
authority of the Pope over the bishops and cardinals and the
bishops and cardinals over the clergy (in the case of Colombia
we could go on to say the clergy over the laity) means that
the individual orientations, personalities and inclinations of
each Church official has the potential of having a great deal
of impact within the particular realm of jurisdiction of that
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authority.

This means that huge transformations in the

Church's orientations can occur without warning (Vatican II),
according to the orientations of the Pope.
In both Colombia and Brazil the individual orientations of
the hierarchy

as well as collective currents in the Church

had a direct effect
spread.

upon liberation theology's ability to

The socially-oriented papacies of John XXIII and Paul

VI were largely responsible for liberation theology's survival
and development.

Vatican II and the Medellin Conferences were

manifestations of these orientations.
Colombia CEBs began to form in the aftermath of the Medellin
Conference due to the conference's emphasis on social concerns
and laity groups.

Similarly, in Brazil CEBs spread and became

more active after the conference.

Golconda was also able to

form on the coat-tails of Medellin.
The individual orientations of the bishops of
northeastern Brazil were largely responsible for that area of
the Church's rapid politicalization.

Similarly, in Colombia

we saw how the CEBs level of independence and politicalization
directly depended upon the tolerances of individual bishops in
a particular diocese.

Radical Catholic clergy and laity

groups could only exist in dioceses of particularly tolerant
bishops.
The Neo-conservative movement in the Catholic
hierarchy and papacy of John Paul II and appointment of Lopez
Trujillo have resulted in a conservatizing of many Catholic
groups.

In Brazil liberationists such as Leonardo Boff have
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been silenced and in Colombia radical groups have been heavily
sanctioned.

This indicates that changes in the positions of

power in the Church can have a rapidly conservatizing effect
as well as a radicalizing one.
Thus, it seems that my analysis has shown that
political and ecclesiastical environments have greatly shaped
liberation theology's level of social impact and effect on
social change.

On the other hand, given certain conditions

the theology represents a powerful resource to social
movements as well as
oppressed groups.

an important source of empowerment for

The CEB organization proves to be an

especially significant source of these resources and powers.
All in all, Levine's commentator has hit upon a useful
metaphor.

Like a tree, liberation theology needs certain

elements to thrive and flourish.

On the base level, however,

it does seem to be able to take root

even when conditions on

the outside are not ideal for its growth.
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APPENDIX

Timetable of Various Religious and Political Events
1958-1985

Latin American
Political Events

Catholic
Religious Events

1958

Pope John XXIII elected
1959

Revolution in Cuba

1960

Mater et Mag istra
pubished
Vatican II opens

1961
1962
1963

Pacem in Terris
Pope Paul VI elected

Military coup, Brazil

1964

Vatican II closes

1965
1966

Camilo Torres killed

1967

Populorum Prog ressio

1968

Medellin Conference
Pope to Colombia
"Buenaventura"

1969

Theology of Liberation
published

1970
1971

Lopez Trujillo elected
Sec. General CELAM

1972
1973
1977

1980

Pope John Paul I
elected
Pope John Paul II
elected
Puebla Conference
Pope to Mexico
Pope to Brazil

1983

Pope to Central Am.

1978
1979

1985

Pope to Colombia
Leonard Boff silenced

Civilian Rule, Brazil
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